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INTRODUCTION
Consumer debtors seeking relief from a federal bankruptcy
court now number well in excess of one million per annum, and
another two million individuals are employed by businesses filing
for the bankruptcy protection of a federal court.' Bankruptcy,
therefore, is a substantial and significant component of the
charge of the federal courts. Yet, the jurisdiction in bankruptcy
remains one of the most enduring puzzles of our federal court
system.2 Congress, of course, has plenary legislative power "on
the subject of Bankruptcies."' For the most part, however,
creditors' and debtors' rights and obligations in bankruptcy are
governed by state law, not federal law.4 For example, a creditor
may assert a right to payment from a debtor founded upon a
disputed state-law cause of action. Likewise, among the debtor's
assets, to which the creditors lay claim, may be similar state-law
1. See THE BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK & ALMANAC 8-10 (Christopher M. McHugh ed.,
9th ed. 1999); Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, The Business Bankruptcy Pro-
ject: The Work in Progress, 1998 NATL CoNF. BANKR. JUDGES 2-3, at 2-22 to 2-24; 33
Bankr. Ct. Dec. Wkly. News & Comment (LRP) No. 23, at A10 to All (Mar. 16,
1999).
2. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 441-44, 901-03 (4th ed. 1996).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 4.
4. See, e.g., John D. Ayer, Through Chapter 11 with Gun or Camera, but Probably
Not Both: A Field Guide, 72 WASH U. L.Q. 883, 886 (1994) ("It is axiomatic that
bankruptcy respects rights established under state law."); Vern Countryman, The Use
of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (pts. 1 & 2), 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 407, 631 (1972).
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causes of the debtor against others. Bankruptcy brings all such
state-law disputes into federal court, but without any diversity-of-
citizenship requisite, and thus, the constitutional source of this
federal "judicial Power"5 is not at all self-evident. The Supreme
Court consistently has confirmed the propriety of the federal
jurisdiction in bankruptcy, but has been cryptic, parsimonious,
and inconsistent in its explanations of this judicial province.6
The Supreme Court's abstruseness is, of course, fuel for the
scholarly engine, and bankruptcy has become the seemingly in-
scrutable crucible of federal jurisdiction theory. In fact, because it
is not easily explained by traditional theory, most scholars rely
upon bankruptcy to buttress novel and unconventional depar-
tures that would accommodate the apparent anomaly of federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction.' These efforts, however, have not grap-
pled with the parallel and equally bedeviling problem of charting
5. U.S. CoNsT. art. m, § 2, cl. 1.
6. Professor Wright, in responding to inquiries from the House Judiciary Commit-
tee, frustratingly stated that "I do not know how many angels can stand on the head
of a pin until the Supreme Court tells me." By way of explanation for this exaspera-
tion, he made the following observations regarding the constitutional source of federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction:
Although we know from Williams v. Austrian -and Schumacher v. Beeler
that "constitutional courts" can hear plenary actions in a bankruptcy
case, we do not know why this is so. As astute a student of federal ju-
risdiction as Felix Frankfurter tried to explain this in his opinion in the
National Mutual case. He spoke to the matter again in Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills. Yet the explanations he offers in those two opin-
ions do not seem to me to be wholly consistent.
Letter from Charles Alan Wright to Chairman Rodino (June 4, 1976) (citations omit-
ted), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE
COMI. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., CONSTITUTIONAL BANKRUPTCY COURTS app.
H, at 73 (Comm. Print No. 3 1977) [hereinafter CONST. BANKR. CTS.]. All of the
cases noted in Professor Wright's letter are discussed infra Part II, notes 212-395
and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., John T. Cross, Congressional Power to Extend Federal Jurisdiction to
Disputes Outside Article III: A Critical Analysis from the Perspective of Bankruptcy, 87
Nw. U. L. REV. 1188 (1993); Thomas Galligan, Jr., Article III and the "Related to"
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A Case Study in Protective Jurisdiction, 11 U. PUGET SOUND
L. REV. 1 (1987); Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 542, 551-54 & n.67, 573-74, 579-82 (1983); Richard A.
Matasar, Rediscovering 'One Constitutional Case": Procedural Rules and the Rejection
of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1399, 1470-74 (1983);
Scott A. Rosenberg, Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV.
933, 974-83, app. at 1026-30 (1982).
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the outermost bounds of the statutory grant of federal bankrupt-
cy jurisdiction, which contemplates a federal forum for any pro-
ceeding "related to" a bankruptcy case.8 This provision for perva-
sive federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is the most extensive in our
history, and indeed, was designed to be as broad as the Constitu-
tion permits.' The extant jurisdictional structure, therefore, pro-
vides a contextual framework that proves critical for testing con-
stitutional theories of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.
In the absence of clear constitutional guidance, jurisprudential
demarcation of the content of the statutory grant, not surpris-
ingly, has been chaotic. In fact, the case law has developed in a
vacuum-like separation from constitutional principles that would
define the reach of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.0 This discon-
nect is aggravated by the literal breadth of the statute itself,
which on its face extends to any dispute, even one wholly be-
tween third parties and not directly involving the debtor nor the
debtor's bankruptcy estate, but that nonetheless is in some man-
ner "related to" the debtor's bankruptcy case. The dominant test
for "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction in such a third-party dis-
pute, the so-called Pacor test," merely asks "whether the outcome
of that [third-party] proceeding could conceivably have any effect
on the estate being administered in bankruptcy."'
When one ponders such an approach to third-party "related to"
bankruptcy jurisdiction for an operating business attempting
reorganization in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, the pros-
pect of potentially limitless federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is not
beyond the pale. As one court noted when asked to pass on the
validity of IRS liens on the property of certain third parties, be-
cause the Chapter 11 debtor anticipated using that property to
help finance its reorganization:
The desires of every Chapter 11 debtor are affected by a myr-
iad of external indirect effects created by the circumstances
in which it operates[,] [w]hether they arise from the ebbs and
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994).
9. See infra notes 209, 222-24 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part III.B.1, notes 461-73 and accompanying text.
11. So-called for the opinion that produced it, Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984
(3d Cir. 1984), discussed infra Part III.B, notes 455-560 and accompanying text.
12. Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994 (emphasis omitted).
[Vol. 41:743
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flows of commerce, the effects of governmental action or the
acts of third parties with respect to property of nondebtors,
[all having some] impact on a debtor's attempt to reorga-
13nize ....
Thus, the pressures pushing at the edges of federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction are immense, and even more so as federal bankrupt-
cy proceedings rapidly assume great importance in the larger
scheme of federal jurisdiction and dispute resolution in general,
especially in confronting the difficulties of complex litigation
such as mass torts.14
The Supreme Court highlighted the challenge presented by
"related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction over third-party disputes in
Celotex Corp. v. Edwards,15 decided in the Chapter 11 reorgani-
zation proceedings of Celotex Corp.-one of many asbestos man-
ufacturers whose massive potential liability for asbestos-related
personal injuries precipitated a Chapter 11 filing.'6 In that case,
the Court stated that "Congress did not delineate the scope of
'related to' jurisdiction, but its choice of words suggests a grant
13. Holland Indus., Inc. v. United States (In re Holland Indus., Inc.), 103 B.R. 455,
466 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989); see also Gerald T. Dunne, Editor's Headnotes: The Bot-
tomless Pit of Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 112 BANKING L.J. 957, 957 (1995) (noting "the
soaring jurisdiction afforded . . . in a universe where everything is related to every-
thing else"); infra Part III.B.1, notes 461-73 and accompanying text. Bankruptcy ju-
risdiction without limits can even be bootstrapped into boundless substantive relief-in
the form of injunctions that discharge the obligations of nondebtors, without any ex-
press congressional authorization therefor. See Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions
and Complex Litigation: A Critical Reappraisal of Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11
Reorganizations, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 959, 1033-42, 1068-80.
14. See, e.g., Lindsey v. O'Brien, Tanski, Tanzer & Young Health Care Providers
(In re Dow Corning Corp.), 86 F.3d 482, 485-87, 488-95 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding third-
party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction over all plaintiffs' claims in breast-implant
litigation against the codefendants of debtor Dow Coming). See generally RICHARD L.
MARcus & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION 199-208 (3d ed. 1998) (discuss-
ing complex litigation in bankruptcy proceedings); JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H.
TRANGSRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM ch. 6 (1998) (same);
Hon. Edith H. Jones, Rough Justice in Mass Future Claims: Should Bankruptcy
Courts Direct Tort Reform?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1695 (1998); Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy
as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2000).
15. 514 U.S. 300 (1995).
16. See generally 6A WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTcy LAW AND
PRACTICE 2D ch. 154 app., pt. I (William L. Norton, Jr. ed., 1997) (collecting reported
opinions from asbestos bankruptcy cases).
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of some breadth," while cautioning that "a bankruptcy court's
'related to' jurisdiction cannot be limitless."17 The Court noted
that nearly all circuits have embraced the Pacor test, 8 but
(wisely) did not find it necessary to adopt any particular test in
order to decide the case before it. 9 Pacor is manifestly inade-
quate, as it simply provides no principled limits for third-party
"related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction. The issue of the outermost
bounds of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is rife with litigation,
and scores of circuit court opinions have done virtually nothing
to clarify the appropriate jurisdictional standards. In fact, Pacor
has produced a state of affairs in which jurisdictional determina-
tions are essentially arbitrary-with countless instances of iden-
tical factual and procedural postures producing diametrically
disparate results on nominal application of the same "test."20
17. Celotex, 514 U.S. at 307-08 (footnote omitted).
18. "The First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
have adopted the [Third Circuit's] Pacor test with little or no variation. The Second
and Seventh Circuits, on the other hand, seem to have adopted a slightly different
test." Id. at 308-09 n.6 (citations omitted); see also Elscint, Inc. v. First Wis. Fin.
Corp. (In re Xonics, Inc.), 813 F.2d 127, 131 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that "related to"
jurisdiction over a third-party dispute depends on whether "it affects the amount of
property available for distribution or the allocation of property among creditors");
Turner v. Ermiger (In re Turner), 724 F.2d 338, 341 (2d Cir. 1983) (determining that
third-party "related to" jurisdiction requires a "significant connection" to the debtor's
bankruptcy case).
19. Likewise, the dissent agreed "that the facts of this case do not require us to -ie-
solve whether [Pacor] articulates the proper test for determining the scope of the
district court's 'related to' jurisdiction." Celotex, 514 U.S. at 319 n.5 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). Quite apart from this Article's strident criticism of the Pacor test, the
Celotex case would have been an inappropriate vehicle for announcing a test for third-
party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, as that case involved jurisdiction to tempo-
rarily enjoin, rather than adjudicate, a third-party dispute. Such injunctive jurisdiction
is distinct from and not limited by a federal bankruptcy court's adjudicative jurisdic-
tion. See Brubaker, supra note 13, at 1042-67; Larry Peitzman & Margaret S. Smith,
The Secured Creditor's Complaint: Relief from the Automatic Stays in Bankruptcy
Proceedings, 65 CAL. L. REV. 1216, 1220-23 (1977).
20. See Michigan Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Wolverine Radio Co. (In re Wolverine
Radio Co.), 930 F.2d 1132, 1142 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that "[a]lthough several circuit
courts have adopted the definition of 'related to' that is supplied by the Third Circuit
in Pacor, the application of that definition has produced varying results"); Burns v.
First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. (In re Rainbow Sec. Inc.), 173 B.R. 508, 511 (Bankr.
M.D.N.C. 1994) (noting that cases "have reached opposite conclusions regarding juris-
diction when applying the same test to fact situations which are very similar"); Susan
Block-Lieb, The Case Against Supplemental Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A Constitutional,
Statutory, and Policy Analysis, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 735-37 (1994); Brubaker,
750
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The daunting disarray of the case law cries out for a new ap-
proach, and this Article proffers a comprehensive, unifying stat-
utory and constitutional theory that would vastly simplify and
bring principled limits to third-party "related to" bankruptcy
jurisdiction. Given the intended expanse of that provision, the
limits of "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction are constitutional
limits. The search for a sensible solution to the statutory conun-
drum of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, therefore, becomes
meaningful only if it is explicitly coupled with a coherent consti-
tutional explanation for our federal bankruptcy jurisdiction-an
explanation that has eluded both courts and scholars. This inter-
pretive method will succeed, of course, only if it is, in fact, possi-
ble to formulate a determinate constitutional theory of federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction, and this Article undertakes that task.
How, then, do we ascertain the boundaries of a statutory
bankruptcy jurisdiction that admits of no limits other than those
imposed by constitutional principles of judicial federalism, when
the essence of our federal bankruptcy jurisdiction seems to defy
the logic of those constitutional standards? This Article heeds
the sage counsel gleaned from the opening salvo to Justice
Frankfurter, and therefore, approaches interpretation of the
grant of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction as a multifaceted his-
torical inquiry that must begin by exploring statutory anteced-
ents. From this historical understanding, we then can fashion a
reconciliation with the Constitution's provisions for federal judi-
cial power and comparable congressional conferrals of the same.
The result is a comprehensive theory of federal bankruptcy juris-
diction that integrates constitutional theory with an interpretive
theory for the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute.
To that end, Part I traces the historical evolution of the scope
of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. This historical survey reveals
the backdrop of an English model of bankruptcy jurisdiction,
against which a unique American conception of federal bank-
supra note 13, at 1072-73 n.441 (citing many examples); Darrell Dunham, Bankruptcy
Court Jurisdiction, 67 UMKC L. REV. 229, 229 (1998) (noting that "a connection justi-
fying jurisdiction may be found in one case, while in a factually similar case another
court will hold that the connection with a pending bankruptcy is too attenuated"); E.
Scott Fruehwald, The Related to Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Courts, 44
DRAKE L. REV. 1, 6-22 (1995).
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ruptcy jurisdiction competed and ultimately prevailed. Pursuant
thereto, a general grant of federal jurisdiction over "bankruptcy
proceedings" brought the federal judicial power to bear on any
dispute to which a bankruptcy estate was a party. In addition to
this general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over all claims by
and against a bankruptcy estate, the historical inventory of Part
I also discloses settings in which federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
extended to incidental disputes through principles of supplemen-
tal jurisdiction. The origins of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion include perhaps the earliest instance of an express congres-
sional grant of supplemental jurisdiction, which created a feder-
al bankruptcy jurisdiction in certain third-party disputes neces-
sary to the administration of a bankruptcy estate. In the current
jurisdictional statute, Congress consciously designed as broad a
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction as imaginable. Yet, the assump-
tion that there must be some constitutional limit to federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction has left the courts groping to find the
perimeter of third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, but
without a constitutional compass.
Part II relies upon the sum total of our historical experience
with federal bankruptcy jurisdiction to construct a constitutional
theory. An approach grounded in the Article I Bankruptcy Power
is explored and rejected as incapable of defining the content of
third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, as inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's view that Article Ill contains the
source and limits of the federal judicial power, and ultimately as
unnecessary.
Article III federal question jurisprudence has obvious import,
but scholars have misunderstood its proper application to bank-
ruptcy, largely because of a misleading emphasis on the role of a
federal bankruptcy trustee. Because the trustee is merely a
representative of the federally created bankruptcy estate, the
historical concept of a general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction of
all claims by and against a bankruptcy estate is sustained by a
conventional federal entity theory of constitutional federal ques-
tions. Although this federal entity theory of constitutional feder-
al questions does not explain third-party "related to" bankruptcy
jurisdiction over state-law claims to which the federal bankrupt-
cy estate is not a party, combining the federal entity theory with
752 [Vol. 41:743
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a proper conception of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction will
both account for and define these third-party "related to" claims.
Supplemental jurisdiction has been tendered as the source of
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over all state-law claims forming
one constitutional bankruptcy "case." This supplemental bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction theory, though, adopts an in rem model of a
bankruptcy "case" that does not fully explain third-party "related
to" bankruptcy jurisdiction. Moreover, such an in rem theory
misconstrues the relevant constitutional "case" in bankruptcy.
The appropriate constitutional explanation for the entirety of
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction materializes only when one rec-
ognizes that the fundamental jurisdictional unit in bankruptcy
is an individual bankruptcy "proceeding" raising a justiciable
controversy between adverse parties. The resulting constitution-
al theory is an almost stunningly simple and orthodox combina-
tion of (1) the federal entity theory, which explains the historical
concept of a general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over all
claims by and against a bankruptcy estate as independent, free-
standing constitutional federal questions, and (2) conventional
supplemental jurisdiction of "related" third-party claims.
The simplicity of the constitutional framework developed in
Part II permits direct incorporation of constitutional principles
into a basic theory for interpretation of the bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion statute that would vastly streamline jurisdictional inquiries.
Part III constructs the interpretive theory by identifying and
removing the extraneous separation of powers influence that has
skulked into "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction. Under this
interpretive theory, third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion is seen as a grant of supplemental jurisdiction over any
claim sharing a conventional supplemental relationship with (1)
a claim created by the Bankruptcy Code, or (2) a claim to which
a bankruptcy estate is party.
Part III then uses this Article's interpretive theory to critique
the Pacor test for third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion, which is both unconstitutionally overinclusive and, at the
same time, decidedly underinclusive in terms of the intended
function of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. Pacor not only an-
nounced the prevailing "conceivable effect" test, but also main-
tained, in a similarly influential manner, that third-party "related
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
to" bankruptcy jurisdiction is not supplemental jurisdiction.
Thus, for example, if a bankruptcy trustee brings an action
against two defendants and those defendants assert state-law
cross-claims for contribution and indemnification against each
other, under Pacor, the federal courts have no supplemental
jurisdiction to hear those cross-claims. In fact, as a result of
Pacor, bankruptcy appears to be the only context in which the
federal courts cannot entertain such cross-claims through sup-
plemental jurisdiction.
Pacor's hostility to supplemental jurisdiction, though, was
based upon a fundamental misapprehension of both bankruptcy
law and the Supreme Court's supplemental jurisdiction jurispru-
dence. Pacor, thus, recklessly repudiated the widely heralded
values of supplemental jurisdiction and, in its place, adopted a
functional, outcome-oriented test that is hopelessly indetermi-
nate and entirely incompatible with Congress's design for a fair,
efficient, pervasive federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. The Pacor
test has fostered endless jurisdictional litigation and has im-
posed an antiquated in rem jurisdictional structure on federal
bankruptcy litigation-and a poorly conceived one at
that-which actually abrogates centuries-old in rem precepts of
bankruptcy jurisdiction. Moreover, the extreme inconsistencies
in the case law since Pacor demonstrate that the courts have
covertly infused modern transactional, in personam principles of
supplemental jurisdiction into third-party "related to" bankrupt-
cy jurisdiction, even in the face of professed adherence to Pacor's
proscriptions against supplemental jurisdiction.
The contradictory and confused case law of third-party "related
to" bankruptcy jurisdiction is simply a product of the tension
presented as the manifest efficacy of modern joinder practice,
now generally available in federal litigation through the 1990
supplemental jurisdiction statute,2 1 confronts the anachronistic
aberration of Pacor. The same tension is evident in divisive
disagreements over the proper application of the supplemental
jurisdiction statute in bankruptcy and what is now dubbed "sup-
plemental" bankruptcy jurisdiction. The simple, but robust theory
developed in this Article simultaneously responds to the under-
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
754 [Vol. 41:743
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lying source of discord in both "related to" and "supplemental"
bankruptcy jurisdiction, by revealing the fallacy in that distinc-
tion. The answer lies not in tinkering with the Judicial Code,2
but in a proper recognition and express acknowledgment that
Pacor was wrong: The existing grant of third-party "related to"
bankruptcy jurisdiction is unrestricted supplemental bankruptcy
jurisdiction.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
Where we are and from whence we came in the matter of
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, like much of American law, is a
complex amalgam of English ideas transmuted by our unique
American experiment. The present-day statutory provision for
bankruptcy jurisdiction in the federal courts is a remarkably
succinct grant of "original and exclusive jurisdiction of all [bank-
ruptcy] cases" and "original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all
civil proceedings arising under [the Bankruptcy Code], or arising
in or related to [bankruptcy] cases."" The conciseness of this
provision, though, conceals a treasure trove of historical
esoterica surrounding issues of allocation of judicial power as
between various tribunals. The most well-known of these, by
virtue of the decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 4 is the appropriate division of federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction as between Article Ill federal courts and
specialized non-Article III adjuncts-a division of responsibilities
closely approximating an English ancestry that divided bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction between bankruptcy commissioners and the
courts of law and equity.25
22. Cf. Block-Lieb, supra note 20, at 829-32 (proposing that Congress amend the
general supplemental jurisdiction statute to address concerns unique to the bankrupt-
cy context); Dunham, supra note 20, at 282 (suggesting "a clarifying amendment to
either section 1367 or to ... the provision referring bankruptcy cases to the bank-
ruptcy judges" to "make explicit whether supplemental jurisdictional [sic] is available
to the bankruptcy court").
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)-(b).
24. 458 U.S. 50 (1982), discussed infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text and
Part HI-.A1, notes 418-30 and accompanying text.
25. See Thomas E. Plank, Why Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and Should Not Be
Article III Judges, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 567 (1998).
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This Article, however, addresses an aspect of bankruptcy
jurisdiction for which our English traditions provide no direct
analogues: allocation of judicial power as between federal and
state courts. As the concurrent nature of the above-quoted juris-
dictional provision indicates, federal bankruptcy proceedings do
not completely divest state courts of authority to adjudicate
controversies implicating the debtor or the debtor's bankruptcy
estate. The extent of state-court involvement in that regard,
though, will be inversely proportional to that of the federal
courts. This judicial federalism issue regarding the scope of
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction (vis-a-vis state-court jurisdiction)
was, of course, unknown to the English system." Yet, English
notions regarding the nature of bankruptcy jurisdiction have
permeated the development of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction in
a subtle and even unconscious manner.27 Indeed, as revealed in
this Part, the historical struggle to determine the nature and
extent of federal "bankruptcy proceedings" has been largely a
struggle against an English model of "bankruptcy proceedings."
Nonetheless, a uniquely American conception of federal bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction appeared in our early American bankruptcy
statutes2" and persevered,29 such that a general grant of federal
jurisdiction over "bankruptcy proceedings" was consistently con-
strued to encompass all claims by or against a bankruptcy es-
tate-what this Article refers to as a general federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction.
The present jurisdictional statute, of course, goes beyond a
general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction of all claims by and
against the bankruptcy estate, in its "related to" jurisdiction
over third-party disputes not directly involving the estate.3 ° Thi s
third-party jurisdiction, though, also has historical origins in
26. See Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 609, 633 (1864) (noting
that practice in the English courts is not determinative "in the sense which this court
has sanctioned with reference to the line which divides the jurisdiction of the Federal
courts from that of the State courts').
27. See infra notes 676-78 and accompanying text. See generally Ralph Brubaker,
One Hundred Years of Federal Bankruptcy Law and Still Clinging to an In Rem
Model of Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 261 (1999) (discussing the im-
pact of history on modern bankruptcy jurisdiction).
28. See infra Part L.A, notes 37-63 and accompanying text.
29. See infra Part I.B.1, notes 74-111 and accompanying text.
30. See infra Part 1.C, notes 162-211 and accompanying text.
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notions of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction.3 Tracing the
evolution of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction in this Part, there-
fore, will help us find the hidden meaning in the jurisdictional
statute's delineation of "arising under," "arising in," and "related
to" proceedings.12 The jurisdictional language employed in previ-
ous statutes echoes in the current statute, including "related to"
jurisdiction of third-party disputes.3
The historical survey in this Part is significant not only for
lexical discovery of the origins of statutory jurisdictional phras-
es, but also because it plays a decisive role in the quest to find
the outermost limits of third-party "related to" bankruptcy juris-
diction through a constitutional theory of federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction. Both the historical concept of a general federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction34 and ideas of supplemental bankruptcy
jurisdiction 5 reappear in this Article's constitutional theory.
Moreover, the appropriate constitutional theory emerges only
after the structure of these predecessor statutory provisions
reminds us of the justiciable "case" or "controversy" to which the
judicial power attaches in federal bankruptcy proceedings.36
A. Early American Bankruptcy Statutes:
The Birth of a- General Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
Bankruptcy would not become a permanent institution in this
country until 1898. Earlier legislation proved sporadic and
short-lived, but nonetheless contained jurisdictional provisions
that elucidate the nature of "bankruptcy proceedings" in federal
court. From those provisions, the Supreme Court forged a
unique (given our English bankruptcy heritage) and enduring
vision of a federal jurisdiction in bankruptcy. The bankrupt's
31. See infra Part I.B.2, notes 112-61 and accompanying text.
32. See infra Part IH.A, notes 411-54 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Part I.B.2.b, notes 124-42 and accompanying text. For ease of later
reference, quotations of jurisdictional provisions in this Part will add emphasis to
those portions with linguistic similarity to the present jurisdictional statute.
34. See infra Part H.B, notes 253-327 and accompanying text.
35. See infra Part II.C, notes 328-95 and accompanying text.
36. See infra Part H.C.2, notes 343-69 and accompanying text.
37. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995).
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"estate," central to the administration of the bankruptcy law,
was also the focal jurisdictional concept, and federal jurisdiction
of "bankruptcy proceedings" was established as a general juris-
diction over all claims by or against the estate.
1. The Bankruptcy Act of 1800
The very first United States bankruptcy statute, the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1800 (the 1800 Act),38 contained no general juris-
dictional provisions, although it did provide that certain proceed-
ings would take place in federal court. These provisions, howev-
er, did not rise to the level of a general federal bankruptcy juris-
diction over all claims by and against a bankruptcy estate.
Under the 1800 Act, the "estate and effects" of a bankrupt
debtor passed to a fiduciary comparable to the modern-day
bankruptcy trustee, designated an assignee, who would take
such property in trust for the benefit of the bankrupt's credi-
tors.3 9 The statute specifically provided for trial before a federal
judge with respect to many justiciable controversies arising out
of the administration of the bankrupt's estate,40 including adju-
dication of creditors' claims to share in the estate.41 Vesting of
the bankrupt's estate in the assignee included among the estate
38. Ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (amended 1801 & 1802 and repealed 1803), reprinted in 10
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1721-37 (James Win. Moore et al. eds., 14th ed. 1978)
[hereinafter COLLIER (14th ed.)].
39. See Bankruptcy Act of 1800 § 6 (providing for appointment of an assignee and
assignment of the "bankrupt's estate and effects" to the assignee); id. § 18 (stating
that "assignment of [bankrupt's] estate . . . vest[s] the same in the assignees . . . in
trust, for the use of all and every the creditors [sic] of such bankrupt, who shall
come in and prove their debts"). See generally Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193,
217-21 (1828) (Story, J.).
40. See Bankruptcy Act of 1800 § 3 (requiring a jury trial before a district court to
determine whether a person was a merchant subject to a commission of bankruptcy
and had committed an act of bankruptcy); id. § 52 (allowing for a jury trial, in the
discretion of the district court, "in case either the bankrupt or creditor shall think
him or herself aggrieved by the determination of the said judge or commissioners,
relative to any material fact, in the commencement or progress of the said proceed-
ings").
41. See id. § 58 (providing "[t]hat any creditor ... [aind in like manner the as-
signee or assignees of such bankrupt may object to the consideration of any particular
claim by the commissioners, and require that the same should be referred to a ju-
ry... and a jury shall be impanneled, as in other cases, to try the same in the
circuit court for the district").
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property any causes of action belonging to the bankrupt, such as
"all the debts due to such bankrupt,"42 and the 1800 Act autho-
rized the assignee to sue on such actions to recover money or
property for the estate.43 Nothing in the 1800 Act, however,
expressly granted any jurisdiction over these suits to the federal
courts, and the fleeting duration of that statute left no precedent
regarding federal jurisdiction over such suits."
2. The Bankruptcy Act of 1841
After a nearly forty-year hiatus in federal bankruptcy law, the
Bankruptcy Act of 1841 (the 1841 Act)45 brought the first explicit
statutory grant of a general federal jurisdiction over all "bank-
ruptcy proceedings." Although the 1841 Act was also very transi-
tory, the purposes and scope of its jurisdictional provisions did
receive meaningful judicial illumination, from which comes the
42. Id. § 13; see also id § 5 (defining the bankrupt estate to include "all the es-
tate, real and personal, of every nature and description to which the said bankrupt
may be entitled, either in law or equity, in any manner whatsoever"); THOMAS COO-
PER, THE BANKRUPr LAW OF AMERICA COMPARED wIm THE BANKRUPT LAW OF ENG-
LAND 308, 317-19 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1992) (1801).
43. Section 13 of the 1800 Act provided that the assignee "shall have such remedy
to recover the same, in his ... own name ... as such bankrupt might or could have
had, if no commission of bankruptcy had issued." Bankruptcy Act of 1800 § 13.
44. The famous Midnight Judges Act of 1801, as part of a broader effort to widen
federal judicial power, also amended the 1800 Act to give the circuit courts and dis-
trict courts concurrent jurisdiction "of all cases which shall arise .. . under the [1800]
act." Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 12, 2 Stat. 89, 92 (repealed 1802) (emphasis added).
See generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 2, at 34 (discussing the general political
climate surrounding enactment and repeal of the Midnight Judges Act). The scope of
this jurisdictional grant, however, was uncertain. One can find instances of 1800 Act
assignees suing on the bankrupts actions in federal court, but without specification of
the grounds for federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Richards v. Maryland Ins. Co., 12 U.S.
(8 Cranch) 84 (1814); Tucker v. Oxley, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 34 (1809); Wood v. Owings,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 239 (1803). Given the construction placed on similar language in
the jurisdictional grant of the subsequent 1841 Act, it is conceivable that the assignee
could sue in federal court based upon federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over cases that
"arise under" the bankruptcy statute. See infra Part I.A.2, notes 45-57 and accompa-
nying text. Alternatively, these suits may have been maintained in federal court
based upon diversity of citizenship as between the bankrupt and the defen-
dant-jurisdictional standing to which the assignee may have succeeded by virtue of
section 13 of the 1800 Act. See Bankruptcy Act of 1800 § 13, quoted supra note 43;
cf infra notes 81, 92 and accompanying text.
45. Ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843), reprinted in 10 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra
note 38, at 1738-45.
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notion of a general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over all
claims by and against a bankruptcy estate.
The operative provision of the 1841 Act gave the federal dis-
trict courts "jurisdiction in all matters and proceedings in bank-
ruptcy arising under this [18411 act."46 The statute specified
certain classes of "cases and controversies in bankruptcy" en-
compassed within this broad jurisdictional grant, including the
catchall category of "all acts, matters, and things to be done
under and in virtue of the bankruptcy."' In the prominent case
of Ex parte Christy,48 Justice Story accorded these 1841 Act
jurisdictional provisions a most generous content.
In construing the reach of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
under the 1841 Act, Justice Story first noted that "the assignee
is vested with all the rights, titles, powers, and authorities, to
sell, manage, and dispose of the estate and property of the bank-
rupt,.., and to sue for and defend the same, ... as fully as the
bankrupt might before his bankruptcy."49 Thus, he interpreted
jurisdiction over "all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy
arising under" the 1841 Act to "reach[] all cases where the
rights, claims, and property of the bankrupt, or those of his
assignee, are concerned, since they are matters arising under
the act, and are necessarily involved in the due administration
and settlement of the bankrupt's estate."0 Accordingly, federal
district courts possessed jurisdiction over assignee suits on a
bankrupt's causes of action against others as part of the "bank-
ruptcy proceedings."51
46. Bankruptcy Act of 1841 § 6 (emphasis added).
47. Id. (emphasis added). That particular clause provided, in full:
And the jurisdiction hereby conferred on the district court shall extend to
all cases and controversies in bankruptcy arising between the bankrupt
and any creditor or creditors who shall claim any debt or demand under
the bankruptcy; to all cases and controversies between such creditor or
creditors and the assignee of the estate, whether in office or removed; to
all cases and controversies between such assignee and the bankrupt, and
to all acts, matters, and things to be done under and in virtue of the
bankruptcy, until the final distribution and settlement of the estate of
the bankrupt, and the close of the proceedings in bankruptcy.
Id.
48. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292 (1845).
49. Id. at 312; see Bankruptcy Act of 1841 § 3.
50. Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 313.
51. At issue in Ex parte Christy was the assignee's suit to recover real estate
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The holding in Ex parte Christy is a notable interpretation for
several reasons." Initially, Justice Story included these assignee
suits among the federal "bankruptcy proceedings" even though
such assignee suits to recover money or property for the estate
were not specifically designated as a class of "cases and contro-
versies in bankruptcy" falling within the general jurisdictional
grant over "proceedings in bankruptcy.""3 Additionally, Justice
Story considered such suits to be within the district court's gen-
eral jurisdiction over the "bankruptcy proceedings" in the face of
another more specific section that expressly placed jurisdiction
over such assignee suits-denoted "suits at law and in equity"
against a so-called adverse claimant-in both of the federal trial
courts of the day: the district courts and the now-defunct circuit
courts.54 Thus, Story attributed these assignee suits to the gen-
seized from the bankrupt in mortgage foreclosure proceedings in state court prior to
commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings, where the assignee was challenging the
validity of the underlying mortgages. See id. at 293-97, 308-11; see also Nugent v.
Boyd, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 426, 426-28, 434-37 (1845) (finding federal bankruptcy juris-
diction under the 1841 Act where the "controversy was between the bankrupts as-
signee, on one side, and a mortgage creditor and purchasers at the sale under state
process of the mortgaged premises, on the other"). Justice Story, sitting as a Circuit
Justice, previously had held that the 1841 Act's general bankruptcy jurisdiction ex-
tended to an assignee suit to collect a debt owing to the bankrupt. See Mitchell v.
Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 17 F. Cas. 496, 496, 499-501 (C.C.D. Me. 1843) (No.
9662).
52. An intriguing aside raises the possibility that Justice Story was tacitly function-
ing in- dual capacities, as he is widely reputed to have been the principal draftsman
of the 1841 Act. See PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOL-
VENCY, LMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900, at 23 (1974); GERALD
T. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT 385 (1970);
JAMES MCCLELIAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AmRCAN CONSTITUTION 258 (1971); R.
KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD
REPUBLIC 329 (1985); 2 WILLIAM W. STORY, LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 407
(New World Book Mfg. Co. 1971) (1851); Morris Weisman, Story and Webster and the
Bankruptcy Act of 1841, 46 COM. L.J. 4 (1941).
53. See Bankruptcy Act of 1841 § 6, quoted supra notes 46-47 and accompanying
text.
54. For a discussion of the relationship between the district courts and the old
circuit courts, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 2, at 28-31. Section 8 of the 1841 Act
provided as follows:
And be it further enacted, That the circuit court within and for the
district where the decree of bankruptcy is passed, shall have concurrent
jurisdiction with the district court of the same district of all suits at law
and in equity which may and shall be brought by any assignee of the
bankrupt against any person or persons claiming an adverse interest, or
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eral provision for "bankruptcy proceedings," which made no spe-
cific mention of such suits in its illustrative listing of "bankruptcy
proceedings," and notwithstanding the existence of a separate
stand-alone provision devoted exclusively to jurisdiction of such
suits.
Moreover, and most significantly, Justice Story found the
general federal jurisdiction over "bankruptcy proceedings" to
reach these assignee suits to recover money or property for the
estate, despite the fact that such suits would not be within the
more circumscribed English notion of "bankruptcy proceedings."
English assignees could not pursue such an action in the "bank-
ruptcy proceedings" in the English Court of Bankruptcy. The
assignee could proceed on such a "suit at law or in equity" only
through a formal complaint in a court of law or by a formal bill
in chancery, depending upon the character of the action itself as
either legal or equitable in nature. Thus, Justice Story's concep-
tion of federal "bankruptcy proceedings" in an American feder-
alist scheme nonexistent in England, perhaps not surprisingly,
was an incisive departure from our English traditions and ideas
of a jurisdiction in bankruptcy."
by such person against such assignee, touching any property or rights of
property of said bankrupt transferable to, or vested in, such assign-
ee; ....
Bankruptcy Act of 1841 § 8. In an assignee suit to collect a debt owing to the bank-
rupt, '[tihe debtor in every such case is necessarily in the sense of the act an ad-
verse party." Mitchell v. Great Works Milling, 17 F. Cas. at 501.
55. Only a few years before Justice Story penned the Ex parte Christy opinion,
Vice-Chancellor Shadwell concisely summarized the reach of English bankruptcy juris-
diction this way-
[T]he jurisdiction in bankruptcy has authority to deal only with that
which is the bankrupt's estate; but has no power to determine what is
the bankrupt's estate. If the question be a legal one it must be tried at
law; and if it be an equitable one, it must be decided in this Court. But
when you have determined what is the property of the bankrupt, the
whole administration of it falls under the jurisdiction of the Court in
bankruptcy.
Halford v. Gillow, 60 Eng. Rep. 18, 20 (Ch. 1842). Justice Story's vision of a general
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, then, to the extent it encompassed assignee disputes
with adverse claimants, was broader than that which had evolved in England' re-
garding the jurisdiction of bankruptcy commissioners under the supervision of the
Lord Chancellor, subsequently vested in "The Court of Bankruptcy" in 1831. See
John C. McCoid, II, Right to Jury Trial in Bankruptcy: Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 15, 29-33 (1991); Plank, supra note 25, at 575-78,
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As Professor McCoid has noted, "[i]f ever there was a prece-
dent for the legitimacy of a bankruptcy court with a broad juris-
diction, it is Ex parte Christy,"56 and pursuant thereto, a general
federal jurisdiction of all "matters and proceedings in bank-
ruptcy" extended to "the ascertainment and adjustment of all
claims and rights in favor of or against the bankrupt's estate."57
Thus, in our federal system of dual sovereigns with both state
and federal courts, the American model of bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion was established as that of a general federal jurisdiction over
any, claim to which a bankruptcy estate is a party, whether that
claim is made by or against the estate.
3. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867
The next bankruptcy statute, the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 (the
1867 Act),58 contained jurisdictional provisions very similar to
those of the 1841 Act, and the Supreme Court afforded these
provisions a similarly broad ambit. The federal district courts
exercised "original jurisdiction... in all matters and proceed-
ings in bankruptcy," which extended to certain specified "cases
and controversies" and "to all acts, matters, and things to be
done under and in virtue of the bankruptcy." 9 Like its immedi-
ate predecessor, the 1867 Act also gave the old federal circuit
.587-88.
56. McCoid, supra note 55, at 34-35.
57. Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 314 (1845).
58. Ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (amended 1868, 1870, 1872, 1873, 1874 & 1876 and re-
pealed 1878), reprinted in 10 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, at 1746-82.
59. Bankruptcy Act of 1867 § 1 (emphasis added). The specified categories of con-
troversies falling within this general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction were as follows:
And the jurisdiction hereby conferred shall extend to all cases and con-
troversies arising between the bankrupt and any creditor or creditors who
shall claim any debt or demand under the bankruptcy, to the collection
of all the assets of the bankrupt; to the ascertainment and liquidation of
the liens and other specific claims thereon; to the adjustment of the
various priorities and conflicting interests of all parties; and to the mar-
shalling and disposition of the different funds and assets, so as to secure
the rights of all parties and due distribution of the assets among all the
creditors; and to all acts, matters, and things to be done under and in
virtue of the bankruptcy, until the final distribution and settlement of the
estate of the bankrupt, and the close of the proceedings in bankruptcy.
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courts jurisdiction over an assignee's "suits at law or in equity"
to recover money or property from an adverse claimant. 0 Circuit
court jurisdiction over such assignee suits, though, was concur-
rent with the district courts' general jurisdiction over "all mat-
ters and proceedings in bankruptcy." Moreover, that general
federal bankruptcy jurisidiction, in what seems to have been a
codification of the Ex parte Christy holding, now specifically em-
braced "the collection of all the assets of the bankrupt" 1 and,
thus, subsumed assignee suits against adverse claimants.62
As established through the 1841 and 1867 Acts, then, a general
federal jurisdiction of "all matters and proceedings in bankrupt-
cy" entailed: (1) adjudication of all claims by and against the
estate, which determined the full extent of the estate property
and all those entitled to share in it, and (2) all other proceedings
incident to administering the estate for the benefit of creditors.63
60. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. Section 2 of the 1867 Act provided,
in relevant part:
Said circuit courts shall also have concurrent jurisdiction with the district
courts . . . of all suits at law or in equity which may or shall be brought
by the assignee in bankruptcy against any person claiming an adverse
interest or owing any debt to such bankrupt, or by such person against
such assignee, touching any property or rights of property of said bank-
rupt transferable to, or vested in such assignee; ....
Bankruptcy Act of 1867 § 2.
61. Id. § 1.
62. See Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U.S. 516, 518-20 (1876); Smith v. Mason, 81 U.S. (14
Wall.) 419, 431-32 (1871); Morgan v. Thornhill, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 65, 75 (1870); OR-
LANDO F. BUMP, LAW AND PRACTICE IN BANKRUPTCY 222-23, 227 (New York, Baker,
Voorhis & Co., 9th ed. 1877).
63. These two types of proceedings falling within general federal bankruptcy juris-
diction were articulated by Justice Bradley as follows:
Of this [district court bankruptcy jurisdiction] there are two distinct
classes: first, jurisdiction as a court of bankruptcy over the proceedings in
bankruptcy initiated by the petition, and ending in the distribution of
assets amongst the creditors, and the discharge or refusal of a discharge
of the bankrupt; secondly, jurisdiction as an ordinary court, of suits at
law or in equity brought by or against the assignee in reference to al-
leged property of the bankrupt, or to claims alleged to be due from or to
him. The language conferring this jurisdiction of the district courts is
very broad and general. It is, that they shall have original jurisdic-
tion... in all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy. The various
branches of this jurisdiction are afterwards specified; resulting, however,
in the two general classes before mentioned.
Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U.S. at 517. The suit at issue in Lathrop was by an assignee
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The 1867 Act, however, was repealed in 1878, and this expan-
sive, all-encompassing approach to federal bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion was not replicated when federal bankruptcy legislation next
appeared, twenty years later. Yet, the concept of federal jurisdic-
tion in "bankruptcy proceedings" as a general grant of judicial
power over all claims by and against the bankruptcy estate,
nonetheless, persisted.
B. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898:
A Federalism-Inspired Retrenchment Forces Reaffirmation of the
Nature of Federal Bankruptcy Proceedings and Spawns
Supplemental Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
The expanse of a general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over
all claims by and against a bankruptcy estate, under the 1841
and 1867 Acts, was seen as a concomitant to effectual and effi-
cient administration of bankruptcy estates.64 This jurisdictional
scheme, however, produced a persistent tension between the
federal interest in estate administration and the localized inter-
ests of particular litigants, witnesses, and attorneys, who often
found the federal forum inconvenient as compared with state
courts. In fact, each of the three early "temporary" bankruptcy
statutes was repealed, in large part, because of the relative
inconvenience of the federal courts.65 Furthermore, in the mak-
ing of the first bankruptcy statute in the era of what has since
been "permanent" federal bankruptcy law-the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 (the 1898 Act)6 6 -there were widely held "states' rights"
to recover a preferential transfer from an adverse claimant. See id. at 520-21.
64. See id. at 518; Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 346-47 (1874); Ex parte
Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 312-13, 314-15, 318, 320-22 (1845); Mitchell v. Great
Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 17 F. Cas. 496, 499-501 (C.C.D. Me. 1843) (No. 9662)
(Story, Circuit Justice).
65. See H.R. REP. NO. 55-65, at 126-27 (1897); 1 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38,
0.04, at 8; 1 FRANK 0. LOVELAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PROCEEDINGS IN
BANKRUPTCY § 5, at 10 & § 6, at 12 (4th ed. 1912); 1 HAROLD REMINGTON, A TREA-
TISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 7, at 17, § 8, at 18 & § 9,
at 19 (James M. Henderson ed., 5th ed. 1950).
66. Pub. L. No. 55-171, 30 Stat. 544 (amended 1903, 1906, 1910, 1915, 1916, 1917,
1922, 1926, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1942, 1944, 1946,
1947, 1948, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1962, 1963, 1964,
1965, 1966, 1967, 1970, 1973 & 1976 and repealed 1978) [as amended through date of
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misgivings about conferring too much power on the federal
courts. This was particularly true amongst Southerners, who
deeply disdained the "carpetbagging" federal judges.6 7 The 1898
Act, therefore, responded to this animosity toward a general
federal jurisdiction over "all matters and proceedings in bank-
ruptcy" by narrowing the compass of federal bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion.6" The structure of those 1898 Act jurisdictional provisions,
although considerably more complex than predecessors or present-
day progeny, provides meaningful insights for a rational concep-
tion of the nature of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. This Part
I.B, therefore, analyzes the salient features of the 1898 Act.
In retracting federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, the 1898 Act
essentially returned to the English, bifurcated model of bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction.69 Thus, the federal courts, for the most part,
were affirmatively denied jurisdiction over suits to recover money
or property from an adverse claimant brought by the estate's
representative, now known as the bankruptcy trustee. 0 In our
federal system, then, absence of federal jurisdiction over a
trustee's suits meant that the trustee had to bring such suits in
state court. As explored below, the return of the English model
of bankruptcy jurisdiction also brought a perhaps inevitable
repeal, hereinafter Bankruptcy Act of 1898], reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY
app. A, pt. 3(a) (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 1999) [hereinafter COLLIER (15th
ed.)].
67. See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 15 BANKR.
DEV. J. 321, 323, 331-32, 334-35 (1999); Charles Jordan Tabb, A Century of Regress or
Progress? A Political History of Bankruptcy Legislation in 1898 and 1998, 15 BANKR.
DEv. J. 343, 355, 359-60, 362-64, 380 (1999). The more general mood of this period
was also one of reducing the extent of federal jurisdiction, which had surged precipi-
tously, through the enactments of Reconstruction Congresses. See FALLON ET AL., su-
pra note 2, at 35-37.
68. See Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 648-49 & n.15 (1947); id. at 662-67
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367, 374 (1934); Toledo
Fence & Post Co. v. Lyons, 290 F. 637, 645 (6th Cir. 1923); 31 CONG. REC. 1785
(1898) (statement of Rep. Henderson, Chairman, House Judiciary Committee). Even
with its measures to abate federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, the principal objection to
the 1898 Act was "with the extensive powers it confers on the Federal courts." H.R.
REP. NO. 55-65, pt. 2, at 149 (1898) (entitled "Views of the Minority"); see also 31
CONG. REC. 1793 (1898) (statement of Rep. Underwood); id. at 1803-04 (statement of
Rep. Henry).
69. See supra notes 25, 55 and accompanying text.
70. See infra Part I.B.l.a, notes 74-100 and accompanying text.
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conceptual struggle between the English and early American
visions regarding the nature of "bankruptcy proceedings." These
competing paradigms clashed after the 1938 corporate reorgani-
zation amendments, which forced the issue once again. In 1947,
though, in the William v. Austrian71 case, the early American
model of a federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, as originally con-
ceived by Justice Story, ultimately prevailed. The idea of a fed-
eraljurisdiction in "bankruptcy proceedings" endured as a general
jurisdiction over all claims by and against a bankruptcy estate,
including a trustee's suit to recover money or property from an
adverse claimant--even though such a suit would not be a part
of the more limited English concept of bankruptcy jurisdiction
and "bankruptcy proceedings."72
By sacrificing efficient administration of bankruptcy estates to
a bankruptcy jurisdiction that was bifurcated between state and
federal courts, the 1898 Act increased the need to maintain
litigation efficiencies through other devices. Thus, as this Part
I.B discloses, both the statute itself and judicial practice ex-
panded the reach of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction through
identifiable applications of the modern concept of supplemental
jurisdiction.73 In our search for the full range of federal bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction, then, we can draw on the experience of both
(1) the 1898 Act's ultimate renewal of the concept of a general
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over all claims by and against a
bankruptcy estate, and (2) the 1898 Act's formation and develop-
ment of principles of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction.
1. General Federal Jurisdiction over Claims by and Against
the Bankruptcy Estate
Like prior acts, the 1898 Act also employed the jurisdictional
language of federal "bankruptcy proceedings." The 1898 Act, how-
ever, restricted federal bankruptcy jurisdiction by reference to
plenary suits "at law and in equity." The statutory labyrinth by
which this was accomplished was so ensnared in the differing
procedural conventions for bankruptcy litigation (summary ver-
71. 331 U.S. 642 (1947), discussed infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
72. See infra Part I.B.l.b, notes 101-11 and accompanying text.
73. See infra Part I.B.2, notes 112-61 and accompanying text.
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sus plenary process) that it threatened to erase the established
understanding of the scope of federal "bankruptcy proceedings."
After the 1938 corporate reorganization amendments, though,
the Supreme Court resuscitated the early American notion of
federal "bankruptcy proceedings" as a general jurisdiction over
all claims to which the bankruptcy estate is a party, whether
made by or against the estate.
a. Section 23"s Restrictions and Misleading Distinction
The 1898 Act designated the federal district courts as "courts
of bankruptcy, 4 and as originally enacted, section 2 of the 1898
Act vested those courts "with such jurisdiction at law and in
equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in
bankruptcy proceedings,"5 later changed to "jurisdiction in pro-
ceedings under this [1898] Act."76 As with previous statutes,
section 2 then enumerated specific matters within the district
court's general jurisdiction over the bankruptcy proceedings.7"
The broadest of these jurisdictional categories was the extensive
commission in section 2a(7) to "cause the estates of bankrupts to
be collected, reduced to money and distributed, and determine
controversies in relation thereto, except as herein otherwise pro-
vided"7 8-thus, signaling the substantial restrictions on federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction effected by the 1898 Act.
Like both the 1841 and 1867 Acts, the 1898 Act also contained
a separate section addressing the jurisdiction of the federal
circuit courts over trustee suits to recover money or property
74. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 66, § 1(10).
75. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 55-171, 30 Stat. 544, 545 (emphasis added);
see also 1 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, J1 2.02[1] (reprinting the original text of
1898 Act § 2).
76. Chandler Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840, 842 (emphasis added);
see also 1 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, 1 2.02[21 (marking the text of 1898 Act
§ 2 to reflect the 1938 amendments); infra note 104 (explaining the superficial nature
of this change).
77. See supra notes 47, 59 and accompanying text. The concluding clause of section
2 also contained the saving provision, that "[niothing in this section contained shall
be construed to deprive a court of bankruptcy of any power it would possess were
certain specific powers not herein enumerated." Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note
66, § 2b.
78. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 66, § 2a(7) (emphasis added).
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from an adverse claimant.79 This section 23, though, was also
the provision whereby Congress "otherwise provided" and re-
tracted federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. 0 In the process, section
23 triggered substantial uncertainty regarding the conceptual
nature of federal "bankruptcy proceedings."
In its original form, section 23 (a and b) of the 1898 Act pro-
vided as follows:
SEC. 23. JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES AND STATE
COURTS.-a The United States circuit courts shall have juris-
diction of all controversies at law and in equity, as distin-
guished from proceedings in bankruptcy, between trustees as
such and adverse claimants concerning the property acquired
or claimed by the trustees, in the same manner and to the
same extent only as though bankruptcy proceedings had not
been instituted and such controversies had been between the
bankrupts and such adverse claimants.
b Suits by the trustee shall only be brought or prosecuted
in the courts where the bankrupt, whose estate is being ad-
ministered by such trustee, might have brought or prosecuted
them if proceedings in bankruptcy had not been instituted,
unless by consent of the proposed defendant."'
Understanding the import and controversy generated by sec-
tion 23 requires some background in the differing procedural
modes of bankruptcy litigation. Section 23a's reference to "con-
troversies at law and in equity" plainly suggested the estab-
lished notion of a plenary suit, which was an ordinary civil ac-
tion, as distinguished from summary bankruptcy proceedings."
79. See supra notes 54, 60 and accompanying text.
80. See Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524, 535 (1900) (noting that the
"words 'herein otherwise provided' [in section 2a(7)] evidently refer to section 23").
81. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. at 552 (emphasis added); see also 10 COLLIER
(14th ed.), supra note 38, at 1799 & nn.7-9 (reprinting the original text of 1898 Act §
23a-b).
82. "J]urisdiction . .. of all suits at law or in equity... is the regular jurisdic-
tion between party and party, as described in the Judiciary Act and the third article
of the Constitution," Morgan v. Thornhill, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 65, 80 (1870), and such
an action "could only be enforced by a plenary suit, at law or in equity," Bardes, 178
U.S. at 532. A plenary suit was conducted according to normal rules of civil proce-
dure, including summons and complaint, formal pleadings, discovery and trial, all ac-
cording to the timetables for and in precisely the same manner as a normal civil
action. Summary proceedings, by contrast and as the name indicates, were much less
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Because circuit court jurisdiction under the 1841 and 1867 Acts
was over assignee "suits at law or in equity"83 against an ad-
verse claimant, this required an independent plenary suit in the
circuit court, commenced by a formal bill or complaint." Section
23a of the 1898 Act, by referring to "controversies at law or in
equity" in circuit court, likewise addressed such plenary circuit
court suits against adverse claimants.8 5 The manner in which
the district courts previously exercised jurisdiction over "all
matters and proceedings in bankruptcy,"86 though, was largely
through more informal summary proceedings.
By its terms, the district court's general federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction under the 1841 Act was "to be exercised summarily,
in the nature of summary proceedings in equity."87 The 1867 Act
did not specify the process-summary or plenary-for district
courts to use in exercising their general bankruptcy jurisdiction,
but the Supreme Court held that actions against adverse claim-
formal and more expeditious, initiated by a motion or petition, with a relatively short
notice period before a hearing, where the evidence would often be presented through
affidavits. See 2 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, 23.02[2].
83. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 2, 14 Stat. 517, 518 (repealed 1878), quoted
supra note 60; see also Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 8, 5 Stat. 440, 446 (repealed
1843), quoted supra note 54.
84. See Marshall v. Knox, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 551, 554-55, 556 (1872) (applying the
1867 Act); Smith v. Mason, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 419, 430-33 (1871) (same); Ex parte
Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 314-15, 316-17 (1845) (Story, J.) (applying the 1841
Act).
85. See Bush v. Elliott, 202 U.S. 477, 477-78, 482-84 (1906); Bardes, 178 U.S. at
531-32, 535-36.
86. Bankruptcy Act of 1867 § 1; Bankruptcy Act of 1841 § 6.
87. Bankruptcy Act of 1841 § 6. Summary process in bankruptcy proceedings was a
tradition imported from England. See Ex parte Matthews, 26 Eng. Rep. 1266, 1267
(Ch. 1754); COOPER, supra note 42, at 117. Assignee suits against adverse claimants,
though, were not encompassed within the English "bankruptcy" jurisdiction and, thus,
required plenary suit in a court of law or equity. See supra note 55 and accompany-
ing text. Justice Story, nonetheless, concluded that the 1841 Act's general summary
jurisdiction of "proceedings in bankruptcy" in the district courts encompassed assignee
disputes with adverse claimants via summary process. See Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
at 314, 317. Although subsequent bankruptcy statutes generally were construed to
require plenary proceedings in actions to recover money or property from adverse
claimants in either federal district or circuit court, Justice Story's original notion, that
such actions are subsumed within the scope of general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction,
endured. As explained in the text, however, the manner of proceeding (summary ver-
sus plenary) continued to complicate inquiries into the nature and extent of jurisdic-
tional grants over "bankruptcy proceedings."
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ants required a plenary suit, whether in district court or circuit
court.8" The district courts, though, summarily resolved all other
bankruptcy proceedings brought before them. 9 The procedural
backdrop against which section 23 of the 1898 Act was enacted,
therefore, was one in which assignees pursued adverse claim-
ants through formal plenary suits commenced in either a federal
district or circuit court; all other "bankruptcy proceedings," how-
ever, were conducted by summary processes in district court.
The obvious intent of section 23 of the 1898 Act, in sharp
contradistinction to the 1841 and 1867 Acts, was to contract the
bankruptcy jurisdiction of the federal courts. The Supreme
Court, thus, interpreted section 23a and 23b, in concert, as with-
holding jurisdiction from both circuit and district courts in
trustee suits against adverse claimants, except in the limited
circumstances specified.9" Section 23a accomplished this by per-
mitting a trustee's plenary suit "at law or in equity" in federal
circuit court only in those instances where the bankrupt would
have independent grounds for maintaining the cause of action in
circuit court.9" Section 23b, then, although not referring specifi-
cally to the federal district courts, but to state and federal courts
in general, likewise provided that the federal district courts
88. See Marshall v. Knox, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 554-57; Smith v. Mason, 81 U.S.
(14 Wall.) at 429-33 & 432 n.t (citing Ex parte Bacon, 2 Molloy 441). In doing so, the
Court adopted the English practice requiring a formal plenary suit in assignee actions
to recover money or property from an adverse claimant. See GEORGE TAYLOR, THE
BANKRUPT LAW, ACr OF MARCH 2, 1867, WITH NOTES AND REFERENCES TO ENGLISH
DECISIONS 61-62 (Washington, D.C., Win. H. Moore 1867) (citing Ex parte Bacon).
89. See Sherman v. Bingham, 21 F. Cas. 1270, 1272 (C.C.D. Mass. 1872) (No.
12,762) (Clifford, Circuit Justice); Goodall v. Tuttle, 10 F. Cas. 579, 582-83 (W.D. Wis.
1872) (No. 5533).
90. See Bardes, 178 U.S. at 525-27, 534-39. The Bardes case held that section 23b
limited the jurisdiction of federal courts to entertain a trustee suit to recover a
prebankruptcy fraudulent conveyance by the bankrupt. See id. at 539. After the
Bardes case, Congress amended section 23b to except from its limitations trustee suits
to avoid liens and recover preferential and fraudulent transfers. See Act of June 25,
1910, Pub. L. No. 61-294, § 7, 36 Stat. 838, 840; Act of Feb. 5, 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-
62, § 8, 32 Stat. 797, 798-99. Thus, while overturning the precise holding of the
Bardes case, Congress left intact its interpretation of section 23b as applied to all
other trustee suits against adverse claimants.
91. See, e.g., Bush v. Elliott, 202 U.S. 477, 477-78, 480-84 (1906) (finding circuit
court jurisdiction over a trustee's suit where the bankrupt was of diverse citizenship
from the defendant).
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could entertain "suits by the trustee" only if the bankrupt could
have sued in district court 92 or the defendant consented to dis-
trict court jurisdiction. 3
The theoretical conundrum introduced by section 23 came
with its juxtaposition in subsection 23a of "controversies at law
and in equity, as distinguished from proceedings in bankruptcy."94
Section 23a seemed to draw such a sharp dichotomy between
plenary suits "at law and in equity" against adverse claimants,
on the one hand, and "proceedings in bankruptcy," on the other,
that a plenary suit against an adverse claimant could in no way
be considered a bankruptcy proceeding-an implication rein-
forced by the more limited English notion of "bankruptcy pro-
ceedings," which did not include plenary suits against adverse
claimants.9" Recall, however, that under both the 1841 and 1867
Acts, general federal jurisdiction in the district courts over "all
matters and proceedings in bankruptcy" fully subsumed suits "at
law and in equity" against adverse claimants, including those
under the 1867 Act which could be maintained only through a
formal plenary suit.96
92. See, e.g., Spencer v. Duplan Silk Co., 191 U.S. 526, 526-27, 531-32 (1903) (find-
ing district court jurisdiction over a trustee's suit where both the bankrupt and the
trustee were of diverse citizenship from the defendant).
93. See, e.g., Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367, 368-71, 377 (1934). Although the
1867 Act practice requiring a formal plenary suit against an adverse claimant contin-
ued under the 1898 Act, the concept of jurisdiction by consent also extended to the
manner of proceeding, such that the defendant could consent to both federal jurisdic-
tion and summary process. See 2 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, 19 23.08, 23.14.
94. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 66, § 23a (emphasis added), quoted as
originally enacted supra text accompanying note 81.
95. See supra notes 25, 55, 69-70 and accompanying text; ef 1 WM. MILLER COL-
LIER, THE LAW AND PRACTICE IN BANKRUI1cy UNDER THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTcy ACT
OF 1898 § 2, at 38 (Frank B. Gilbert & Fred E. Rosbrook eds., 13th ed. 1923) [here-
inafter COLLIER (13th ed.)] (describing "the district courts while sitting in bankruptcy"
as 'exercising a distinct jurisdiction" analogous to that of "[t]he English court of bank-
ruptcy in the London district [which] is in effect a separate court, devoted exclusively
to bankruptcy matters").
96. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text and Part I.A2-3, notes 45-63 and
accompanying text. Nonetheless, several Supreme Court opinions under the 1898 Act
embraced the supposed dichotomy between a trustee's plenary suits and the "bank-
ruptcy proceedings" inferred from section 23a. See, e.g., Schumacher v. Beeler, 293
U.S. at 371-72; Bush v. Elliott, 202 U.S. at 479-80; Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178
U.S. 524, 531-34, 536-38 (1900); see also William E. Mussman & Stefan A. Riesenfeld,
Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 88, 101 (1948) (characterizing
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The misleading "distinction" intimated by section 23a was not
only inconsistent with the jurisprudence of the 1841 and 1867
Acts, but in addition, the statutory "distinction" could be fully
explained by the fact that section 23a, in its original form, ap-
plied only to the circuit courts. Both the 1841 and 1867 Acts
strictly limited the original bankruptcy jurisdiction of the circuit
courts to plenary suits "at law and in equity" against adverse
claimants; this contrasted sharply with the broader, general
bankruptcy jurisdiction that those previous Acts gave to the
district courts over "all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy."
9 7
Thus, section 23a's clumsy phrasing seemed to be an effort both
to contract federal jurisdiction over trustees' suits and, at the
same time, continue to confine the circuit courts to hearing, in
the limited circumstances specified, only plenary "controversies
at law and in equity" against adverse claimants and no other
"proceedings in bankruptcy."" A comparison of section 23a's
constraints on the jurisdiction of the circuit courts with section
23b's circumscription of district court jurisdiction reinforces this
interpretation. With respect to the district courts, who had en-
joyed a general jurisdiction over "all matters and proceedings in
these decisions as "misled by an erroneous reading of" Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U.S. 516
(1876)). Other Court opinions, though, espoused the view that (but for section 23) gen-
eral federal jurisdiction of the "bankruptcy proceedings" would fully comprehend a
trustee's plenary suits. See, e.g., Collett v. Adams, 249 U.S. 545, 548-50 (1919); Kelley
v. Gill, 245 U.S. 116, 119-20 (1917); Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216 U.S. 102, 106-14 (1910);
Whitney v. Wenman, 198 U.S. 539, 549-50 (1905); First Nat'l Bank v. Chicago Title &
Trust Co., 198 U.S. 280, 289 (1905). The same dissonance is evident in the contempo-
rary commentary. Compare Wn MILLER COLLIER, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY AND THE
NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1898 17-19, 24-25, 213-14 (Albany, N.Y., Matthew
Bender, 2d ed. 1899) [hereinafter COLLIER (2d ed.)] (advancing the broader view of
"bankruptcy proceedings,' based upon an analysis of 1841 and 1867 Act cases), with 1
LOVELAND, supra note 65, § 26, at 87 & § 25, at 85 (describing section 23's apparent
"distinction between" two "distinct classes of jurisdiction"). See also 1 COLLIER (13th
ed.), supra note 95, § 23, at 737 (noting that "since Ex parte Christy the questions
suggested by this section [23] have led to discussions in Congress and confusion in
the courts" (footnote omitted)).
97. The closest the circuit courts ever came to having a general bankruptcy juris-
diction was their fleeting and uncertain jurisdiction under the 1800 Act "of all cases
which shall arise . . . under the [1800] act." Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 12, 2 Stat.
89, 92 (repealed 1802); see supra note 44.
98. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 66, § 23a, quoted as originally enacted
supra text accompanying note 81.
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bankruptcy" under both the 1841 and 1867 Acts, section 23b
restricted their jurisdiction with nothing more than a terse ref-
erence to "suits by the trustee," without any mention of or differ-
entiation from the more general concept of "proceedings in bank-
ruptcy."99 The false dichotomy suggested by section 23a in ad-
dressing the peculiarities of circuit court jurisdiction, though,
directly (and impertinently) implicated the district courts after
the demise of the circuit courts in 1911, because section 23a
thereafter expressly governed jurisdiction of the district courts
over "controversies at law or in equity, as distinguished from
proceedings in bankruptcy."0 0
b. The "Bankruptcy Proceedings" in a Corporate
Reorganization
The conceptual uncertainty wrought by section 23 regarding
the nature and scope of federal "bankruptcy proceedings" came
to a head in 1938, when Congress enacted the corporate reorga-
nization provisions of Chapter X 0 With the enactment of Chap-
ter X, Congress evidently sought to afford the federal courts
broader jurisdiction in reorganization proceedings than they
enjoyed in "straight" or "ordinary" bankruptcy liquidation pro-
ceedings. 10 2 Thus, the 1938 amendments expressly made section
23 inapplicable in Chapter X reorganization proceedings,1 03 and
thereby, activated the full breadth of section 2's general federal
99. Compare Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 66, § 23b, with id. § 23a, both
quoted as originally enacted supra text accompanying note 81.
100. The Judicial Code of 1911 both abolished the circuit courts and transferred all
of their powers and duties to the district courts. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, Pub. L. No.
61-475, §§ 289, 291, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167. Formal amendment of 1898 Act § 23a, sub-
stituting "district courts" for "circuit courts," occurred in 1926. See Act of May 27,
1926, Pub. L. No. 69-301, § 8, 44 Stat. 662, 664; see also 10 COLLIER (14th ed.), su-
pra note 38, at 1799 & n.7 (marking the text of 1898 Act § 23a to reflect the 1926
amendments). Professor Moore observed that, after the amendment, "the section re-
tained its original peculiar cast, which tends to be confusing." James Wm. Moore &
Philip W. Tone, Proposed Bankruptcy Amendments: Improvement or Retrogression?, 57
YALE L.J. 683, 710-11 n.124 (1948); accord Bartle v. Markson, 357 F.2d 517, 521 &
n.5 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.).
101. Chandler Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840, 883-905.
102. For a review of the legislative background, see Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S.
642, 654-58, 661-62 (1947), and id. at 675-79 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
103. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 66, § 102.
774 [Vol. 41:743
2000] A THEORY OF FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION 775
"jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings"1 to "cause the estates
of bankrupts to be collected"0 5 in corporate reorganization pro-
ceedings. If, however, a trustee's plenary suit against an adverse
claimant was not a "bankruptcy proceeding," as insinuated by
section 23a, merely abrogating section 23 in reorganization pro-
ceedings would not, in itself, expand federal jurisdiction to per-
mit federal courts to entertain such plenary suits of reorganiza-
tion trustees.1' 6
The Supreme Court resolved this issue in the momentous case
of Williams v. Austrian,"7 which rationalized general federal jur-
isdiction of "bankruptcy proceedings" and reaffirmed Justice
104. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. In including "reorganization" proceed-
ings within the scope of the Act, the term "bankruptcy proceedings" in section 2 was
redesignated "proceedings under this [1898] Act." See supra note 76 and accompanying
text. Chapter X's corporate reorganization predecesor was section 77B, enacted in
1934, which expressly provided that "courts of bankruptcy shall exercise original juris-
diction in proceedings for relief of debtors, as provided in section 77B" and "[i]n pro-
ceedings under this section [77B] ... the jurisdiction and powers of the court . ..
with respect to the debtor and its property, shall be the same as if a voluntary peti-
tion for adjudication [as a bankrupt] had been filed." Act of June 7, 1934, Pub. L. No.
73-296, §§ 77A, 77B(o), 48 Stat. 911, 912, 922. Prior to the enactment of section 77B,
a corporate reorganization could be accomplished through the 1898 Act's composition
provisions. See 6 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, 0.03, at 21-22, 25-28. And the
Supreme Court clearly considered federal jurisdiction of "bankruptcy" proceedings to
include compositions. See Wilmot v. Mudge, 103 U.S. 217, 219 (1880) (interpreting the
1867 Act, a "composition proceeding is . .. a part of the proceedings in bankruptcy,
and one of the modes which the bankrupt law authorizes of releasing the debtor and
securing to his creditors an equal share of his means"). Thus, the 1938 change from
jurisdiction in "bankruptcy proceedings" to "proceedings under this [1898] Act" appears
to be a purely cosmetic one.
105. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 66, § 2a(7), quoted supra text accompany-
ing note 78.
106. Chapter X also contained a provision giving the reorganization court all the
powers of a federal court presiding over an equity receivership. See Bankruptcy Act of
1898, supra note 66, § 115. As discussed infra Part II.C.1, notes 332-42 and accompa-
nying text, a federal receivership court had jurisdiction over plenary suits by the
receiver against adverse claimants. It was unclear, however, whether the Chapter X
provision giving the reorganization court the "powers" of a receivership court was
jurisdictional in nature. See Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. at 659-60 & n.45; THOMAS
K. FINLETTER, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 181-82 (1939); 1 JAMES WM.
MOORE & ROBERT STEPHEN OGLEBAY, MOORE AND OGLEBAY ON CORPORATE REORGANI-
ZATION 3.18, at 665 & n.34 (1948).
107. 331 U.S. 642 (1947). At issue was federal district court jurisdiction over the
Chapter X trustees' state-law action against officers and directors of the corporate
debtor alleging a conspiracy to misappropriate corporate assets. See id. at 645-46.
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Story's broad view of the concept. The Court confirmed (1) that
the lineage of section 2's general jurisdiction over "bankruptcy
proceedings" and "proceedings under this [18981 Act" is directly
traceable to 1867 and 1841 Act jurisdiction of "all matters and
proceedings in bankruptcy,"0 8 and (2) that such a general federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction fully embraces plenary trustee suits
against adverse claimants. 0 9
Thus, despite momentary uncertainties caused by inartful leg-
islative drafting1 ° and variations in the mode of particular pro-
ceedings (i.e., summary versus plenary)-a distinction that con-
108. See id, at 646-48, 661 (citing with approval Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216 U.S. 102,
106-08 (1910) (tracing 1898 Act § 2 to 1867 Act § 1 to 1841 Act § 6)). In fact, the
"proceedings under this [1898] Act" jurisdictional language has specific ancestry in
every previous bankruptcy statute. See Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 1, 14 Stat.
517, 517, 518 (repealed 1878) (jurisdiction of "all matters and proceedings in bank-
ruptcy," including "all acts, matters, and things to be done under and in virtue of the
bankruptcy" (emphasis added)), discussed supra note 59 and accompanying text; Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 6, 5 Stat. 440, 445 (repealed 1843) (jurisdiction of "all
matters and proceedings in bankruptcy arising under this [1841] act," including "all
acts, matters, and things to be done under and in virtue of the bankruptcy" (empha-
sis added)), discussed supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text; Act of Feb. 13, 1801,
ch. 4, § 12, 2 Stat. 89, 92 (repealed 1802) (jurisdiction of "all cases which shall
arise ... under the [1800] act" (emphasis added)), discussed supra note 44.
109. See Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. at 646-62; William T. Plumb, Jr., The Tax
Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws-Tax Procedures, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1360, 1456 n.548 (1975) ("Although Christy . .. was viewed generally
as a discredited dictum in Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, the Bardes reading of the ear-
lier Acts was itself repudiated by the Court in Williams v. Austrian." (citations omit-
ted)).
110. The confusion was greatly compounded by a compilation error in the Revised
Statutes of 1874 that inaccurately denoted federal jurisdiction over "all matters and
proceedings in bankruptcy" to be exclusive of state court jurisdiction-an error that
was not corrected until 1978. See infra note 358 and accompanying text. This error,
though, when combined with section 23's misleading distinction between "proceedings
in bankruptcy" and "controversies at law and in equity," generated a deceptively at-
tractive (but false) impression that federal jurisdiction over "proceedings in bankruptcy"
was exclusive, but the "exclusive jurisdiction .. . does not extend to matters at law
or in equity which may grow out of bankruptcy proceedings." 1 LOVELAND, supra note
65, § 28, at 96 (noting that supposedly "[tihis principle is recognized by section 23 of
the act of 1898"); see also REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRuPTcY LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. No. 93-137, pt. II, at 32 (1973) [hereinafter 1973
COMM'N REPORT] (stating that for "independent suits between assignees in bankruptcy
and adverse claimants, .. . concurrent jurisdiction . .. was recognized to lie in the
federal and state courts" and thus "[ilnferentially the jurisdiction of proceedings in
bankruptcy was exclusively vested in the federal courts").
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tinues to influence thinking about and the jurisprudence of
bankruptcy jurisdictionn1L-the concept of a general federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction under the 1898 Act remained the same
as under the 1841 and 1867 Acts. General federal jurisdiction
over "bankruptcy proceedings" was ineluctably linked to the
construct of the bankruptcy estate and .its administration, in-
cluding resolution of all claims by and against the estate. A
general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over all claims to which
the estate was party, though, did not fix the absolute capacity of
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, as the 1898 Act itself further
expanded federal bankruptcy jurisdiction to certain third-party
disputes not directly involving the bankruptcy estate. This and
other examples represent the apparent origins of supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction.
2. Supplemental Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
There was an appreciable recognition under the 1898 Act that,
although somewhat inconsistent with the general desire to with-
hold the full measure of bankruptcy jurisdiction from the federal
courts, administration of the estate might implicate controver-
sies not directly involving the estate itself, but nonetheless prop-
erly resolved in federal court as an incident to federal jurisdic-
tion over the bankruptcy estate. Furthermore, the federal courts'
developing practice of entertaining otherwise jurisdictionally
111. The most prominent examples are the Court's decisions in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), Granfinanciera, SA.
v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), and Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990).
Through these decisions, the Court tied both (1) the permissible bounds of a non-Arti-
cle III bankruptcy judge's jurisdiction (over "the restructuring of debtor-creditor rela-
tions, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power," Marathon, 458 U.S. at
71 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion)), and (2) the extent of the constitutional right to a
jury trial in bankruptcy proceedings (in actions not "integral to the restructuring of
debtor-creditor relations," Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 58 (Brennan, J.)), to the 1898
Act's divide between summary and plenary proceedings. See Douglas G. Baird, Bank-
ruptcy Procedure and State-Created Rights: The Lessons of Gibbons and Marathon,
1982 SuP. CT. REV. 25, 42-47; Brubaker, supra note 13, at 1062 & n.404; S. Elizabeth
Gibson, Jury Trials and Core Proceedings: The Bankruptcy Judge's Uncertain Authori-
ty, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143, 170 (1991). In a much less obvious manner, these histori-
cal procedural differences, via Marathon, also continue to restrict the scope of federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction. See infra Part III.1 & D.2, notes 418-30, 659-84 and accom-
panying text.
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deficient claims through the doctrines of ancillary and pendent
jurisdiction, which are now collectively known as supplemental
jurisdiction," found its way into certain aspects of 1898 Act
jurisprudence. As applied to third-party disputes-to which the
bankruptcy estate was not a party-this concept actually re-
ceived express acknowledgment in the 1898 Act's jurisdictional
provisions and one of the earliest Supreme Court cases decided
thereunder. Understanding these early instances of supplemen-
tal bankruptcy jurisdiction is an important component of this
Article's theory of the conceptual expanse of federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction."n
a. The Impostor in Section 2a(20)
Tracing the development of supplemental jurisdiction under
the 1898 Act is difficult because of uneven usage of the terminol-
ogy of supplemental jurisdiction. Much confusion can be attrib-
uted to section 2a(20), enacted in 1910,4 which provided the
following:
The courts of the United States... as courts of bankrupt-
cy... are hereby invested, within their respective territorial
limits ... with such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will
enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in proceedings
under this Act... to-
(20) Exercise ancillary jurisdiction over persons or proper-
ty within their respective territorial limits in aid of a receiver
or trustee appointed in any bankruptcy proceedings pending
in any other court of bankruptcy...."'
This textual reference to "ancillary jurisdiction" can easily be
mistaken for a statutory version of supplemental bankruptcy
112. The Judicial Code's 1990 codification of the judge-made principles of ancillary
and pendent jurisdiction employs the term 'supplemental" jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §
1367 (1994); see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REvISION PROJECT
at xviii, 12-14 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1998) [hereinafter ALI, JUDICIAL CODE PRO-
JECT]. Tentative Draft No. 2 of the ALI's Judicial Code Revision Project, denominated
Supplemental Jurisdiction: Proposed Revision of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, was unanimously
approved at the ALI's May 1998 meeting. See ALI Advocates Proposed Amendment to
Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 66 U.S.L.W. 2719 (1998).
113. See infra Part II.C.3, notes 370-95 and accompanying text.
114. Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-294, 36 Stat. 838, 839.
115. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 66, § 2a(20) (emphasis added).
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jurisdiction,116 an assumption that points toward a misleading
paradigm for a theory of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion.1 7 Supplemental jurisdiction, though, is a doctrine extend-
ing the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, whereas
section 2a(20)'s so-called ancillary jurisdiction owed its existence
solely to the geographic principles of personal jurisdiction.
As the introductory phrase of section 2 indicated, unlike the
nationwide service-of-process provisions governing contemporary
bankruptcy proceedings,11 8 the 1898 Act initially limited the geo-
graphic reach of a federal district court sitting in bankruptcy to
the territorial bounds of the particular federal district. 9 Thus,
for example, when a trustee wished to bring a plenary suit
against a defendant situated beyond the process of the district
where the bankruptcy proceedings were pending, the trustee
was forced to sue that defendant in another federal district court
that could effect service on the defendant. 20 Section 2a(20) pro-
116. See, e.g., Block-Lieb, supra note 20, at 781-84 & nn.346, 351-52; cf Rosenberg,
supra note 7, at 977-80, app. at 1026-28 (discussing this aspect of 1898 Act jurisdic-
tion as a theory of "pendent courts").
117. See infra Part H.C, notes 328-95 and accompanying text (discussing the in rem
equitable receivership model of supplemental jurisdiction). Thus, Professor Block-Lieb
equates section 2a(20) with the doctrine of Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450
(1860), discussed infra notes 371-73 and accompanying text. See Block-Lieb, supra
note 20, at 782 n.346.
118. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(d), 9014.
119. See 1 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, 1 2.11[1]. Adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, also made applicable in bankruptcy proceedings,
made the process of the district courts coextensive with state boundaries and state
long-arm jurisdiction. See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 977-78. There was authority for
nationwide service of process in certain summary proceedings in reorganization cases,
but it was unclear whether such nationwide personal jurisdiction had any applicability
in "straight" liquidation proceedings. See Mussman & Riesenfeld, supra note 96, at 97-
99. With the adoption of the 1973 Bankruptcy Rules, the bankruptcy courts were
given nationwide service of process in all summary proceedings, in both reorganization
and liquidation cases. See FED. R. BANKI. P. 704(f)(1) & advisory committee's note
(1973) (superseded 1983), reprinted in 13 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, at 7-60,
J 704.01, at 7-65 to -66. Plenary proceedings, however, continued to be governed by
the more restrictive territorial service provisions of the Federal Rules. See id.
701.03, at 7-7, 704.09, at 7-102 to -103.
120. Therefore, when the 1973 Bankruptcy Rules were adopted, the advisory commit-
tee predicted that "[tihe availability of nationwide service of process under Rule
704(f)(1) [in any summary proceeding] should substantially reduce the need for ancil-
lary proceedings." FED. R. BANKR. P. 217(b) advisory committee's note (1973) (super-
seded 1983), reprinted in 12 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, 1 217.01, at 2-192.
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vided express jurisdictional authority for such an "ancillary" suit
in another federal district,1 21 and merely codified what the Su-
preme Court consistently held to be the case, even before enact-
ment of Section 2a(20): Section 2's grant to the federal district
courts of jurisdiction over "bankruptcy proceedings" vested all
district courts with bankruptcy jurisdiction, not just the "home"
court in which the debtor was adjudicated a bankrupt. 2
Thus, section 2a(20)'s "ancillary" jurisdiction was not of the
sort that later came to be known as supplemental jurisdic-
tion-an incidental jurisdiction over a related, supplemental
claim that would not "be within the original jurisdiction of the
district court if it were the sole claim pleaded in a complaint
commencing a civil action in the district court as between a sin-
gle plaintiff and a single defendant."m The subject matter juris-
diction of an 1898 Act "ancillary" court was precisely the same
as that of the "home" court-an independent, freestanding gen-
eral federal jurisdiction of any "bankruptcy proceeding" involving
the estate (as restricted by section 23), even on a single claim by
the trustee against a single defendant. Nonetheless, the modern
notion of supplemental jurisdiction did appear in 1898 Act juris-
prudence, but without the "ancillary" insignia.
b. "Necessity" Jurisdiction over Third-Party Disputes
The most significant prototype of supplemental bankruptcy
jurisdiction under the 1898 Act came in what may be the earli-
est express statutory grant to the federal courts of supplemental
121. See, e.g., Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 658-60 & n.41 (1947); Collett v.
Adams, 249 U.S. 545, 548-50 (1919); Lovell v. Newman, 227 U.S. 412, 418-19 (1913).
122. See Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216 U.S. 102, 105-15 (1910); In re Madson Steele Co.,
216 U.S. 115, 116-17 (1910); see also Lazarus, Michel, & Lazarus v. Prentice, 234
U.S. 263, 267 (1914) (stating that section 2a(20) was a codification of Babbitt v.
Dutcher); Lovell v. Newman, 227 U.S. at 418-19 (same). The same principle held un-
der both the 1841 and 1867 Acts. See Burbank v. Bigelow, 92 U.S. 179, 181-82 (1876)
(decided under the 1867 Act); Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U.S. 516, 516-18 (1876) (same);
Ex parte Martin, 16 F. Cas. 874, 874-75 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (No. 9149) (Story, Cir-
cuit Justice) (decided under the 1841 Act). Cases predating section 2a(20) also used
the misleading terminology of "ancillary" jurisdiction to describe the bankruptcy juris-
diction of federal courts other than the home court.
123. ALI, JUDICIAL CODE PROJECT, supra note 112, at 37; see id. at 39 (stating that
a supplemental claim is not a freestanding claim).
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jurisdiction. The 1898 Act itself created federal bankruptcy juris-
diction over certain incidental, third-party disputes, in what this
Article refers to as "necessity" jurisdiction, which takes on spe-
cial significance in light of the current statute's third-party "re-
lated to" bankruptcy jurisdiction.
The broad jurisdictional grant in section 2a(7) of the 1898 Act
over bankruptcy proceedings to "cause the estates of bankrupts
to be collected, reduced to money and distributed," also con-
tained the further authorization to "determine controversies in
relation thereto." " Moreover, section 2a(6) gave the district
courts jurisdiction to "bring in... additional persons or parties
in proceedings under this [18981 Act when necessary for the
complete determination of a matter in controversy. " "5 In Bryan
v. Bernheimer, 26 the Supreme Court read this provision to au-
thorize jurisdiction in the nature of the contemporary concept of
supplemental jurisdiction over third-party disputes to which the
bankruptcy estate is not party.' 7 Although the lower courts se-
verely restricted the reach of this third-party jurisdiction, Bryan
clearly augured not only the "supplemental" bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion that is a topic of current debate, 8 but also the coming ac-
cretion of federal courts' more general invocation of principles of
supplemental jurisdiction. 9
In Bryan, pursuant to the provisions of an Alabama statute,
Abraham executed a general assignment for the benefit of credi-
124. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 66, § 2a(7) (emphasis added). As the Court
noted in the Bardes case, this language went beyond that of corresponding provisions
of prior acts. See Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524, 535 (1900); see also In re
Baudouine, 101 F. 574, 576 (2d Cir. 1900) ("Standing alone, the language of clause 7
would seem to be sufficiently comprehensive to authorize the determination by courts
of bankruptcy of every controversy relating to the estates of bankrupts.").
125. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 66, § 2a(6). As originally enacted,
"proceedings in bankruptcy" appeared in lieu of "proceedings under this Act." See 1
COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, 2.38, at 255 (marking the text of section 2a(6) to
reflect the 1938 amendments).
126. 181 U.S. 188 (1901).
127. Cf 1 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, 2.38 & 2.39, at 257-58 (stating
that § 2a(6) provided statutory coverage for the broad joinder provisions of the Fed-
eral Rules made applicable in bankruptcy); infra note 143 and accompanying text
(discussing the relationship between joinder rules and the development of supplemen-
tal jurisdiction).
128. See infra Part HI.D, notes 613-84 and accompanying text.
129. See infra Part I.B.2.c-d, notes 143-61 and accompanying text.
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tors, conveying all of his property, consisting of an inventory of
goods, to Davidson as assignee for the benefit of Abraham's
creditors.13 Shortly thereafter, some of Abraham's creditors filed
a bankruptcy petition against him in federal district court. After
the petition filing, Davidson sold all of Abraham's inventory to
Bernheimer, who commenced retail sales of the goods. Under
orders of the federal district court presiding over Abraham's
bankruptcy proceedings, though, the federal marshal seized all of
the remaining inventory from Bernheimer. l'3 The district court
then determined that, by virtue of the bankruptcy filing,
"Bernheimer acquired no title to the said goods, or to the pro-
ceeds of the sales thereof made by him... superior to the title
of [Abraham's] bankrupt estate"1 2 and ordered Bernheimer to
turn over proceeds from his retail sales to, the bankruptcy es-
tate.133
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court had
jurisdiction to determine the bankruptcy estate's claim against
Bernheimer to recover this property and that the rights of the
estate superseded those of Bernheimer." Because Bernheimer
had already paid Davidson for the inventory, though, the Court
considered it "manifestly inequitable that Bernheimer should
lose both the goods themselves and the price which he had paid
to Davidson for them. l35 Even though that was an issue in
which Abraham's bankruptcy estate had no direct interest and
to which the estate would not be a party,3 6 the Court nonethe-
130. See Bryan, 181 U.S. at 188-89. For a general description of state-law as-
signments for the benefit of creditors, see Melvin G. Shimm, The Impact of State Law
on Bankruptcy, 1971 DUKE L.J. 879, 888-92.
131. See Bryan, 181 U.S. at 189.
132. Id. at 192 (quoting the district court order).
133. See id.
134. See id. at 197. The district court had jurisdiction over the claim against
Bernheimer because, as against the bankruptcy estate, Bernheimer had no substantial
defense to turnover of the funds and, therefore, was not considered an adverse claim-
ant within the jurisdictional bar of section 23. See infra notes 174-75 and accompa-
nying text. In addition, the Court held that Bernheimer had consented to district
court jurisdiction of the dispute-another exception to the jurisdictional constraints of
section 23. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
135. Bryan, 181 U.S. at 198.
136. The relationship among the parties with respect to their claims against each
other can be represented graphically as follows:
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less remanded, pointing to section 2a(6) as authority for the dis-
trict court to bring in Davidson in order to settle the equities as
between he and Bernheimer, presumably through a third-party
claim for return of the purchase price.137 Of particular note is
the fact that such a third-party impleader claim by a defendant
is now a common context for the application of supplemental
jurisdiction.13
As the Court indicated in Bryan, under the terms of section
2a(6), jurisdiction over a dispute between third parties, not di-
rectly involving the estate, existed only "when necessary for the
complete determination of a matter in controversy. " "'a Section
2a(6)'s necessity requirement subsequently evolved in the lower
courts into a rather stringent standard: "[A] bankruptcy court
does have jurisdiction to resolve a dispute between third parties
'if it is impossible to administer completely the estate of the
bankrupt without determining the controversy."l 4 Not surpris-
ingly, then, the courts considered very few third-party disputes
necessary to estate administration, and these generally con-
cerned conflicting claims to ownership of the stock interests or
Davidson
claim for
purchase
price
Abraham's claim for goods and I
Bankruptcy Estate sales proceeds Bemheimer
137. See Bryan, 181 U.S. at 198.
138. See 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3523, at 109-12 & n.65 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing supplemental jurisdiction over third-
party impleader claims under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Rich-
ard D. Freer, Third-Party Practice, in 3 JAMES WM. MOORE, MooR's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE § 14.41141[a] (3d ed. 1999) (same); Martin Redish, Supplemental Jurisdiction, in
16 MOORE, supra, § 106.0411], at 106-16 & n.4 (same).
139. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 66, § 2a(6) (emphasis added).
140. Uranga v. Geib (In re Paso Del Norte Oil Co.), 755 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir.
1985) (quoting First State Bank & Trust Co. v. Sand Springs State Bank, 528 F.2d
350, 353 (10th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added)).
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debt obligations of the debtor.' In fact, the third-party dispute
in Bryan itself almost certainly would not meet such an impossi-
bility-of-administration standard, since the bankruptcy estate
had no direct interest in the outcome of the defendant's third-
party claim.'42 This restrictive statutory version of supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction, however, was not the only example of
supplemental jurisdiction in 1898 Act jurisprudence.
c. Ancillary Jurisdiction of the Estate's Counterclaims
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,
with its provisions for liberal joinder of claims and parties, accel-
erated the development of a more generous resort to supplemen-
tal jurisdiction, which permits a federal court to entertain other-
wise jurisdictionally deficient claims that are logically and
transactionally related to a claim with an independent jurisdic-
tional basis.' To take the most common example, in instances
where a plaintiff pursues a claim founded upon federal question
jurisdiction, the federal district court has what was formerly
known as ancillary jurisdiction to hear the defendant's state-law
counterclaims "aris[ing] out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the [plaintiffs] claim," designated com-
141. See Brubaker, supra note 13, at 1050-53 nn.349 & 352 (collecting numerous cases).
142. After the Bryan case, the Supreme Court addressed bankruptcy jurisdiction over
third-party disputes only sporadically. In the case of Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S.
132 (1949), the Court found no federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over a particular third-
party dispute, but the Court emphasized that a pending state-court suit could resolve
the matter in a timely manner. See id. at 141-51. See generally Ralph Brubaker,
Nondebtor Releases and Injunctions in Chapter 11: Revisiting Jurisdictional Precepts
and the Forgotten Callaway v. Benton Case, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 54-57 (1998). In
two other cases, the Court indicated that section 2a(6) did empower federal bankruptcy
courts to resolve particular third-party disputes. See Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U.S. 161,
170-72 & n.19 (1946) (stating that the bankruptcy court, in which a derivative claim
on behalf of a corporation had been filed against the bankruptcy debtor, could resolve
an intracorporate dispute regarding control and prosecution of the derivative claim);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Bray, 225 U.S. 205, 216-19 (1912) (affirming
the dismissal of a collateral suit involving creditors' third-party claims against a
debtor's surety, relying on the exclusive jurisdiction' of the bankruptcy court over
administration of the debtor's estate and citing section 2a(6)).
143. See 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 138, § 3523, at 93-96; Richard D. Freer,
Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the Court's Role in
Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 815-17 (1989).
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pulsory counterclaims by the Federal Rules.' 4 This brand of
supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims also
appeared in bankruptcy practice under the 1898 Act.
Recall that section 23 of the 1898 Act, to a very large extent,
affirmatively denied federal bankruptcy jurisdiction in suits by
the bankruptcy estate on a debtor's state-law causes of action.14
However, the Supreme Court's sanction of ancillary jurisdiction
over compulsory counterclaims in Moore v. New York Cotton
Exchange' raised the possibility of ancillary jurisdiction over a
bankruptcy estate's state-law action, when asserted as a coun-
terclaim to a creditor's claim against the estate.147 This prospect
first took shape in the context of equitable receivership proceed-
ings and eventually gained widespread acceptance in bankruptcy.
In Alexander v. Hillman,' the Court applied Moore's ancillary
jurisdiction principles to counterclaims by a receiver against
creditors who had filed claims in federal receivership proceed-
ings. 4 9 The lower courts, relying upon Hillman, concluded that a
144. FED. R. CrV. P. 13(a); see 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 138, § 3523, at 106-08 & n.59.
145. See supra Part I.B.1.a, notes 74-100 and accompanying text.
146. 270 U.S. 593, 609-10 (1926); see also Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S.
467, 469 n.1 (1974). The compulsory counterclaim in the Moore case was made pursu-
ant to Equity Rule 30, which served as the model for the compulsory counterclaim
rule of the subsequent Federal Rules. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13 advisory committee's
note 1, 1937 adoption ("This is substantially [former] Equity Rule 30 . . . broadened
to include legal as well as equitable counterclaims." (alteration in original)).
147. The creditor's claim and the estate's state-law counterclaim can be represented
graphically as follows:
148. 296 U.S. 222 (1935).
149. See id. at 239-43 (citing Equity Rule 30 and Moore). In Hillman, clearly there
was subject matter jurisdiction over the receiver's counterclaims, through the in rem
ancillary jurisdiction principles discussed infra notes 336-39, 371-73 and accompanying
text. See Hillman, 296 U.S. at 237-38 (citing White v. Ewing, 159 U.S. 36 (1895), and
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bankruptcy trustee's compulsory counterclaims against a credi-
tor likewise were within the jurisdiction of the federal bankruptcy
court, notwithstanding the circumscription of section 23.15'
Noticeably absent from the compulsory counterclaim cases
was any reference to section 2a(6)'s necessity standard; like
general principles of supplemental jurisdiction, this jurisdiction
was, rather overtly, premised largely upon considerations of
fairness, procedural convenience, and judicial economy.' 1i More-
Pope v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. Co., 173 U.S. 573 (1899)). The Hillman
Court, thus, invoked Moore's counterclaim jurisdiction principles merely to support
personal jurisdiction over the creditors with respect to the receiver's counterclaims.
See Hillman, 296 U.S. at 238-43. Nonetheless, the ensuing bankruptcy cases applying
Hillman extended its rationale to subject matter jurisdiction, the context in which
Moore was decided.
150. See In re Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch., 464 F.2d 1136, 1138-39
(9th Cir. 1972); Nissho Am. Corp. v. Humphreys (In re Behring & Behring), 445 F.2d
1096, 1098-1100 (5th Cir. 1971); In re Carnell Constr. Corp., 424 F.2d 296, 297-99 (3d
Cir. 1970); Katchen v. Landy (In re Katchen's Bonus Corner, Inc.), 336 F.2d 535, 535-
37 (10th Cir. 1964), affd on other grounds, 382 U.S. 323 (1966); Cherno v. Engine Air
Serv., Inc. (In re Thiem Supply Co.), 330 F.2d 191, 193 (2d Cir. 1964); Peters v.
Lines, 275 F.2d 919, 923-26 (9th Cir. 1960); Dwyer v. Franklin (In re Majestic Radio
& Television Corp.), 227 F.2d 152, 154-57 (7th Cir. 1955); Inter-State Nat'l Bank v.
Luther (In re Garden Grain & Seed Co.), 221 F.2d 382, 386-90 (10th Cir. 1955);
Conway v. Union Bank of Switz., 204 F.2d 603, 606-07 (2d Cir. 1953); In re Solar
Mfg. Corp., 200 F.2d 327, 329-31 (3d Cir. 1952); In re Petroleum Conversion Corp.,
196 F.2d 728, 728 (3d Cir. 1952); Columbia Foundry Co. v. Lochner, 179 F.2d 630,
631-35 (4th Cir. 1950); Floro Realty & Inv. Co. v. Steem Elec. Corp., 128 F.2d 338,
340-41 (8th Cir. 1942); Florance v. Kresge, 93 F.2d 784, 785-86 (4th Cir. 1938); cf
Daniel v. Guaranty Trust Co., 285 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1932) (holding that no jurisdic-
tion existed over a trustee's counterclaim that was unrelated to the creditor's claim
against the estate).
151. See Peters v. Lines, 275 F.2d at 925; Solar Mfg., 200 F.2d at 331 & n.2;
Lochner, 179 F.2d at 632-34; cf Hillman, 296 U.S. at 241-43. In fact, such efficiency
concerns prompted calls by many to extend jurisdiction to even the estate's unrelated,
permissive counterclaims against creditors. See, e.g., Liman v. United Kingdom Mut.
S.S. Assurance Assoc. (In re Seatrade Corp.), 297 F. Supp. 577, 580-81 (S.D.N.Y.) (dic-
tum), appeal dismissed, 418 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1969); 1 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note
38, T1 2.40, at 266, 268; 2 id. 23.08[6], at 557-58; 4 id. 68.20, at 948-51; Martin
Gendel, Jurisdiction of a Referee in Bankruptcy to Render Affirmative Judgment on a
Counterclaim in Favor of a Trustee, 26 S. CAL. L. REV. 167, 171-72 (1953); James
Win. Moore, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Bankruptcy, 68 YALE L.J. 1, 35-
39 & n.186 (1958); Robert Stephen Oglebay, Some Developments in Bankruptcy Law
Regarding Summary Jurisdiction and the Determination of the Effect of Discharges, 21
J. NAT'L ASS'N REFEREES BANKR. 18, 20 (1946); William J. Rochelle, Jr. & John L.
King, Summary Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy: Katchen v. Landy and Questions Left
Unanswered, 1966 DUKE L.J. 669, 693-94; Charles Seligson & Lawrence P. King,
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over, in the famous bankruptcy case of Katchen v. Landy,52
which also relied heavily upon Hillman153 and procedural simpli-
fication ideals,154 the Supreme Court favorably cited the counter-
claim cases as fully in accord with its decision"5 upholding sum-
mary bankruptcy jurisdiction over a trustee's preference action
against a creditor who had filed a claim against the bankruptcy
estate. 6 Thus, 1898 Act jurisprudence clearly recognized the ap-
Jurisdiction and Venue in Bankruptcy, 36 J. NAT'L ASSN REFEREES BANKR. 73, 83
(1962).
152. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
153. See id. at 335 (quoting Hillman, 296 U.S. at 241-42).
154. "[Tlhis Court has long recognized that a chief purpose of the bankruptcy laws is
'to secure a prompt and effectual administration and settlement of the estate of all
bankrupts within a limited period," id. at 328 (quoting Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 292, 312 (1845)), and [to require the trustee to commence a plenary action in
such circumstances," where the trustee's preference claim against the creditor must be
adjudicated in passing on the validity of the creditor's claim against the estate,
"would be a meaningless gesture," id. at 334.
155. See id. at 326 & n.1, 335-36 & n.12 (characterizing the compulsory counterclaim
cases as "reach[ing] similar results").
156. See id. at 326-40. Suits to recover preferential transfers were among the narrow
class of exceptions to section 23's limitations on federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over
trustee suits. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 66, §§ 23b, 60b; supra note 90.
A preference suit, though, usually was pressed against an adverse claimant, thus
requiring a plenary suit in federal district court rather than summary proceedings
before a referee. See 2 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, 1 23.1517]; supra note 93.
Because there was clearly federal jurisdiction over the trustee's preference suit in
Katchen, therefore, all that was at issue was summary jurisdiction of a federal bank-
ruptcy referee versus plenary jurisdiction of a federal district court, which, from the
standpoint of determining the outer limits of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction (vis-k-vis
state-court jurisdiction), was insignificant in comparison to the compulsory counter-
claim cases. Katchen's significance, then, in addition to its express approval of the
compulsory counterclaim cases, is that the Court balked at the potential statutory
grounding for the compulsory counterclaim cases. Although not present in Hillman,
nor the earliest cases applying Hillman in the bankruptcy context, later cases began
characterizing the filing of a proof of claim as implied consent to federal jurisdiction
over the trustee's counterclaims. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Franklin (In re Majestic Radio &
Television Corp.) 227 F.2d 152, 156 (7th Cir. 1955); Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther
(In re Garden Grain & Seed Co.), 221 F.2d 382, 386-87, 389-90 (10th Cir. 1955); In re
Nathan, 98 F. Supp. 686, 688-93 (S.D. Cal. 1951). Consent, of course, was another
express exception to section 23, clearly giving federal courts jurisdiction over an action
by the bankruptcy estate with the defendant's consent. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
supra note 66, §§ 2a(7), 23b; supra note 93 and accompanying text. In Katchen,
though, the Court specifically refused to base its holding. upon a consent rationale.
See Katchen, 382 U.S. at 332 n.9; cf Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., The Consensual
Basis of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in Matters of Bankruptcy: Fact and Fiction, 14
RuTGERs L. REV. 491, 511-17 (1960) (criticizing the implied consent theory as a basis
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plicability of general principles of ancillary jurisdiction, and the
same was true for its supplemental sibling, pendent jurisdiction.
d. The Estate's Avoidance Actions and Pendent State-Law
Claims
The federal courts' primary use of what was formerly known
as pendent jurisdiction was the variety labeled pendent-claim
jurisdiction, which the Supreme Court consistently approved
throughout the twentieth century. 5 ' Pursuant thereto, the
courts found the 1898 Act's grant of independent federal juris-
diction over a trustee's avoidance action to also carry an inciden-
tal, supplemental jurisdiction over the trustee's pendent state-
law claims against the same defendant.
Shortly after its enactment, Congress amended section 23 to
remove from its jurisdictional bar trustees' plenary suits under
certain bankruptcy avoidance provisions, including actions to
recover preferential and fraudulent transfers." 8 Thus, when a
trustee pursued such a claim in federal court, the joinder of
for waiver of jury trial rights on an estate's counterclaims). Instead, the Katchen
Court rested its decision upon the equitable principle espoused in Hillman that served
as the progenitor for modern principles of supplemental jurisdiction-a development
"in harmony with the rule generally followed by courts of equity that having jurisdic-
tion of the parties to controversies brought before them, they will decide all matters
in dispute and decree complete relief." Katchen, 382 U.S. at 335 (quoting Hillman,
296 U.S. at 242). See generally Matasar, supra note 7, at 1477-90; Mary Brigid
McManamon, Dispelling the Myths of Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: The Rami-
fications of a Revised History, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 863 (1989). The misplaced
consent theory of counterclaim jurisdiction inhibited full recognition of general princi-
ples of ancillary jurisdiction in bankruptcy. For example, in In re Penn Central Trans-
portation Co., 419 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Pa. 1976), when the trustee, in making state-
law compulsory counterclaims, also joined additional counterdefendants pursuant to
Federal Rule 13, the court acknowledged that "the generally accepted principle of
ancillary jurisdiction" would normally support federal jurisdiction over these additional
parties, and "the policy consideration of efficient judicial administration that underlies
the concept of ancillary jurisdiction is fully applicable in the bankruptcy context." Id,
at 1384. Nonetheless, because the court viewed counterclaim jurisdiction in the bank-
ruptcy context as grounded upon a theory of implied consent, this precluded jurisdic-
tion over additional counterdefendants who had not themselves filed any claims
against the estate. See id,
157. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 722-29 (1966); Hum v.
Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175,
190-93 (1909).
158. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 66, §§ 23b, 60b, 67e, 70e(3); supra note 90.
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related state-law claims against the defendant, having no inde-
pendent jurisdictional basis by virtue of section 23's jurisdictional
constraints, presented a classic case for the invocation of pen-
dent-claim jurisdiction."9 Although there were some who be-
lieved that section 23's express restrictions on federal bankrupt-
cy jurisdiction precluded such pendent jurisdiction, 160 the domi-
nant attitude in the lower courts favored this pendent-clain
jurisdiction as "[tihe proper balance between the evils of piece-
meal litigation in different courts and undesirable federal han-
dling of state law claims."
161
In sum, then, the historical background prefacing the present
jurisdictional statute imparts two significant parameters at the
peripheral borders of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. A general
federal jurisdiction over "proceedings in bankruptcy" enveloped
all claims to which a bankruptcy estate was party. Additionally,
principles of supplemental jurisdiction were employed to hear
disputes with no independent basis for federal jurisdiction, but
that nonetheless were properly resolved in a federal court as an
incident to federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over claims by and
against a bankruptcy estate. This incidental, supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction even brought to the federal bankruptcy
forum certain third-party disputes not directly involving the
bankruptcy estate, through the 1898 Act's "necessity" jurisdiction.
Our present statute fully exploits both of these jurisdictional
159. A trustee's bankruptcy avoidance claim and a related state-law claim against a
defendant can be represented graphically as follows:
Bankruptcy (1) avoidance claim Defendant
Estate (2) related state-law claim
160. See Kaigler v. Gibson, 264 F. 240, 242-43 (N.D. Ga. 1920) ("The denial of juris-
diction is as authoritative and binding as are the permissions of the exceptions to
it."); 2 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, 23.15[5], at 616-18 & n.44.
161. Bartle v. Markson, 357 F.2d 517, 523 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.); accord
Melamed v. Lake County Nat'l Bank, 727 F.2d 1399, 1402-03 (6th Cir, 1984); In re
Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 298 F. Supp. 422, 423-26 (E.D. Pa. 1969), and 287 F.
Supp. 431, 433-34 (E.D. Pa. 1968); cf. Creel v. Lawler, 462 F. Supp. 118, 120-23 (N.D.
Tex. 1978) (recognizing pendent-claim jurisdiction, but declining to hear pendent claims
in an exercise of the court's discretion under the circumstances of the particular case).
789
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
concepts in what Congress intended to be the most complete and
pervasive federal bankruptcy jurisdiction possible.
C. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978:
Pervasive Federal Jurisdiction Renews an Unexpected
Constitutional Quandary
Enactment of the current Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 (the 1978 Reform Act)162 repealed the 1898
Act and also brought a new jurisdictional system to bankruptcy
law, with the most expansive federal bankruptcy jurisdiction in
our history. Of course, the subsequent decision in Northern Pipe-
line Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co."6 would necessi-
tate a restructuring of this new jurisdictional scheme, and the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
(the 1984 BAFJA amendments) 164 accomplished this reorganiza-
tion. Marathon and the 1984 BAFJA amendments, however,
addressed a separation of powers issue, and Marathon's pro-
scription, at its most basic level, was that the entirety of the
1978 Reform Act's pervasive federal bankruptcy jurisdiction can-
not be assigned to non-Article III bankruptcy courts.'65 That
separation of powers holding speaks solely to the proper alloca-
tion of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction as between Article III and
non-Article III federal tribunals. Marathon and the 1984 BAFJA
amendments, though, say nothing about the issue analyzed in
this Article, which pertains to the scope of federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction. 66 Irrespective of the type of federal judicial officer
who will exercise it (Article III or non-Article III), what is the
full extent of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction?
The scope of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is, of course, a
judicial federalism issue going to the allocation of judicial power
162. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
163. 458 U.S. 50 (1982), discussed infra Part III.A.1, notes 418-30 and accompanying
text.
164. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333.
165. See Marathon, 458 U.S. at 87 n.40 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) ("It is clear
that, at the least, the new bankruptcy judges cannot constitutionally be vested with
jurisdiction to decide this state-law contract claim against [defendant] Marathon.").
166. Nonetheless, Marathon and BAFJA have had an inadvertent, invidious impact
upon construction of the reach of "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction. See infra Part
IIIA l & D.2, notes 418-30, 659-84 and accompanying text.
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as between the federal courts and the state courts. What dis-
putes can we essentially take from the state courts and place
before the federal courts through our pervasive federal bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction? The 1984 BAFJA amendments made no
changes whatsoever in the scope of federal bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion, which is still defined by the same statutory grant as that of
the 1978 Reform Act.167 That provision, however, effects a sea
change from the restrictive federal bankruptcy jurisdiction of the
1898 Act.
The 1898 Act's splintering of bankruptcy jurisdiction between
federal and state courts produced a number of deleterious conse-
quences. In fact, when Congress embarked upon comprehensive
reform of bankruptcy law in the 1970s, the foremost impetus for
and target of those efforts was bankruptcy jurisdiction, 68 and
the particular difficulties Congress was confronting help inform
the nature and scope of their response.' 6s Congress's chief aim
was to rid federal bankruptcy jurisdiction of the in rem jurisdic-
tional strictures embodied in the 1898 Act 7 -- in rem concepts
imported with the 1898 Act's adoption of the bifurcated, English
model of bankruptcy jurisdiction.'7" As further explained in this
Part I.C, the 1978 jurisdictional expansion sought to simplify ju-
risdictional inquiries with a statutory grant of an awesome mag-
nitude, incorporating both a general federal bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion of all claims to which a bankruptcy estate is party and an
unrestricted jurisdiction over "related" third-party disputes. At
167. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
168. See NATIONAL BANKR. REVIEW COMMWN, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS
709 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 COMMWN REPORT].
169. For an excellent roadmap to the rather involved legislative process that led to
enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, authored by one of its principal
architects, see Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28
DEPAUL L. REV. 941 (1979).
170. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 153 (1978) (-The idea of possession and consent as
bases for jurisdiction is eliminated. The adjunct bankruptcy courts will exercise in
personam as well as in rem jurisdiction in order that they may handle everything
that arises in a bankruptcy case."), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C-AN. 5787, 5939; H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, at 48-49 (1977) ("Possession of the res[] that is the subject of a
particular proceeding will no[l longer be relevant. The bankruptcy courts will have in
personam jurisdiction over all proceedings, whether or not involving a specific item of
property."), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6010.
171. See supra notes 25, 55, 69-70 and accompanying text. See Brubaker, supra note
27, at 263-64, 266-69.
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the same time, though, Congress accorded federal bankruptcy
courts the flexibility to decline to exercise their bankruptcy ju-
risdiction on a case-by-case basis, through an express provision
authorizing discretionary abstention-a privilege generally un-
available to the federal courts. 172 This unique, discretionary ab-
stention power is central to this Article's theory regarding the
nature of "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction in third-party dis-
putes.173
The primary vice of the 1898 Act's jurisdictional regime was
that it engendered an excessive amount of preliminary litigation
over jurisdictional issues surrounding the bifurcation of bank-
ruptcyjurisdiction. The distinction between summary and plenary
proceedings that found its way into section 23's jurisdictional
divide was bound up with notions of in rem and in personam
jurisdiction. In rem jurisdiction over all property in the actual or
constructive possession of the federal bankruptcy court and pro-
ceedings to administer that property for the benefit of creditors
(so-called summary bankruptcy jurisdiction exercised through
summary processes) continued unfettered under the 1898 Act.174
A trustee's action to recover money or property from a third party,
however, was considered a summary in rem proceeding (in the
constructive possession of the court) only if the defendant had no
substantial defense to turnover of the property. Third parties
who could present more than a colorable defense were consid-
ered adverse claimants whom the trustee could pursue only
through a plenary in personam suit and subject to section 23's
restrictions on federal jurisdiction over such suits.17 5 Section 23
left summary (in rem) federal bankruptcy jurisdiction undis-
turbed, but contracted the scope of so-called plenary (in perso-
nam) federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.
Of course, because the summary-plenary determination in a
trustee's suit turned on the substantiality of turnover defenses,
any jurisdictional contest in a trustee suit required a "minitrial"
172. See Susan Block-Lieb, Permissive Bankruptcy Abstention, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 781
(1998).
173. See infra notes 442-44 and accompanying text.
174. See 2 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, 23.03, at 443.
175. See Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox (In re Cowen Hosiery Co.), 264 U.S. 426,
430-34 (1924); 2 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, I 23.05[11, at 471-72 &
23.05[31-[4], 23.06[1].
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on the merits,1 76 and the murky contours of the substantiality
doctrine itself generated even more litigation. 7 7 Moreover, both
trustees and defendants had practical and strategic incentives
for suing and resisting suit, respectively, in federal court.17' The
inevitable by-products of the 1898 jurisdictional structure, then,
were expense and delay, both of which are particularly perni-
cious in the bankruptcy context. The congressional commission
charged with study and reform recommendations, the Commis-
sion on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States (the Commis-
sion), therefore, set the tone for subsequent legislation by rec-
ommending a "comprehensive grant of jurisdiction" that "would
greatly diminish the basis for litigation of jurisdictional issues
which consumes so much time, money, and energy of the bank-
176. See 2 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, 1 23.0711].
177. See 2 id. 1 23.07[21; Ven Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Ju-
risdiction: The Chief Justice, the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 6 (1985). As the leading commentary indicated:
Naturally, each case depends upon its own particular facts, and when
one in possession asserts an adverse claim, the question may be present-
ed as to whether the court has exceeded its jurisdiction in investigating
the colorable character of the claim and has in fact determined the con-
troversy on its merits on disputed evidence.
2 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note' 38, 23.0713], at 532. For a flavor of the complex
doctrine and the extent of litigation surrounding the question of a substantial versus
a merely colorable defense, see 2 id. 23.06[2]-[12]; see also JAMES ANGELL
MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 24, at 19 (1956) ("When a
'summary' proceeding in the bankruptcy court is appropriate and when a plenary suit
is required is one of the most involved and controversial questions in the entire field
of bankruptcy." (footnotes omitted)).
178. Because a defendant could consent, either expressly or impliedly (e.g., by failure
to object), to jurisdiction in the federal bankruptcy court, see supra note 93 and ac-
companying text, a trustee could bring suit in federal court solely in the hopes of
obtaining jurisdiction by consent. See Frank R. Kennedy, An Adversary Proceeding
Under the New Bankruptcy Rules, with Special Reference to a Sale Free of Liens, 79
COM. L.J. 425, 430-32 (1974); Lawrence P. King, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the
Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38 VAND. L. REV. 675, 689 n.44 (1985). The concept
of implied consent itself added yet another jurisdictional battleground in federal bank-
ruptcy court. See 2 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, 23.08[21-[6]. The added ex-
pense and delay of pursuing litigation in other and perhaps multiple forums, though,
would nonetheless push the trustee toward federal court. Defendants could wield these
prospective burdens, as well as those flowing from extended litigation over federal
jurisdiction, as very powerful bargaining levers in negotiations with the trustee. See
1973 COMMIN REPORT, supra note 110, pt. I, at 90. Defendants were also prone to
resist federal jurisdiction because of prevailing impressions that the bankruptcy court
was "trustee friendly." Id.
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ruptcy system and of those involved in the administration of the
debtor's affairs."
179
The Commission's proposal was, rather explicitly, organized
around the historical concept of a general federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction over all claims to which a bankruptcy estate is party,
consciously derived from the jurisdictional systems of the 1841
and 1867 Acts.i8 ° Thus, the Commission's proposed statute con-
templated federal bankruptcy jurisdiction of "all controversies
that arise out of a [bankruptcy] case,"181 with specific provision
for all claims by..2 and against" the estate, and with a catchall
for "all other actions in which the trustee... is a party plaintiff
179. 1973 ColMN REPORT, supra note 110, pt. I, at 90. The Commission cited delay
as "critical" in bankruptcy cases, "particularly in the business cases where litigation is
most likely to occur . . . because of the prejudicial effect it might have on prospects
for rehabilitating an enterprise in financial distress and the aggravated risk of de-
terioration of the estate in the course of liquidation." Id. at 89. With respect to ex-
pense and the estate's obviously "limited resources with which to wage such litiga-
tion," the Commission stated that "it is common knowledge that trustees have often
foregone litigation to recover assets of estates because of the potential expense and
other difficulties." Id. at 90; see also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 17-18 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5803-04; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 13-14, 43 (1977), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5974-75, 6004; Countryman, supra note 177, at 6; Frank
R. Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Court Under the New Bankruptcy Law: Its Structure and
Jurisdiction, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63, 85-86 (1981).
180. See 1973 CoMM'N REPORT, supra note 110, pt. II, § 2-201 note 2, at 32.
181. Id. § 2-201(a), at 30 (emphasis added). The Commission's proposed statute was
introduced as a bill in both the House and Senate in the ninety-third and ninety-
fourth Congresses. See S. 236, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R. 31, 94th Cong. (1975); S. 4026,
93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 10792, 93d Cong. (1973). The National Conference of Bank-
ruptcy Judges drafted a competing bill that contained substantially identical jurisdic-
tional provisions. See S. 235, 94th Cong. § 2-201 (1975); H.R. 32, 94th Cong. § 2-201
(1975); H.R. 16643, 93d Cong. § 2-201 (1974); see also Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hear-
ings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., app. 1, at 55-58 (1976) [hereinafter
H.R. 31/32 Hearings] (setting forth a side-by-side comparison of section 2-201 of H.R.
31 and H.R. 32).
In addition to the general jurisdictional grant quoted in the text, the
Commission's bill provided that "[t]he jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts shall also
extend to the determination of... any other issue of law or fact arising in the
course of administration of a debtor's estate under this Act." 1973 COMm'N REPORT,
supra note 110, pt. II, § 2-201(b)(9) (emphasis added).
182. See 1973 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 110, pt. II, § 2-201(a)(5) (providing juris-
diction over "controversies involving property of the estate of the debtor without re-
gard to who has possession").
183. See id. § 2-201(a)(6) (providing jurisdiction over "objections to claims, whether
secured or not, against the estate").
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or defendant.""s Congress subsequently would build upon the
Commission's design of a general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
of all disputes involving the bankruptcy estate and add to it an
unqualified, unconditional "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction in
third-party disputes not directly involving the bankruptcy estate.
After extensive hearings in both the House and the Senate,
and consultations with bankruptcy and constitutional law ex-
perts, a simplified, broader jurisdictional provision emerged.'85
As enacted in the 1978 Reform Act," and preserved in current
law by the 1984 BAFJA amendments, this measure gives the
federal district courts "original and exclusive jurisdiction of all
cases under" the Bankruptcy Code,187 as well as "original but not
exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under [the
Bankruptcy Code], or arising in or related to cases under" the
Bankruptcy Code."58
This jurisdictional grant was designed to be every bit as broad
as that of the Commission bill,'8 9 which utilized the model of a
general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction of all claims by and
184. Id. § 2-201(a)(9).
185. See Klee, supra note 169, at 943-46. This simplified jurisdictional approach first
appeared in H.R. 6, 95th Cong. § 244(a) (1977) (proposing a new 28 U.S.C. § 1471).
186. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2668 (enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1471(a)-
(b) (1982) (repealed 1984)).
187. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1994).
188. Id. § 1334(b) (emphasis added). This concurrent jurisdiction over civil pro-
ceedings originally was formulated as "civil proceedings arising under or related to
cases" under the Bankruptcy Code. H.R. 6, 95th Cong. § 244(a) (1977) (proposing a
new 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b)). In a subsequent bill, this expression became "civil proceed-
ings arising under [the Bankruptcy Code] or arising under or related to cases under"
the Bankruptcy Code. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. § 243(a) (1977) (proposing a new 28
U.S.C. § 1471(b)). The substitution of proceedings "arising in" a bankruptcy case, in
the place of proceedings "arising under" a bankruptcy case, was the product of infor-
mal negotiations between the managers of the House and Senate bankruptcy legisla-
tion, first offered on the floor of the House. See 124 CONG. REC. 32,350, 32,385 (1978)
(proposing a new 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b)); Kee, supra note 169, at 953-54. There is
nothing in the legislative history or the nature of these changes to suggest that they
were anything other than mere clarifying modifications of the original language. See
Kelley v. Nodine (In re Salem Mortgage Co.), 783 F.2d 626, 633 n.17 (6th Cir. 1986)
(stating that "it appears to be a stylistic change"). Statutes providing for general
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction have at various times employed both the "under" and
the "in" terminology, separately and in combination. See supra Part I.A-B.1, notes 37-
111 and accompanying text.
189. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 446 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6401.
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against the estate. In fact, consistent with the thrust of similar
language in the 1898 Act,1" there was explicit recognition in the
legislative process that "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction went
beyond claims by and against the estate and would embrace dis-
putes between third parties having some relationship to the
bankruptcy case.191 The legislative record variously characterizes
the expanse of this jurisdictional provision as "pervasive,"92
"complete,"193 "comprehensive,"'" "as broad [a] jurisdiction as
190. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 66, § 2a(6)-(7), discussed supra Part
I.B.2.b, notes 124-42 and accompanying text. The breadth of the 1978 Reform Act's
jurisdiction was intended to fully incorporate all matters provided for in section 2a of
the 1898 Act. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 446, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN. at 6401.
191. The Chairman of the Commission, in comparing the jurisdictional provisions of
the Commission's bill, testified that "related to" jurisdiction "does not even require, for
example, that the trustee be a party to the litigation, as long as it can be determined
to be 'related to' the bankruptcy proceeding." Bankruptcy Court Revision: Hearings on
H.R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 73 (1977) [hereinafter H.R. 8200 Hearings] (state-
ment of Harold Marsh); accord id. at 114 (statement of Judge Wesley E. Brown,
Chairman, Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Bankruptcy Legislation); id. at
213 (statement of Herbert Minkel, Esq.); id. at 213-14 (statement of Arthur Moller,
Esq.); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266 and H.R. 8200 Before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong. 484 (1977) [hereinafter S. 2266 Hearings] (statement of Harold Marsh).
Parallel legislation in the Senate more explicitly adopted the estate-as-a-party
jurisdictional approach, through a grant of concurrent jurisdiction "of all civil proceed-
ings by or against a debtor in possession, a trustee, or other representative of the
estate of a debtor." S. 2266, 95th Cong. § 202 (1977) (proposing an amended 28
U.S.C. § 1334(b)). In explaining an amendment that conformed relevant portions of
this Senate bill to those of the House bill, the committee report described the change
in jurisdictional scope as "expanded to include all controversies arising out of-the
language of the Commission bill's estate-as-a-party grant-"or related to a [bankruptcy]
case." S. REP. No. 95-989, at 153 (1978) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5939; see also S. 2266, 95th Cong. § 216 (1978) (replacing former
section 202 of the bill in proposing an amended 28 U.S.C. § 1334), reprinted in 17
ALAN N. RESNICK & EUGENE M. WYPYSKI, BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978: A LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY doc. 53 (1979). Such an "expansion," then, obviously contemplated
federal jurisdiction over proceedings not "by or against a debtor in possession, a trust-
ee, or other representative of the estate of a debtor," but nonetheless "related to" the
debtor's bankruptcy case.
192. 124 CONG. REC. 34,010 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); id. at 32,419
(statement of Rep. Butler); id. at 32,410 (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at 28,258
(statement of Sen. Wallop). Because House and Senate differences were resolved with-
out a formal conference, the agreed statements of the floor managers, Representative
Edwards and Senator DeConcini, generally are given the effect of a conference report.
See Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 64 n.5 (1990); 124 CONG. REC. 32,391 (1978) (state-
ment of Rep. Reusselot).
193. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 14 n.84, 48, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5976
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possible,"'95 and "as broad as can be conceived."'9 6
The fullness of this jurisdictional grant prompted concerns of
unwarranted encroachment into the business of the state
courts197 and a proposed "jurisdiction by detriment" amendment
(the Danielson-Railsback amendment) that received initial ap-
proval on the floor of the House.19 This amendment, though,
threatened to undo the principal objectives of jurisdictional re-
form, by reintroducing splintered bankruptcy jurisdiction akin to
the bifurcated jurisdiction of the 1898 Act, with the potential for
preliminary litigation over the need for a federal forum in any
particular action. 99 Thus, after additional hearings and an addi-
tional committee report devoted to the drawbacks of the
Danielson-Railsback amendment,"° the House reversed its vote
and defeated the jurisdiction by detriment" proposal.201
The jurisdiction by detriment" advocates, to some extent,
overstated the intrusiveness of pervasive federal bankruptcy
n.84, 6010.
194. Id. at 46 (quoting 1973 COMMWN REPORT, supra note 110, pt. I, at 90), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. at 6007.
195. S. 2266 Hearings, supra note 191, at 544 (statement of Griffin Bell, Attorney
General).
196. H.R. 8200 Hearings, supra note 191, at 217 (statement of Griffin Bell, Attorney
General).
197. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 541-42 (separate views of Reps. Railsback,
Danielson, Mann, and Hyde), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6428; id. at 544 (sep-
arate additional views of Rep. Danielson), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A-N. at 6430.
198. See 123 CONG. REC. 35,673, 35,676-77, 35,692-93 (1977) (proposing an amended
28 U.S.C. § 1334); Kee, supra note 169, at 949. This amendment adopted the more
restrictive estate-as-a-party jurisdictional approach that also appeared in a parallel
Senate bill, discussed supra note 191, but the Danielson-Railsback amendment also
provided as follows:
An original action under subsection (b) of this section [estate-as-a-party
plaintiff or defendant] may be filed only with the consent of the district
court, upon a showing of need to have the case heard in a district court
to prevent a potential loss of assets or to avoid other adverse effects on
the administration of the estate of the debtor.
123 CONG. REC. at 35,676 (proposing an amended 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)).
199. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 51-52 (discussing the 'jurisdiction by detriment"
proposal made in committee), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN. at 6012-13.
200. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., BANKRUPTCY COURTS: REPORT ON HEARINGS
ON THE COURT ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE FOR BANKRUPTCY CASES (Comm. Print No.
13 1978); Klee, supra note 169, at 949-51.
201. See 124 CONG. REc. 1800, 1803-04 (1978).
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jurisdiction, because both the Commission bill2 2 and the juris-
dictional provisions that ultimately became law. tempered ex-
pansive federal jurisdiction by giving federal bankruptcy courts
a concomitantly broad, discretionary power to abstain from hear-
ing any given proceeding and leave the parties to a nonbank-
ruptcy forum.20' Thus, the new jurisdictional structure, which
the Commission originally visualized, was one that removed
wooden jurisdictional limitations, but retained enough flexibility
to accommodate the interests of the states in the development
and administration of their laws, the convenience interests of
litigants and witnesses involved in particular disputes, and the
general public interest in fair and economical resolution of litiga-
tion.2 5 From the beginning, then, an indispensable element of
this pervasive federal bankruptcy jurisdiction was a symbiotic,
synergistic discretionary abstention power.0 6
202. "Nothing in this section precludes the bankruptcy court from permitting an
action, proceeding, or matter within its jurisdiction to be commenced or continued in
another court having jurisdiction of the subject matter." 1973 COMM'N REPORT, supra
note 110, pt. II, § 2-201(c), at 31.
203. "Subsection (b) or (c) of this section [granting pervasive federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction] does not prevent a district court or a bankruptcy court, in the interest of
justice, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising under [the Bank-
ruptcy Code] or arising in or related to a case under [the Bankruptcy Code]." Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2669 (enact-
ing 28 U.S.C. § 1471(d) (1982) (repealed 1984)). The 1984 BAFJA amendments, Pub.
L. No. 98-353, § 101, 98 Stat. 333, 333, expressly added to the "interest of justice"
ground, abstention "in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State
law." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (1994). This amendment merely codified a federalism
concern underlying the original "interest of justice" language. See S. REP. No. 95-989,
at 154 (1978) (stating that the abstention power "recognizes there may be cases in
which it is more appropriate to have a State court hear a particular matter of State
law"), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5940; cf. Block-Lieb, supra note 172, at
808-10 (noting that, if anything, the 1984 amendments evince a congressional intent
to expand the scope of permissive bankruptcy abstention).
204. Codification of a discretionary abstention power acknowledged (and likely ex-
panded) an existing body of Supreme Court precedent recognizing the propriety of a
federal bankruptcy court staying its hand, in cases such as Thompson v. Magnolia Pe-
troleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940). See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 51, 446 (citing
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6012, 6401; 1973
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 110, pt. II, at 32-33 (citing Thompson v. Magnolia Petro-
leum); Block-Lieb, supra note 172, at 796-806.
205. See 1973 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 110, pt. I, at 81, 89-90, pt. II, at 32-33.
206. The House committee responsible for the even broader jurisdictional provisions
ultimately enacted, adopted much of the Commission's reasoning verbatim. See H.R.
798
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The drafters of the 1978 Reform Act, somewhat ironically,
thought that the "powerful"2 7 breadth of the jurisdictional provi-
sions would "leave no doubt as to the scope of the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction over disputes,"208 and the legislative history
reveals virtually no regard for just how far "related to" jurisdic-
tion extends. In fact, the only limitations suggested are whatever
limits the Constitution imposes.2 9 That constitutional issue,
REP. NO. 95-595, at 43-48 (quoting 1973 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 110, pt. I, at
88-92), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. at 6004-09. The committee report expressly
rejected any functional, case-by-case approach to determining the parameters of fed-
eral bankruptcy jurisdiction. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 52, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6013. Whatever tailoring is necessary to address the peculiarities of
any particular case, instead, was left to the discretionary abstention power:
[In order to insure that the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is exer-
cised only when appropriate to the expeditious disposition of bankruptcy
cases, the bill codifies present case law relating to the power of absten-
tion in particular proceedings by the bankruptcy court. Occasions arise
when determination of an issue is best left to a court that decides simi-
lar issues regularly, especially if the issue is one that requires a particu-
lar expertise that the bankruptcy court does not have. For example, in
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum, the Supreme Court required a bank-
ruptcy court to defer to a State court for determination of a particularly
unusual question of State real property law. The power of abstention is
necessary to the effective and meaningful exercise of the expanded jurisdic-
tion granted by this bill.
Id. at 51, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.N. at 6012 (emphasis added). Testimony in
congressional hearings also reinforced this symbiotic relationship between expansive
jurisdiction and discretionary abstention. See, e.g., H.R. 8200 Hearings, supra note
191, at 239, 242 (statements of Prof. Vern Countryman, George Triester, Prof. Frank
Kennedy, and William Rochelle on behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference); id.
at 106-07 (statement of Louis Levit, Commercial Law League); S. 2266 Hearings, su-
pra note 191, at 832 (statement of Charles A. Horsky, Chairman, National Bankrupt-
cy Conference); The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong. 35 (1975) (statement of Prof. Frank Kennedy, Executive Director, Com-
mission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States); H.R. 31/32 Hearings, supra note
181, pt. 1, at 584 & n.1 (statement of George Triester, Vice-Chairman, National Bank-
ruptcy Conference). For discussions of the role of abstention in third-party disputes
encompassed within "related to" jurisdiction, see H.R. 8200 Hearings, supra note 191,
at 213-14 (statements of Herbert Minkel, Esq. and Arthur Moller, Esq.); H.R. 31/32
Hearings, supra note 181, pt. 1, at 315-16 (statement of Daniel Cowans, Esq.).
207. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 49, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6010.
208. Id. at 446, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C-.AN. at 6401; S. REP. No. 95-989, at 154,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5940.
209. The committee report in the House quoted the following passage from the
Commission's report:
Litigation of jurisdictional issues would not be eliminated since the exis-
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though, is one that has persistently perplexed the most eminent
scholars of the federal court system.
In the legislative debates over the 1978 Reform Act's jurisdic-
tional provisions, the looming and distinct separation of powers
problems introduced by the Reform Act's non-Article III bank-
ruptcy judges completely overshadowed the constitutional feder-
alism issues embedded in the outermost boundaries of federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction. 2" Not surprisingly, though, ensuing
case law charting the farthest reaches of statutory bankruptcy
jurisdiction has been almost completely random.211 Without a
clear vision of the constitutional dimension of federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction, interpreting the statutory grant is an aimless and
haphazard endeavor. Thus, Part II formulates a comprehensive
constitutional theory of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, which
then is employed in Part III to design an interpretive theory for
the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute.
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF FEDERAL
BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
The capaciousness of a general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
over all claims by and against a bankruptcy estate and the ab-
tence of jurisdiction is always questionable in a federal tribunal. As part
of the federal government the bankruptcy courts would be courts of lim-
ited jurisdiction, and it would always be open to a party haled into such
a court to object that there was not sufficient connection between the
litigation and any legitimate federal concern to warrant the assumption
of jurisdiction. See MacLachlan § 197, at 212.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 46 n.29 (quoting 1973 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 110, pt.
I, at 100 n.29), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6008 n.29. The cited discussion in
the MacLachlan hornbook alludes to the constitutional federal question issues dis-
cussed infra Part II.B, notes 253-327 and accompanying text. See also H.R. 31/32
Hearings, supra note 181, pt. 1, at 315-16 (detailing an exchange between Ken Klee,
committee counsel, and Daniel Cowans, Esq., regarding "constitutional restrictions on
comprehensive jurisdiction" in third-party disputes); 123 CONG. REC. 35,681 (1977)
(statement of Rep. Railsback) ("We would expand the jurisdiction within what we
believe to be constitutional limits, a concept that is endorsed by all of the interested
groups."); cf MACLACHLAN, supra note 177, § 219, at 245-46 (alluding again to the
constitutional federal question issue).
210. See generally CONST. BANKR. CrS., supra note 6 (discussing the status and con-
stitutional considerations surrounding the proposed bankruptcy courts).
211. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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sence of any definitive constitutional rationale for its existence
have made bankruptcy jurisdiction a popular testing ground for
various unconventional constitutional theories of federal jurisdic-
tion. In many respects, however, these exegeses have proceeded
from faulty assumptions about the bankruptcy process and dis-
torted paradigms of bankruptcy jurisdiction. Properly conceived,
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is, in all its permutations, fully
explained by traditional constitutional theory. The constitutional
account of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction developed in this Part,
then, not only reinforces the durability and versatility of ortho-
dox federal jurisdiction theory, but it also holds the solution for
many of the most knotty problems concerning the sweep of the
statutory grant of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.
The most elementary aspect of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is
the power to entertain "all civil proceedings arising under title 11
[the Bankruptcy Code]." 1 This "arising under' bankruptcy juris-
diction was designed to replicate general federal question juris-
diction where the source of federal law under which a claim is
made is the federal Bankruptcy Code. 13 Thus, for example,
when a trustee seeks to recover a preferential transfer pursuant
to the cause of action created by section 547 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 14 this action is constitutionally secure in federal court as
an Article III claim "arising under.., the Laws of the United
States."215 This conventional "arising under," federal question
jurisdiction, though, is but a small component of federal bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction.
A general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, in assigning to the
federal courts all claims by and against a debtor's bankruptcy
estate, also permits federal adjudication of state-law claims that
do not constitute Article III "Controversies.. . between Citizens
of different States."216 The Supreme Court has affirmed unwa-
veringly the constitutionality of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
over nondiverse state-law claims; it has not, however, clearly or
consistently articulated the basis for this conclusion. Indeed, in
212. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994).
213. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 445, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN. at 6401.
214. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994).
215. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, c. 1.
216. Id.
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declaring the 1978 Reform Act's jurisdictional provisions uncon-
stitutional on separation of powers grounds-because they per-
mitted a non-Article III adjunct to adjudicate a Chapter 11
debtor's state-law breach-of-contract action-all of the opinions
in the Marathon case unceremoniously assumed that there
would be no constitutional bar to an Article III federal court
entertaining the action.217
In the ensuing congressional scramble to restructure the fed-
eral bankruptcy court system, the lurking uncertainty regarding
the constitutional foundation for far-reaching federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction of state-law claims belatedly surfaced.21s One prod-
217. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 72
n.26, 84 n.36 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (stating that the debtor's state-
law contract action "may be adjudicated in federal court on the basis of its relation-
ship to the petition for reorganization," even though "Congress has not purported to
prescribe a rule of decision for the resolution of [the debtor's] contractual claims"); id.
at 89 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (stating that if the lawsuit "is to be resolved by an
agency of the United States, it may be resolved only by an agency which exercises
'[tihe judicial power of the United States' described by Art. III of the Constitution");
id. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (opining that with respect to "a 'traditional' state
common-law action, not made subject to a federal rule of decision and related only
peripherally to an adjudication of bankruptcy under federal law," all of the "problems
arising from today's judgment can be resolved simply by providing that ancillary com-
mon-law actions, such as the one involved in these cases, be routed to the United
States district court"); id. at 95 (White, J., dissenting) (reasoning that "if the Court is
correct that such a state-law claim cannot be heard by a bankruptcy judge," then
"cases such as these would have to be heard by Art. III judges"); see also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 4.5.3, at 237 (2d ed. 1994) ("None of the jus-
tices . . . indicate[d] that it would be unconstitutional to vest an Article I judge
with the bankruptcy courts' power to decide state law claims.").
In subsequent testimony to Congress, Professor Redish characterized this as "the
ultimate irony in Northern Pipeline":
[Bloth the plurality and concurring opinions reach the conclusion that the
one type of case which must be heard by an article III court is a suit
between private litigants over a state-created cause of action, a case that
arguably does not even fall within the terms of article III, except when
diversity of citizenship is present.
Northern Pipeline Bankruptcy Decision: Hearings on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 315 (1982) (statement of
Prof. Martin H. Redish); accord MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS
IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 67 (2d ed. 1990).
218. See S. REP. No. 98-55, at 18-19, 40-41 (1983); 129 CONG. REC. 9922 (1983)
(statement of Sen. Thurmond). Senator Hatch was most persistent in pressing this
issue. See 130 CONG. REC. 13,066-67, 20,085, 20,086-87, 20,089-91 (1984); 129 CONG.
REC. 9938-39 (1983). For excellent summaries of the profuse congressional activity
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uct of this concern was a revival of the once-repulsed jurisdic-
tion by detriment" proposal, previously put forth and defeated in
congressional debate over the 1978 Reform Act.219 The renewed
version of this proposal, now in a much weaker form, was enacted
as the so-called mandatory abstention provisions of the 1984
BAFJA amendments, ostensibly requiring abstention in favor of
proceedings in state court under specified circumstances.22 Some
in Congress championed mandatory abstention, which supple-
ments the 1978 Reform Act's broader discretionary ("permis-
sive") abstention provisions, as an appropriate response to the
constitutional "problems" associated with an overly extensive
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.221 Of course, if federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction is set at the constitutional maximum, in accordance
with the design of the 1978 Reform Act, then by definition, it
will not produce an unconstitutionally broad federal jurisdic-
tion.222 Moreover, the "new" bankruptcy court structure of the
following Marathon, see Susan Block-Lieb, Using Legislative History to Interpret Bank-
ruptcy Statutes, in BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE AND STRATEGY 1 2.0211]-[5] (Alan N.
Resnick ed., 1987); Jean K. FitzSimon & Andrea J. Winkler, Legislative History of the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, in COLLIER (15th ed.),
supra note 66, app. E, pt. 6(b).
219. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
220. Mandatory abstention is as follows:
Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State
law claim or State law cause of action, related to a [bankruptcy]
case... but not arising under [the Bankruptcy Code] or arising in a
[bankruptcy] case, with respect to which an action could not have been
commenced in a court of the United States absent [bankruptcy] jurisdic-
tion. .. , the district court shall abstain from hearing such proceeding if
an action is commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum
of appropriate jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (1994). Because the federal bankruptcy court retains a certain
amount of discretion to determine what is necessary for a state court adjudication to
be considered "timely," the "mandatory" abstention moniker is somewhat misleading.
Case law confirms that timeliness must "be referenced against the needs of the [bank-
ruptcy] case, rather than against an absolute time guideline," 1 COLLIER (15th ed.),
supra note 66, 1 3.05[2], at 3-71, and "Ithe bankruptcy court is best able to coordi-
nate the timing of the proceeding with the needs of the bankruptcy case," JOHN SILAS
HOPKINs, II, THE BANKRUPTCY LTIGATOR'S HANDBOOK § 11.09, at 82 (1993).
221. See Block-Lieb, supra note 172, at 831-34.
222. To the extent the Supreme Court's general federal abstention jurisprudence is of
constitutional proportions (a matter of considerable uncertainty), such general absten-
tion doctrines would be equally applicable in the bankruptcy context, even without the
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1984 BAFJA amendments fully retained the 1978 Reform Act's
scheme of an all-encompassing federal jurisdiction over all civil
proceedings "arising under" the Bankruptcy Code, or "arising in"
mandatory abstention statute. See id. at 820, 833-34 & n.257; cf. ALI, JUDICIAL CODE
PROJECT, supra note 112, at 109, 93 (discussing the general power of a federal court
to abstain, which is "supported by no clear consensus of justification," as being "sub-
sumed within the power to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction"). Thus, con-
tentions that the mandatory abstention statute was of constitutional compulsion seem
misplaced. See 1997 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 168, at 723 (opining that mandatory
abstention has "no bearing on the constitutionality of the current bankruptcy court");
Block-Lieb, supra note 172, at 833 n.256 ("If bankruptcy jurisdiction is constitutionally
conferred on district courts, then the Constitution does not require district courts to
abstain from its exercise."); Galligan, supra note 7, at 15-16 n.54 (arguing that if
bankruptcy jurisdiction is unconstitutionally broad, "abstention is an illogical re-
sponse"; rather, "[n]o jurisdiction is the only answer"); cf. Bobroff v. Continental Bank
(In re Bobrofi), 766 F.2d 797, 802 n.3 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that the mandatory
abstention statute "presuppose[s] that 'related to' jurisdiction exists"). BAFJA's manda-
tory abstention provisions actually were touted as some sort of miraculous constitu-
tional cure-all, remedying even the Marathon separation of powers problem-a posi-
tion that also seems unfounded. See Block-Lieb, supra note 172, at 827-31.
A more rational explanation for the mandatory abstention provision is that it is
a legislative accommodation of the persistent efficiency-federalism tension inherent in
a general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction-the same tension that produced the restric-
tive jurisdictional provisions of the 1898 Act and the ill-fated 'jurisdiction by detri-
ment" proposal in 1978. See S. REP. No. 98-55, at 18-19, 41 (1983) (stating that the
mandatory abstention provision "draws an equitable balance between the legitimate
interests of federalism-federal courts deciding federal law, State courts deciding State
law-and the important interests promoted by the 1978 Act in consolidating as much
jurisdiction as possible in a single decision-making body"); 130 CONG. REC. 17,157
(1984) (statement of Sen. Dole) (considering the contours of mandatory abstention and
noting that "[c]ertainly, comity between Federal and State courts depends upon the
mutual respect that each of those divisions of the national judiciary has for the ju-
risdiction of the other," but "I believe that it is equally essential that a bankruptcy
court-or district court hearing a bankruptcy pr[o]ceeding-have the ability to expedi-
tiously dispose of all claims that may be pressed by or against a debtor"); id. at
17,156 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (describing the need for an "acceptable compromise"
on a mandatory abstention provision that acknowledges "the wisdom of respecting the
authority of State courts to adjudicate purely State law issues, and the advisability of
fashioning an efficient bankruptcy system"); 129 CONG. REC. 9924 (1983) (statement of
Sen. Heflin) (noting that "[t]he 1978 act significantly expanded the scope of Federal
jurisdiction" and the mandatory abstention provision "gives increased respect for State
courts and State laws by according greater opportunity for purely State law issues to
be adjudicated in State court"); id. at 9922 (statement of Sen. Thurmond) ('The new
[abstention] provisions do not entirely reverse the changes enacted by the 1978 act
but merely attempt to establish a more appropriate balance between the scope of
responsibilities of Federal and State tribunals."); see also Galligan, supra note 7, at
65.
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or "related to" bankruptcy cases. 2 The constitutional "problem"
presented by this pervasive bankruptcy jurisdiction statute,
thus, remains one of determining what the constitutional maxi-
mum for federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is,2" and this Part ven-
tures into that thicket.
Initially, this Part explores Congress's Article I Bankruptcy
Power, which itself can be credibly construed to contain an au-
thority to place adjudication of state-law claims in the federal
courts. This, however, invites a dangerous demise of Article III's
limits on the federal judicial power, through open-ended theories
of "protective jurisdiction." In addition, an Article I theory of
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, tellingly, reveals nothing about
the proper interpretation and bounds of third-party "related to"
bankruptcy jurisdiction.2 5
Constitutional federal question jurisprudence, and its "original
federal ingredient" theory for adjudication of state-law claims in
federal court, has been recognized widely as having substantial
sway in bankruptcy, but without any consensus on the extent of
its application. The visibility of the federal bankruptcy trustee,
being a real person, obscures the artificial legal person on whose
behalf the trustee acts, the federal bankruptcy estateS26-thus,
eclipsing the "original federal ingredient" in Chapter 11 reorga-
nization cases in which no trustee is appointed. Because both
the Bankruptcy Code and the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute
223. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b); see supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text. The BAFJA
amendments addressed the Marathon separation of powers holding by altering the
allocation of this pervasive jurisdiction as between the Article III district courts and
their non-Article III adjuncts, the bankruptcy courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 157; infra Part
IlI.A.1, notes 418-30 and accompanying text. This division of judicial responsibilities
displays many of the features of the adjunct referee system employed under the 1898
Act. See Brubaker, supra note 13, at 1042-45, 1059-61.
224. As Professor Block-Lieb has noted, like the 1978 Reform Act, the 1984 BAFJA
amendments also sought to retain a federal bankruptcy jurisdiction as expansive as is
constitutionally permissible: 'he fragmentation of bankruptcy jurisdiction among fed-
eral district courts, bankruptcy courts and state courts conflicts with the bankruptcy
goal of expeditious administration. Therefore, Congress sought to divide bankruptcy
jurisdiction among these courts only as much as the Constitution required." Block-
Lieb, supra note 172, at 813-14.
225. See infra Part II.A, notes 231-52 and accompanying text.
226. See infra Part fI.B.1, notes 269-91 and accompanying text.
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personify the federal bankruptcy estate, even in Chapter 11 re-
organization cases, Justice Story's archetype of a general federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction over all claims by and against a bank-
ruptcy estate is fully explained by a federal entity theory of con-
stitutional federal questions.227
The ultimate test for a constitutional theory, though, is pre-
sented by federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over third-party dis-
putes to which the bankruptcy estate is not a party-claims that
are not explained by a federal entity theory. Supplemental juris-
diction is the obvious candidate, yet scholars have improperly
assumed that supplemental state-law claims in bankruptcy are
ancillary to the federal bankruptcy "case," employing an anach-
ronistic in rem theory of ancillary jurisdiction.22 s A bankruptcy
"case," though, is not the equivalent of an ordinary civil "case."
Bankruptcy contains a unique admixture of ordinary adversarial
litigation, contested administrative hearings, and judicial over-
sight of an administrative process-some of which contains liti-
gable controversies and some of which does not. An attempt to
find a uniform theory that explains all of bankruptcy jurisdiction
as one constitutional "case," then, seems predestined to fall
short, and the in rem bankruptcy "case" theory ultimately proves
inadequate for the task.
The complex nature of a bankruptcy "case" distracts and con-
ceals the essential character of federal jurisdiction over the vari-
ous justiciable controversies that arise during the course of ad-
ministration of a bankruptcy estate. Individual bankruptcy "pro-
ceedings" have always provided the relevant jurisdictional unit
in bankruptcy.2 2 9 Explaining federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over
all of these bankruptcy "proceedings," therefore, is simply a mat-
ter of combining two conventional constitutional theories in a
perfectly orthodox manner. All claims by and against a bank-
ruptcy estate have an independent, freestanding basis for federal
jurisdiction as constitutional federal questions to which a federal
entity is party. "Related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction in third-
227. See infra Part II.B.2, notes 292-327 and accompanying text.
228. See infra Part II.C.1, notes 332-42 and accompanying text.
229. See infra Part II.C.2, notes 343-69 and accompanying text.
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party disputes, then, simply reduces to a form of modern in
personam supplemental jurisdiction over third-party claims
"related to" the constitutional federal question claims by and
against the bankruptcy estate.3 0 Moreover, this constitutional
theory provides the clarity necessary to a principled interpretive
framework for the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute.
A. An Article I Approach:
The Bankruptcy Power as a Federal Forum Power
Relying upon Congress's Article I Bankruptcy Power to ex-
plain federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over state-law claims is
tempting, yet treacherous and, ultimately, unhelpful and unwar-
ranted. An Article I approach to federal bankruptcy jurisdiction,
reflected more generically in "protective jurisdiction" theories,
provides no assistance in discerning the appropriate contours of
thir&-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction.
Most of the Supreme Court's discussions2"' of Congress's con-
stitutional power to vest bankruptcy jurisdiction in the federal
courts simply rely upon Congress's power under Article I "[t]o
establish... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States."2 '2 This approach has definite ap-
peal, as bankruptcy "law," for the most part, functions not to
create distinct federal grounds for recovery or relief, but to cre-
ate an alternative means for enforcing existing substantive
rights, most of which are grounded in state law. The historical
role of bankruptcy has been to provide a centralized mechanism
for collection of a debtor's assets and distribution of those assets
among all of the debtor's creditors, 33 and in our Anglo-American
230. See infra Part H.C.3, notes 370-95 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 483-84 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337
U.S. 582, 594-99 (1949) (Jackson, J., plurality opinion); Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S.
642, 652 n.24 (1947); Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 439 (1940); Schumacher v.
Beeler, 293 U.S. 367, 374 (1934); Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox (In re Cowen Ho-
siery Co.), 264 U.S. 426, 430 (1924); Sherman v. Bingham, 21 F. Cas. 1270, 1272
(C.C.D. Mass. 1872) (No. 12,762) (Clifford, Circuit Justice), opinion adopted in Lathrop
v. Drake, 91 U.S. 516, 518 (1876); accord 1973 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 110, pt. I,
at 91; MACLACHLAN, supra note 177, § 194, at 207, § 219, at 245.
232. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
233. See Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 186 (1902) (stating that the
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experience, bankruptcy's centralized collection-distribution func-
tion has been administered as a judicial process.2" Thus, it is
perfectly logical to conclude that congressional power to enact
uniform national bankruptcy "laws" necessarily, and even pri-
marily, envisions the power to place adjudication of all disputes
incident to administering bankruptcy estates in federal court.15
Bankruptcy Power "extends to all cases where the law causes to be distributed, the
property of the debtor among his creditors; this is its least limit") (quoting In. re
Klein, 14 F. Cas. 716, 718 (C.C.D. Mo. 1843) (No. 7865) (Catron, Circuit Justice)). As
Professor Radin put it: "Unless we intend to bring the creditors into one large group,
and adjust their common claims to a fund consisting of a single debtor's property,
there is no reason to have recourse to bankruptcy." Max Radin, The Nature of Bank-
ruptcy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1940); see also Baird, supra note 111, at 35 (noting
that "bankruptcy law provides a single forum and procedures that are directed spe-
cifically at the problem of identifying claims and gathering assets," and a "bankruptcy
proceeding is principally a forum in which all of a debtor's creditors can gather, as-
semble the debtor's assets, and divide them among themselves, according to the rights
that state law gives them"); Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy
Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 223, 225 (1918) (stating that "[all bankruptcy law. . . no
matter when or where devised and enacted ... aims, first, to secure an equitable
division of the insolvent debtor's property among all his creditors" through "[a] special
process of collective execution . . .directed against all of the property of the debtor,
resorted to for the common benefit and at the common expense of all the creditors");
Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 325, 329 n.21 (1991) (characterizing "the essence of a bankruptcy proce-
dure" as "collection of the debtor's assets, liquidation, and distribution on a pro rata
basis to all creditors").
234. See 1973 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 110, pt. I, at 85. For a discussion of the
early development of Chancery's province in English bankruptcy, see W.J. JONES, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH BANKRUPTCY: STATUTES AND COMMISSIONS IN THE EARLY
MODERN PERIOD 40-51 (1979). Professor Helnholz even finds antecedents to English
bankruptcy practice in the ecclesiastical courts, prior to the earliest Tudor-period
bankruptcy statutes. See R.H. HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND ch.
15 (1987). The judicial function in bankruptcy was certainly clear to the Framers of
the Constitution. In fact, at the Convention, the impetus for the Bankruptcy Clause
was discussion regarding full faith and credit for state-court judgments. See Kurt H.
Nadelmann, On the Origin of the Bankruptcy Clause, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 215
(1957).
235. Accordingly, a prominent commentary of a previous generation reasoned as fol-
lows:
The constitutional grant of power to Congress to enact laws with respect
to "bankruptcies" necessarily carries with it, by implication, power to reg-
ulate and deal with all incidents of the subject. By its very nature, the
administration of insolvency cases is a judicial function ...or at least a
matter for judicial supervision. Adequate handling of such matters re-
quires the determination of a series of points of law in the light of facts
presented even in the simplest instance and frequently runs into numer-
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The lure of an Article I approach to federal bankruptcy juris-
diction has spawned a more universal theory of an Article I
power to invest state-law claims in the federal courts-the so-
called protective jurisdiction theory."6 Analogizing to the bank-
ruptcy model, this theory posits that there may well be many
other instances where Congress, within the realm of its enumer-
ated Article I legislative powers, perceives independent value in
a federal tribunal, but without the need for substantive federal
law governingparties' rights and obligations." 7 Under this theory,
then, Congress's legislative prerogatives include extending the
federal judicial power to state-law claims if "necessary and
proper to protect a federal forum interest.239
To the extent protective jurisdiction relies solely upon
Congress's Article I powers, it rings inharmoniously with the
conventional wisdom that the Framers intended Article Ill as
both the source and limits of the federal judicial power. More-
over, Article III seems to contemplate only a very narrow class
of federal "protective" jurisdiction over state-law claims, through
the Diversity Clause.' In an attempt to bring protective juris-
ous incidental and collateral controversies of a justiciable nature, the con-
clusive determination of which is essential to complete and ultimate dis-
position. It is therefore essential to fix jurisdiction in some qualified tri-
bunal, and to invest it with exclusive jurisdiction so that it can draw
into the proceeding, and finally determine, all phases and problems es-
sential to the aim and object of ultimate adjustment of the debtor's lia-
bility and his creditors' rights.
1 REINGTON, supra note 65, § 13, at 27.
236. See generally Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7; Rosenberg, supra note 7. Justice
Jackson and Professors Forrester and Wechsler first articulated different versions of
this theory, simultaneously and independently. See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewa-
ter Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 588-600 (1949) (Jackson, J., plurality opinion); Ray
Forrester, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Labor Disputes, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 114, 120, 128-31 (1948); Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revi-
sion of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 224-25 (1948).
237. See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 948-51. For an extensive discussion of such
federal forum interests, see Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 566-83.
238. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
239. See Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 589 (Jackson, J., plurality opinion).
240. In the Tidewater case, a majority of the Court advanced this reasoning force-
fully in three separate opinions rejecting Justice Jackson's effort to discard Article HI
as a limitation on federal jurisdiction. See id. at 607-16 (Rutledge, J., concurring); id.
at 626-45 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting); id. at 646-52 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Oddly
enough, though federal jurisdiction was upheld in the Tidewater case (extending diver-
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diction within the confines of Article III, some have suggested
that such a congressional grant of federal jurisdiction over state-
law claims could be considered a species of Article III's "arising
under," federal question jurisdiction. Where do these scholars
find the federal law that such an action "arises under"? In the
federal jurisdictional statute itself, enacted pursuant to one of
Congress's Article I powers.24' In addition to the troubling circu-
larity of this reasoning, it does not respond to the concern that
Article III was designed to restrain the federal judicial power.
Given the nearly limitless field of Congress's Article I concerns,
this approach to federal jurisdiction could, indeed, undermine
any intended checks against endless encroachments of the federal
judicial power into a protected sphere of state autonomy over the
development and administration of state law. 2 And therein lies
the ultimate predicament presented by protective jurisdiction;
theories of protective jurisdiction inevitably lead to a con-
founding quest for meaningful, workable limits. Our bankruptcy
context presents a vivid example.
The statutory grant of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over
any and all state-law claims "related to" a pending bankruptcy
case was designed to be as broad as is constitutionally permissi-
ble.24 Protective jurisdiction theory as a constitutional meter,
however, provides absolutely no guidance on the appropriate
content of "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction. The most expan-
sity jurisdiction to citizens of the District of Columbia), no single rationale sustaining
federal jurisdiction garnered the backing of a majority of the Court. "And so, con-
flicting minorities in combination bring to pass a result-paradoxical as it may ap-
pear-which differing majorities of the Court find insupportable." Id. at 655 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
241. See Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the
Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1957); Wechsler,
supra note 236, at 225 ("A case is one 'arising under' federal law within the sense of
Article III whenever it is comprehended in a valid grant of jurisdiction as well as
when its disposition must be governed by the national law.").
242. Indeed, Professor Wechsler acknowledged that "[t]here is hardly any limit to the
cases it would draw today." Wechsler, supra note 236, at 225. For an insightful dis-
cussion of the state autonomy implications from federal adjudications of state-law
actions, see Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 595-608. On the role of the courts in
safeguarding state autonomy, by exposition of constitutional limits on congressional
action, see William T. Mayton, "The Fate of Lesser Voices".• Calhoun v. Wechsler on
Federalism, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083 (1997).
243. See supra notes 209, 222-24 and accompanying text.
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sive form of protective jurisdiction would afford nearly conclu-
sive legitimacy to all congressional enactments, relying on the
political process to confine federal jurisdiction within acceptable
bounds.' This approach, of course, eschews the task of defining
limits, and ironically then, in the context of "related to" bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction, actually fixes the jurisdiction-limiting func-
tion in the politically insular federal judiciary. Not only does this
result contradict a major premise of the theory and present a
startling opportunity for one branch's self-aggrandizement, but as
evidenced by the case law, the absence of coherent limiting prin-
ciples also leads to arbitrary and inconsistent decision making.'
More limited theories of protective jurisdiction, such as bal-
ancing tests' and active federal program or policy prerequi-
sites, 7 likewise produce hopelessly inconclusive results, because
244. Professor Galligan employs this version of protective jurisdiction to explain
bankruptcy jurisdiction. See Galligan, supra note 7, at 54-72. Significantly, other than
noting the issue, nowhere does Galligan confront the difficulties of determining what
claims are sufficiently "related to" a bankruptcy case to trigger federal jurisdiction.
See id. at 9 n.35.
245. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 609-16 (suggesting that protective
jurisdiction grants be scrutinized under the Tenth Amendment, balancing state au-
tonomy interests against federal forum interests); Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 958-59
(proposing "a standard of scrutiny more exacting than a necessary-and-proper stan-
dard of deference," such that "the forum-based interest must be a substantial one,"
and "the jurisdictional grant must not be broader than the forum-based interest war-
rants"). A desire to minimize the expense and delay of auxiliary jurisdictional litiga-
tion counsels in favor of clear guidance to courts and litigants regarding jurisdictional
thresholds, and thus, it seems particularly inappropriate for jurisdiction to turn on a
case-specific balancing of interests. See Carlos Manuel Vbzquez, Night and Day: Coeur
d'Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in
Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1, 84 (1998). On the evils generally
wrought by the ascension of balancing tests, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitution-
al Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
247. Professor Forrester, as one of the original architects of protective jurisdiction
theory, thought that in order to make the federal judicial power fully coextensive with
the legislative, as intended by the Framers, "where Congress has set up a broad leg-
islative program and policy ... it may be argued that Congress is acting within the
constitutional intent... in granting jurisdiction to the federal courts over all litiga-
tion connected with and forming a part of such a program." Forrester, supra note
236, at 120. Along similar lines, Professor Mishkin's formulation was "an articulated
and active federal policy regulating a field . . . permits the conferring of jurisdiction
on the national courts of all cases in the area-including those substantively governed
by state law." Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal 'Question" in the District Courts, 53
COLUM. L. REV. 157, 192 (1953); see also Donald H. Wollett & Harry H. Wellington,
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they assume the existence of a determinate jurisdictional grant,
to which the appropriate protective-jurisdiction litmus can then
be applied. Such a litmus test, however, cannot generate the
solution to be tested, and the requisite definitive grant of federal
jurisdiction does not exist for "related to" bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion. "Related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction is not self-defining,
and protective jurisdiction theory as a referent provides no
readily discernible limits, much like the prevailing test for "re-
lated to" bankruptcy jurisdiction itself.'
Relying on protective jurisdiction theory to support the consti-
tutionality of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is also precarious,
because the Supreme Court has shown no inclination to accept
such a theory.249 In fact, the Court has rejected the proposition
of protective jurisdiction theorists that a federal jurisdictional
statute, standing on its own, can be the federal law on which
Article III federal question jurisdiction is premised.5 Perhaps
Federalism and Breach of the Labor Agreement, 7 STAN. L. REV. 445, 476-79 (1955).
The federal bankruptcy system would seem to constitute such an active federal pro-
gram or policy, but nonetheless, the nagging question of the permissible limits of the
"related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction remains unanswered.
248. See infra Part III.B.1, notes 461-73 and accompanying text.
249. Only Justices Black and Burton joined Justice Jackson's opinion in the Tidewa-
ter case. See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949)
(Jackson, J., plurality opinion). Justices Burton and Harlan invoked the appellation
"protective jurisdiction" in the Lincoln Mills case, although their reasoning seemed to
rely upon traditional principles of constitutional federal questions. See Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957) (Burton, J., concurring) (reasoning
"that some federal rights may necessarily be involved . . . and hence that the con-
stitutionality of [a collective bargaining agreement jurisdiction statute] can be upheld
as a congressional grant ... of what has been called 'protective jurisdiction'); infra
Part II.B, notes 253-327 and accompanying text. More recently, Justice O'Connor, for
a unanimous Court, noted that "[wie have, in the past, not found the need to adopt a
theory of 'protective jurisdiction' to support Art. III 'arising under' jurisdiction." Mesa
v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 137 (1989).
250. See, e.g., Mesa, 489 U.S. at 136 (stating that "a pure jurisdictional statute,
seeking to do nothing more than grant district court jurisdiction over cases in which
a federal officer is a defendant ... cannot independently support Art. III 'arising
under' jurisdiction"); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 495-96
(1983) (upholding federal jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
because the Act "does not merely concern access to the federal courts" and distin-
guishing "prior cases in which this Court has rejected congressional attempts to confer
jurisdiction on federal courts simply by enacting jurisdictional statutes" as "the stat-
utes at issue in these prior cases sought to do nothing more than grant jurisdiction
over a particular class of cases").
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bankruptcy is sufficiently unique that it provides a narrower
basis on which to premise an Article I theory of federal jurisdic-
tion 251 but such an enterprise is unnecessary. Traditional federal
jurisdiction theory fully explains federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
and provides principled limits for third-party "related to" bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction, through an appropriate blend of principles of
constitutional federal questions and supplemental jurisdiction. 2
B. Constitutional Federal Questions and a Federal Entity Theory
In the main, federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is constitutional
federal question jurisdiction. As demonstrated in this Part II.B,
a bankruptcy estate is a federally created entity, such that any
claim to which a bankruptcy estate is a party, even a state-law
claim, contains federal law as an "original ingredient" within the
meaning of Osborn v. Bank of the United States.21 Some ques-
tion whether the claims of a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession, as
opposed to those of a bankruptcy trustee, contain an original
federal ingredient. This misplaced focus on the estate's represen-
tative, rather than the estate itself, however, fails to fully per-
sonify the bankruptcy estate and, as a result, misperceives the
nature of both trustee and debtor-in-possession suits. The rele-
vant federal party in such suits is a federal entity, not a federal
official. A general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over all claims
by and against a federal bankruptcy estate fits squarely within
251. Justice Frankfurter hinted at this in his opinion in the Lincoln Mills case. See
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 483-84 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Indeed, the "uniformity"
requirement in the Bankruptcy Clause can be read to contemplate a uniform federal
process when Congress enacts bankruptcy legislation. See Baird, supra note 111, at
26-36. Nonetheless, the Marathon case, although decided in the very different context
of separation of powers issues, seems to refute the notion that the Article I
Bankruptcy Power gives license to Congress to skirt Article HIrs constraints on the
exercise of federal judicial power. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 72-76 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); cf Seminole Tribe
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) ("he Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial
power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional
limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.").
252. As Professor Goldberg has noted: "[W]e must distinguish those cases that are
encompassed by conventional readings of the arising under clause of article III from
those that are not. Only in the latter need some concept of protective jurisdiction be
invoked at all." Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 547; see also Verlinden, 461 U.S.
at 491 n.17.
253. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 824 (1824).
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accepted principles of constitutional federal question jurisdiction,
irrespective of the estate's representative on such claims. The
only aspect of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction that is not consti-
tutional federal question jurisdiction is "related to" jurisdiction
over third-party disputes.
Any analysis of Article IIrs provision for "Cases... arising
under.., the Laws of the United States,"2 4 must begin with the
now-settled principle that Article III constitutional federal ques-
tions comprehend much more than statutory "arising under"
bankruptcy jurisdiction255 or its counterpart in the general federal
question statute, 56 despite the linguistic equivalence of the con-
stitutional and statutory "arising under" phrases.257 Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall charted the contours of constitutional "arising
under" jurisdiction in his celebrated and perdurable Osborn
* . 258opinion.
Osborn presented the issue of the ability of the Bank of the
United States, a federally chartered corporation, to bring suit in
federal court.2 59 The statute creating the Bank conferred on it
the capacity to sue and be sued as an entity "in all State Courts
having competent jurisdiction, and in any Circuit Court of the
United States."260 In granting the circuit courts jurisdiction over
any and all claims by or against the Bank, the statute clearly
raised the specter of federal adjudication of nondiverse state-law
actions.2 61 Nonetheless, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
254. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
255. "[The district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil
proceedings arising under title 11 [the Bankruptcy Code] .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)
(1994); see supra notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
256. 'The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the . .. laws . . .of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
257. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 494-95; cf American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 505
U.S. 247, 264 n.16 (1992) (reiterating the distinction between statutory and consti-
tutional federal questions).
258. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
259. See id. at 816-17.
260. Id. at 817 (quoting the statutory provision).
261. The particular action at issue in the Osborn case was clearly one "arising un-
der" federal law, as the Bank was challenging the constitutionality of the State of
Ohio's levy of a tax on the Bank. See Harry Shulman & Edward C. Jaegerman, Some
Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 393, 404 (1936). However,
the companion case of Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 904 (1824), argued by the same counsel and decided in tandem with Osborn,
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the statute as a permissible grant of Article III "arising under"
jurisdiction, and Justice Marshall's reasoning remains the bed-
rock of constitutional federal question jurisprudence.
Because the Bank was a juridical person created by federal
law, Justice Marshall considered federal law an "original
ingredient"26 in any action by or against the Bank, which "is not
only itself the mere creature of a law, but all its actions and all
its rights are dependent on the same law. Can a being, thus con-
stituted, have a case which does not arise literally, as well as
substantially, under the law?"2" Any action by or against the
Bank necessarily involved the preliminary issue of the Bank's
capacity to acquire and assert such rights or incur such obliga-
tions-an issue governed by the federal law of its creation. Con-
sequently, even state-law causes .of action asserted by or against
the Bank constituted cases "arising under" federal law for pur-
poses of Article HLI.2"
The prevailing scholarly consensus postulates that when a
bankruptcy trustee sues on a debtor's state-law cause of action
in federal court, because the bankruptcy trustee is a federal
official (an officer of the federal bankruptcy court), the trustee's
right to bring the action is an original federal ingredient, placing
the action within Osborn's "original ingredient" theory of consti-
tutional federal questions.265 That is where agreement ends,
concerned the Bank's state-law action in circuit court to collect on a promissory note.
See id. at 904-05.
262. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 824.
263. Id. at 823.
264. See id. at 823-24. As Justice Marshall emphasized, the original federal ingredi-
ent supporting federal jurisdiction need not be one that will be contested in the ac-
tion. See id. at 824. Indeed, since jurisdiction must be established at the outset, on
the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint, it cannot depend upon whether the defen-
dant will deny the existence of the original federal ingredient. See Alan D. Hornstein,
Federalism, Judicial Power and the 'Arising Under" Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts:
A Hierarchical Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 563, 665-66, 578-84 (1981); Note, The Outer
Limits of "Arising Under," 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 978, 979-81, 983, 986-88, 991 (1979).
265. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BE-
TWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS app. C, at 482-83 (1969); Bickel & Wellington,
supra note 241, at 21-22 & n.83; Block-Lieb, supra note 20, at 774-76; Cross, supra
note 7, at 1229-33; Ferguson, supra note 156, at 499-501; Ray Forrester, The Nature
of a "Federal Question," 16 TUL. L. REV. 362, 367, 373-74 (1942); Galligan, supra note
7, at 33-34; Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 551-53; Mishkin, supra note 247, at
194-95; Plumb, supra note 109, at 1458-61. But see National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tide-
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however; and in particular, suits by a Chapter 11 debtor-in-pos-
session are the source of considerable consternation. Can a debtor,
by filing a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code-and thereby obtaining the federal designation
"debtor in possession,"266 with the rights and duties of a bank-
ruptcy trustee267--constitutionally gain immediate access to
federal court under Osborn?26' The answer to this difficult ques-
tion rests on the important distinction between the bankruptcy
estate and the representative of the bankruptcy estate. Properly
conceived, a debtor-in-possession's suit is the exact equivalent of
a trustee's with respect to the original federal ingredient. The
constitutionality of a general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
over all claims by and against a bankruptcy estate is a direct
application of Osborn, whether the estate is represented by a
trustee or a debtor-in-possession.
1. Trustee as Representative of the Bankruptcy Estate
Understanding the nature of debtor-in-possession suits begins
by clarifying the nature of trustee suits. Suits by a bankruptcy
trustee have been characterized improperly as federal-official
suits. Such suits, though, are maintained on behalf of a distinct
federal entity, the bankruptcy estate, that serves as a mecha-
nism for transfer of a debtor's assets to creditors.
To say that a trustee sues on a constitutional federal question
because the trustee's status as a federal official presents an orig-
water Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 594-99 (1949) (Jackson, J., plurality opinion) (rely-
ing erroneously on narrower statutory federal question jurisprudence); Rosenberg, su-
pra note 7, at 980 (arguing that a trustee's suit contains no original federal ingre-
dient within the meaning of Osborn, using a rationale similar to that discussed infra
Part II.B.2, notes 292-327 and accompanying text).
266. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1994).
267. See id. § 1107(a).
268. Compare Cross, supra note 7, at 1230 n.158 (opining that "a case involving a
debtor in possession cannot be readily fit into the 'federal party' theory"), and
Galligan, supra note 7, at 34-35 (same), and Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 554
n.67 ("Such suits cannot satisfy any conventional test for arising under jurisdiction
because they do not contain even the minimal federal element present in the trustees'
suits."), with Block-Lieb, supra note 20, at 777-78 (rejecting Galligan's and Cross's
views as based upon an overly "narrow reading of Osborn"). As discussed infra Part
II.B.2, notes 292-327 and accompanying text, Professors Cross, Galligan, and Goldberg
read Osborn correctly, but misjudge the nature of debtor-in-possession suits.
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inal federal ingredient, per the standard analysis, 69 is incom-
plete and misleading. The bankruptcy trustee is not the real
party in interest, plaintiffin such a suit. Although the Bankruptcy
Code expressly gives the trustee "capacity to sue and be sued,"' 0
in that capacity, the trustee merely acts as "the representative
of the [bankruptcy] estate."271 It is the bankruptcy estate, not
the trustee, that succeeds to "all legal or equitable interests of
the debtor in property,"272 including causes of action against
third parties. 73 Indeed, the estate is central to our scheme of
federal bankruptcy law. Since the Roman law of cession (cessio
bonorum), bankruptcy law has concerned itself with transfer of a
debtor's property to the debtor's creditors.2 4 The mechanism for
such transfer in Anglo-American law has been the construct of a
bankrupt's "estate,"27 5 vested in trust to a representative of the
creditor collective.27 6 Thus, the state-law rights and obligations
269. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 7, at 1229-33; Galligan, supra note 7, at 33-34;
Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 552-53. Professor Block-Lieb's analysis is much
more sensitive to the trustee's role as representative of the bankruptcy estate. See
Block-Lieb, supra note 20, at 774-77.
270. 11 U.S.C. § 323(b).
271. Id. § 323(a).
272. Id. § 541(a)(1).
273. See 5 COLLIER (15th ed.), supra note 66, 11 541.08.
274. See 1 LOVELAND, supra note 65, § 1. Early English bankruptcy legislation pro-
vided that "the bankrupt's property was to be seized by a common agent and there-
after there was to be a distribution pro rata of the proceeds." JONES, supra note 234,
at 18. Professor Glenn found that such a transfer process was available amongst trad-
ers, even before English bankruptcy legislation, through the customary practices of the
Law Merchant. See Garrard Glenn, Essentials of Bankruptcy: Prevention of Fraud, and
Control of Debtor, 23 VA. L. REV. 373, 386-88 (1937).
275. As Professor Levinthal stated: "Some agency must be given control over all the
property of the debtor.., to collect, manage and distribute all the assets." Levinthal,
supra note 233, at 227. "In order to work out [the] general objects of bankruptcy, it
is necessary to devise and establish a systematic method of managing the debtor's es-
tate during the pendency of the process." Id. Professor Carlson ably demonstrates how
competing theories of the transfer of property to the bankruptcy estate inform the
contours of the estate's avoiding powers in David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy's Organiz-
ing Principle, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 549 (1999).
276. See 1 SIR WHILAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 470 (A.L.
Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds., 7th ed. rev. 1956) (stating that English assignees
introduced by 1707 statute "were subject to the Chancellor's equitable jurisdiction as
trustees"); Tabb, supra note 37, at 9 (stating that eighteenth-century assignees were
"so named because the bankruptcy estate was assigned to them"). The concept of a
bankruptcy estate was certainly a familiar one by the time of the Constitutional Con-
vention. See F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRup'cy LAw 55-56, 69-70 (1919);
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adjudicated in bankruptcy are attributed to our incorporeal con-
struct, the bankruptcy estate, not to the bankruptcy trustee per-
sonally. 7 The federal party of import in bankruptcy is the bank-
ruptcy estate, not the bankruptcy trustee.
Care in identifying the relevant federal party is warranted,
because maneuvering Osborn's original ingredient theory can, at
times, be quite a ticklish travail, especially in the realm of federal-
official suits. 7 The most straightforward application of Osborn,
however, comes on the facts of Osborn itself, a suit by or against
a federally created entity.2 79 Indeed, the Supreme Court recently
fully reaffirmed the vitality of Osborn in such context. 8 ° More-
Nadelmann, supra note 234, at 221-22.
277. Any personal rights and obligations of a bankruptcy trustee, such as fiduciary
obligation or the right to compensation, are a matter of federal law, derived from the
Bankruptcy Code and a federal common law developed thereunder. See 11 U.S.C. §§
326, 330, 704; Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951); Daniel B. Bogart, Finding the
Still Small Voice: The Liability of Bankruptcy Trustees and the Work of the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission, 102 DICK. L. REV. 703 (1998); Ralph C. McCullough,
Trustee Liability: Is There Enough Protection for These "Arms of the Court?," 103 CoM.
L.J. 123 (1998); E. Allan Tiller, Personal Liability of Trustees and Receivers in Bank-
ruptcy, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 75 (1979). Adjudication of such rights and obligations in
federal court, therefore, is conventional federal question jurisdiction and would appear
to fit comfortably within the statutory grant for proceedings "arising under" the Bank-
ruptcy Code. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Salem (In re Mailman Steam Carpet Cleaning
Corp.), 196 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that the bankruptcy court had jurisdic-
tion over fiduciary negligence suit, because the plaintiff-creditor was alleging that the
Chapter 7 trustee "breached his duty under 11 U.S.C. § 704"); Schechter v. Illinois
Dep't of Revenue (In re Markos Gurnee Partnership), 182 B.R. 211, 223 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1995), afld, 195 B.R. 380, 383 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding that an action for breach of
fiduciary duty against a bankruptcy trustee was a proceeding "arising under" the
Bankruptcy Code and "arising in" a bankruptcy case).
278. See, e.g., Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417 (1995); Mesa v. Cali-
fornia, 489 U.S. 121 (1989); FALLON ET AL., supra note 2, at 904-06 & n.4; James D.
Doster, Note, The Westfall Act Before and After Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno:
Reuiewability, Remand, and Article III-One Down, One to Go, and One That Should
Be Left Open, 32 GA. L. REV. 181, 226-33 (1997). Similar difficulties can be encoun-
tered in suits by injured third parties to hold a bankruptcy trustee personally liable
for "ultra vires" acts, outside the scope of a trustee's official immunity. See Torkelsen
v. Maggio (In re Guild & Gallery Plus, Inc.), 72 F.3d 1171 (3d Cir. 1996); Schechter,
182 B.R. at 217-18, 222-23.
279. See Matasar, supra note 7, at 1445 n.206; Mishkin, supra note 247, at 187 ("At
the very least, [Osborn] establishes that the judicial power under the federal question
clause of Article III may be brought to bear upon any litigation to which a congres-
sionally chartered corporation is a party, though the substantive rule for decision be
state-made.").
280. In American National Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247 (1992), the Court con-
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over, Osborn's federal entity implications readily transfer to
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, because "[w]hen a bankruptcy
petition is filed, a new entity is created-the bankruptcy es-
tate."281 Consistent with the historical purpose of bankruptcy law
to transfer a single debtor's property to multiple creditors, the
estate concept serves one of the most basic functions of a fictional
legal entity: personification of property. Constructing the jurid-
ical person simplifies the Byzantine relationships propogated by
multiple owners, including jurisdictional and joinder complexi-
ties inherent in lawsuits involving numerous parties.282 To that
end, the Bankruptcy Code expressly authorizes the bankruptcy
estate to sue and be sued as an entity, in the same manner that
a corporation can sue and be sued as an entity.2a
A general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, then, as originally
articulated by Justice Story in Ex parte Christy2 M-- a power to
hear all claims by and against the bankruptcy estate-is nothing
more than an Osborn federal entity approach to bankruptcy ju-
risdiction. In fact, although not mentioning Osborn, Justice Sto-
ry nonetheless expressly linked his construction of a general fed-
eral bankruptcy jurisdiction to Osborn's constitutional federal
question jurisprudence.28 Indeed, in Claflin v. Houseman,286 Jus-
strued a provision in the Red Cross's federal charter statute as conferring "original
jurisdiction on federal courts over all cases to which the Red Cross is a party," id. at
248, and summarily affirmed the constitutionality of the grant on the strength of
Osborn, see id. at 264-65. Such a result was not a foregone conclusion. For example,
in the Lincoln Mills case, one of the Court's leading authorities on federal jurisdic-
tion, Justice Frankfurter, questioned and seemed to repudiate Osborn's federal entity
theory. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 479-84 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
281. ELIZABETH WARREN, BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY 41 (1993).
282. See WELL= A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FI-
NANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 67-69, 108-09 (6th ed. 1996).
283. See 11 U.S.C. § 323 (1994).
284. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292 (1845), discussed supra Part I.A.2, notes 45-57 and accom-
panying text.
285. In response to an argument that a statutory provision preserving state-law
rights in bankruptcy precluded federal adjudication of such rights, Justice Story re-
sponded that [s]uch a conclusion would be at war with the whole theory and practice
under the judicial power given by the Constitution and laws of the United States."
Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 316. And in reading the statutory grant of 'jurisdiction
in all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy arising under this act," Bankruptcy Act
of 1841, ch. 9, § 6, 5 Stat. 440, 445 (repealed 1843), to encompass all claims by and
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tice Bradley described federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over an
assignee's suit in precisely those terms: "exactly the same as
that of the Bank of the United States" pursuing "a right arising
under a law of the United States, as much so as can be affirmed
of a case of an assignee in bankruptcy."2 7
against the estate, he opined that "[in this respect the language of the act seems to
have been borrowed from the language of the Constitution, in which the judicial power
is declared to extend to cases arising under the.., laws . . . of the United States."
Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 313. "[It seems perfectly clear, that congress possess[es]
a complete constitutional authority to enact such a law for such an object; for the
judicial power, by the constitution, extends 'to all cases . . . arising under... the
laws . . . made under their authority.'" Mitchell v. Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co.,
17 F. Cas. 496, 499 (C.C.D. Me. 1843) (No. 9662) (Story, Circuit Justice).
In enacting the 1978 Reform Act, Congress specifically relied upon Ex parte
Christy as support for the constitutionality of pervasive federal bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion:
The constitutionality of a grant of a jurisdiction in bankruptcy in
such comprehensive terms should not be subject to any serious doubt.
The jurisdictional grants to the court of bankruptcy by the Acts of 1841
and 1867 were almost as extensive, and the Supreme Court gave the
provisions of those Acts a generous construction and approval of their
constitutionality.
1973 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 110, pt. I, at 91, 100 (footnote citing Ex parte
Christy omitted), quoted in H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 47 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6009.
286. 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
287. Id. at 135. Although he would later recant this version, see supra notes 251,
280 and infra note 333, Justice Frankfurter, in his Tidewater dissent, seemed to sug-
gest a federal entity theory of bankruptcy jurisdiction:
When a petition for bankruptcy is filed, there may be outstanding claims
by the bankrupt against debtors and by creditors against the bankrupt.
Of course Congress has power to determine whether all such
claims-those for, and those against, the bankrupt estate-should be en-
forced through the federal courts .... This is so because in the exercise
of its power to "pass uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies" Con-
gress may deem it desirable that the federal courts be utilized for all the
claims that pertain to the bankrupt estate.. . . The congeries of contro-
versies thus brought into being by reason of bankruptcy may be lodged
in the federal courts because they arise under "the Laws of the United
States," to wit, laws concerning the "subject of bankruptcies." It is a
matter of congressional policy whether there must be a concourse of all
claims affecting the bankrupt's estate in the federal court ....
National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 652 n.3 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In that case, Justice Rutledge also reasoned that "federal
court adjudication of disputes arising pursuant to bankruptcy... is conventional
federal-question jurisdiction," id. at 611 (Rutledge, J., concurring), relying upon Toledo
Fence & Post Co. v. Lyons, 290 F. 637 (6th Cir. 1923), which espoused, at length, an
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Such a federal entity theory of bankruptcy jurisdiction enables
the federal courts to "protect"28 the federal interest in expedi-
tious administration of bankruptcy estates, and it remains true
to the idea that Article IIrs "arising under" jurisdiction was
intended to make the judicial power "coextensive" with the legis-
lative.2 19 Federal bankruptcy "law'--providing for collection and
distribution of a debtor's property--operates through the con-
struct of a federal bankruptcy "estate," and it is this congressio-
nally created entity to which the federal judicial power atta-
ches."9 Thus, the Court's cryptic references to federal bankrupt-
cy jurisdiction as a product of the Bankruptcy Power are best
understood as connoting federal jurisdiction over Article III
cases "arising under" federal bankruptcy law.29' Moreover, this
federal entity theory of general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
also holds for claims by and against the estate of a Chapter 11
* debtor-in-possession.
Osborn rationale for federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, see id. at 640-43.
288. Indeed, Osborn itself has been described as a type of protective jurisdiction. See
Mishkin, supra note 247, at 186-88; Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 965 (describing
Osborn as "the grandfather of the theory of protective jurisdiction").
289. "If there are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power
of a government being co-extensive with its legislative, may be ranked among the
number." THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961); see also Forrester, supra note 265, at 364-67; Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 944
& n.62 (collecting many references by the Framers to the coextensive nature of the
legislative and judicial powers by virtue of Article III's "arising under" jurisdiction).
290. As Justice Story stated: "The obvious design of the bankrupt act ...was to
secure a prompt and effectual administration and settlement of the estate of all bank-
rupts," and "[t]he judicial power of the United States is, by the Constitution, compe-
tent to all such purposes; and congress, by the act, intended to secure the complete
administration of the whole system in its own courts, as it constitutionally might do."
Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 312, 320. Furthermore, in speaking of the Constitution's
"arising under" jurisdiction and the Bankruptcy Power, Justice Story stated that "[tihe
judicial power has, in this respect, under the constitution, always been construed to
be co-extensive with the legislative powers, upon the plain ground, that the constitu-
tion meant to provide ample means to accomplish its own ends by its own courts."
Mitchell v. Great Works Milling, 17 F. Cas. at 499.
291. Cf Ferguson, supra note 156, at 499, 502-03 ('There would appear to be no bar
to the exercise of Article I powers to vindicate the federal interest in the uniformity
of law enacted by Congress by authorizing federal courts to adjudicate cases and con-
troversies involving matters of bankruptcy to which the trustee is a party.");
Mussman & Riesenfeld, supra note 96, at 89 (explaining concisely the authority for
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction as "[tihe scope of the bankruptcy clause in conjunction
with the judiciary article of the Constitution" (emphasis added)).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
2. Debtor-in-Possession as Representative of the Bankruptcy
Estate
The theoretical difficulties with federal jurisdiction of state-
law claims by and against a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession
present the problem of the sham jurisdictional entity. A Chapter
11 reorganization estate, though it may be difficult to envisage,
is not a sham whose only purpose is to create federal jurisdic-
tion. In fact, federal law actually constructs a more elaborate
federal entity in the form of a reorganization estate than it does
in the case of a liquidating Chapter 7 estate. A complex of multi-
farious legal relationships are embodied in and restructured
through the federal reorganization estate, all toward the same
end as that of a Chapter 7 estate: transfer of a debtor's assets to
creditors. Thus, Osborn's federal entity theory sustains federal
jurisdiction over all claims by and against a Chapter 11 reorga-
nization estate.
In Osborn, Justice Johnson, in dissent, raised the issue of the
mere jurisdictional entity, whereby Congress declares a person
or entity a "federal corporation" solely for purposes of bringing
suits involving such person into federal court.9"2 Chief Justice
Marshall apparently agreed that such a congressional act would
be meaningless and indistinguishable from a bare jurisdictional
grant, 9 ' which cannot itself supply an original federal ingredi-
ent."' Thus, in identifying original federal ingredients that give
292. Justice Johnson formulated the issue as follows:
But if the plain dictates of our senses be relied on, what state of
facts have we exhibited here? Making a person, makes a case; and thus
a government which cannot exercise jurisdiction unless an alien or citizen
of another State be a party, makes a party . . . and then claims juris-
diction because it has made a case. If this be true, why not make every
citizen a corporation sole, and thus bring them all into the Courts of the
United States quo minus?
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 897-98 (1824) (Johnson,
J., dissenting).
293. Justice Marshall responded in this way-
This distinction is not denied; and, if the act of Congress was a
simple act of incorporation, and contained nothing more, it might be en-
titled to great consideration. But the act does not step with incorporating
the Bank. It proceeds to bestow upon the being it has made, all the fac-
ulties and capacities which that being possesses.
Id. at 827 (Marshall, C.J.).
294. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
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rise to constitutional federal questions under Osborn, one must
distinguish between those congressional enactments that are
"the source of the legal relationships which the plaintiff neces-
sarily relies upon in asserting the claim,"295 and those that do
nothing more than open the doors of the federal court to the
plaintiff.296
Those who deny the existence of an original federal ingredient
in a suit by a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession 297 apparently
believe that in such a case, federal law governs none of the un-
derlying legal relationships and merely attempts to grant the
debtor access to federal court through the hollow federal title of
295. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 549, qwted with approval in Gutierrez de
Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 436 n.11 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., plurality opinion).
"If those relationships are federally created, even in small part, the claim should be
treated as one that arises under federal law, within the meaning of article II ..
Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 549.
296. "The plaintiff must appear in court arguing, 'My right to win has a federal
element in it,' not, 'My right to be here has a federal element in it.' Rosenberg,
supra note 7, at 969; see also Note, supra note 264, at 979 & n.9 (characterizing this
as a requirement that plaintiffs complaint must rely upon federal "primary relation-
ships," within the Hohfeldian meaning of that term).
This seems to be the nub of the problem with which Justice Frankfurter wrestled
in the Lincoln Mills case, in which he appeared to question the validity of Osborn's
federal entity theory. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 479-
84 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); supra note 280. The congressional enactment at
issue in that case provided that a labor union could acquire rights and obligations
and sue and be sued as an entity and gave the federal district courts jurisdiction in
any suit by or against a labor union for breach of a collective bargaining agreement,
without regard to diversity of citizenship. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 449-50 (quot-
ing section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act). Labor unions, as unincorporated associations
under state law, apparently did not enjoy such entity status under the laws of many
states. Labor unions, however, existed independent of federal law, and apparently
some states had already conferred similar entity status on labor unions. See Forrester,
supra note 236, at 117-18. For labor unions that already enjoyed entity status, then,
the federal enactment seemed to do nothing more than place their state-law contract
disputes in federal court. The Lincoln Mills majority avoided this problem by constru-
ing the statute to authorize the federal courts to fashion a federal common law gov-
erning the collective bargaining agreements subject to the statute, thus, upholding the
constitutionality of the jurisdictional provision as conventional "arising under" federal
question jurisdiction. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456-57. Such a federal common
law solution to bankruptcy's jurisdictional dilemma is unavailable, however, as the
Court has interpreted federal bankruptcy statutes as not authorizing this sort of fed-
eral common law. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979); Cross,
supra note 7, at 1225-28.
297. See sources cited supra note 268.
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"debtor-in-possession."298 This view, however, like that of the
federal-official approach to trustee suits, proceeds from an in-
complete understanding of the debtor-in-possession concept and,
as a result, overlooks the most important legal relationships at
stake in debtor-in-possession suits.
The idea of a debtor-in-possession flows from the presumption
in Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings that, in an effort to
maximize the value of the debtor's assets,299 the debtor's busi-
ness will continue to operate despite the filing of the bankruptcy
petition, and a trustee will not be appointed.3' Thus, unlike a
Chapter 7 liquidation case, which contemplates a trustee's expe-
ditious sale of all assets and distribution of the proceeds to cred-
301itors, in a Chapter 11 reorganization, absent unusual circum-
stances," 2 the prepetition debtor remains in possession of all
assets, operating the business.
In the prototypical case of a corporate Chapter 11 debtor,
then, prepetition management ordinarily retains control of the
debtor's business operations during the reorganization proceed-
ings. This creates the deceptive appearance that the "debtor in
possession is the debtor itself; it is not a federally created entity
298. Thus, Professor Galligan restates the argument of Justice Johnson: "If all Con-
gress has to do to grant federal jurisdiction, without providing a rule of decision, is to
'create' a federal juridical entity, then whenever it wanted a federal court to hear a
case Congress could so legislate by engaging in semantics." Galligan, supra note 7, at
35.
299. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220-21, 232-34 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6180-81, 6191-94.
300. See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1994) (the debtor is a debtor-in-possession, unless a
trustee is appointed); id. § 1107(a) (a debtor-in-possession assumes the rights and
duties of a trustee); id. § 1108 (a debtor-in-possession may operate the debtor's busi-
ness, unless the court orders otherwise).
301. See id. §§ 701-702 (providing for the appointment of a trustee in every Chapter
7 case); id. § 704(1) (the Chapter 7 "trustee shall collect and reduce to money the
property of the estate . . . and close such estate as expeditiously as is compatible
with the best interests of parties in interest"). The Chapter 7 trustee can operate the
debtor's business only with specific authorization from the court and "for a limited
period, if such operation is in the best interest of the estate and consistent with the
orderly liquidation of the estate." Id. § 721.
302. Cause for replacing debtor's management with a Chapter 11 trustee is limited
to extreme misconduct, such as fraud or gross mismanagement. See id. § 1104(a)(1).
Although the Code also contains a more permissive best-interests-of-the-estate ground
for appointment of a trustee in section 1104(a)(2), the courts are extremely hesitant to
appoint a trustee in Chapter 11 cases. See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF
BANKRUPTCY § 11.6, at 778-79 (1997).
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like the Bank of the United States or the bankruptcy trustee.3 °3
As just demonstrated in Part II.B.1, though, in a trustee's suit
the bankruptcy trustee is not the "federally created entity" of
concern, it is the bankruptcy estate, ° and the same holds true in
reorganization cases under Chapter 11. Debtor as debtor-in-
possession assumes the responsibilities of representative of the
estate,3°" and just as in cases where a trustee serves, "the bank-
ruptcy 'estate' is a separate and distinct legal entity."3°6
Although considerably more complex in its operation, the
estate construct in Chapter 11 serves precisely the same purpose
as in ordinary Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings: the historical
role of transferring a debtor's assets to creditors. This transfer is
less evident, however, because a "reorganization," in its purest
form, envisions a reorganized debtor emerging from bankruptcy
conducting the same business operations as the prebankruptcy
debtor.0 7 From a corporal perspective, then, the asset transfer is
utterly anticlimactic, because the assets remain in their original
use. In a legal and financial sense, though, the transfer of assets
in reorganization can be much more direct, as the reorganization
effects a change in ownership of the assets.308
The reorganized debtor is a creature of the Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization. Confirmation of the reorganization plan by the
303. Galligan, supra note 7, at 35 (emphasis added). Admirably, Galligan sees no lo-
gical reason to grant a trustee access to federal court, while denying the federal fo-
rum to a debtor-in-possession. Yet, he does not, therefore, reexamine his premise that
trustee suits are somehow different than debtor-in-possession suits from a federal in-
gredient perspective; rather he concludes that Osborn and the original ingredient
theory are folly and must be rejected in favor of broad-form protective jurisdiction.
See id. at 33-36.
304. See supra Part II.B.1, notes 269-91 and accompanying text.
305. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 323(a), 1107(a).
306. TABB, supra note 302, § 5.1, at 271; see Thomas E. Plank, The Bankruptcy
Trust as a Legal Person, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2000).
307. See Brubaker, supra note 13, at 1018-19. Many "reorganization" cases, nonethe-
less, produce at least some degree of liquidation of the debtor's assets. See id. at 1018
n.212.
308. Jackson states that "[tihe key conceptual difference between a reorganization
and a liquidation is that in a reorganization the firm's assets . . . are sold to the
creditors themselves rather than to third parties," so "[rleorganization proceedings . . .
are basically a method by which the sale of a firm as a going concern may be made
to the claimants themselves." THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANK-
RUPTCY LAW 211 (1986); accord Robert C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal
Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238, 1252-53 (1981).
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court extinguishes all prebankruptcy debts and ownership inter-
ests"' and simultaneously substitutes an entirely new capital
structure. Prebankruptcy creditors receive distributions accord-
ing to the terms of the confirmed plan of reorganization."1 0 The
"estate" concept is critical to determining appropriate distribu-
tions to creditors, 11 because the reorganization plan can be
confirmed only if it provides creditors at least as much value as
they would receive through a liquidation of the estate. 2 Thus,
when the bankruptcy "estate" pursues a state-law action against
a third party, whether at the hands of a trustee or a debtor-in-
possession, that action is maintained for the benefit of creditors
as an asset of the federal bankruptcy estate.
In actuality, federal law plays a more involved role in debtor-
in-possession cases than in Chapter 7 trustee cases. In a Chap-
ter 7 liquidation, the federal bankruptcy estate is a very simple
entity, with the trustee merely collecting the debtor's assets, in
kind, and reducing them to cash for distribution."3 In reorgani-
zation of an operating business, though, the function of federal
law and the bankruptcy "estate" is much more elaborate and
complex. A reorganized debtor is clearly an entity produced by
federal law-that governing Chapter 11 reorganization plans
and the establishment of the reorganized debtor's new capi-
tal/ownership structure.3 1 4 Between filing of the bankruptcy
309. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1).
310. Sections 1121 to 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code regulate the terms of the plan
and the confirmation process. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121-1129. See generally Kenneth N. Klee, All
You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979); Kenneth N. Klee, Cram Down II, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 229
(1990).
311. See TABB, supra note 302, § 5.1, at 273.
312. This is known as the "best interests of creditors" test. See 11 U.S.C. §
1129(a)(7)(A).
313. See TABB, supra note 302, § 1.22, at 68-72.
314. Thus, the possibility for perpetual federal jurisdiction over the reorganized debt-
or, a result that certainly is not within the intent of Congress, but nonetheless pro-
ducing a tension evident in the so-called postconfirmation jurisdiction cases. See NA-
TIONAL BANKi. CONF., REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY
CONFERENCE'S CODE REVIEW PROJECT 53-54 (rev. ed. 1997); Daniel B. Bogart, Unex-
pected Gifts of Chapter 11: The Breach of a Director's Duty of Loyalty Following Plan
Confirmation and the Postconfirmation Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Courts, 72 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 303, 335-85 (1998); Ronald W. Goss, Defining the Scope of Retained Juris-
diction in Chapter 11 Plans, 18 J. CONTEM . L. 1 (1992); Frank R. Kennedy & Gerald
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petition and confirmation of a plan of reorganization, then, fed-
eral law and the federal bankruptcy estate attempt to preserve
and enhance the business and assets315 during this period in
which the business's capital structure is, in effect, in a state of
suspension pending negotiation, promulgation, and confirmation
of a plan of reorganization. Thus, federal law, inter alia, (1)
enjoins enforcement of claimants' prebankruptcy rights, 16 chan-
neling them into the bankruptcy court for resolution and even-
tual treatment under a reorganization plan;317 (2) closely regu-
lates all aspects of the ongoing financing and operation of the
business;31 (3) introduces an interim regime of internal gover-
nance and fiduciary obligation, 19 including a distinct body of law
K Smith, Postconfirmation Issues: The Effects of Confirmation and Posteonfirmation
Proceedings, 44 S.C. L. REV. 621, 622-44 (1993); Norman N. Kinel & Melissa Zelen
Neier, Post-Confirmation Jurisdiction in the Bankruptcy Courts: Does It Ever End?, 55
BUS. LAW. 81 (1999). The estate theory of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction formulated
in this Article can provide a useful framework for resolution of these cases, but that
is a matter that must be pursued in a subsequent article.
315. The extent to which bankruptcy law is successful in doing so is the source of
much contemporary academic debate. For reviews of the literature, see John D. Ayer,
The Role of Finance Theory in Shaping Bankruptcy Policy, 3 AM. BAMK. INST. L.
REV. 53 (1995); Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J.
573 (1998); David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bank-
ruptcy Theory, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 465; Charles J. Tabb, The Future of Chapter 11, 44
S.C. L. REV. 791 (1993).
316. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (providing for an automatic stay of creditor collection ac-
tions). The court also retains the discretionary equitable power to enjoin actions not
covered by the automatic stay, but which nonetheless threaten injury to the bankruptcy
estate. See id. § 105(a); S. REP. No. 95-989, at 51 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5837; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 342 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.N. 5963, 6298; 2 COLIER (15th ed.), supra note 66, It 105.02-.03;
Brubaker, supra note 13, at 969-70.
317. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(a)-(b), 1123(a)(2)-(3).
318. See id. §§ 363-366, 503.
319. The literature on this particular aspect of the bankruptcy estate is very rich.
See Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter 11 Reorganizations: Reducing Costs,
Improving Results, 73 B.U. L. REV. 581 (1993); Daniel B. Bogart, Liability of Directors
of Chapter 11 Debtors in Possession: 'Don't Look Back-Something May Be Gaining on
You", 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 155 (1994); Mark E. Budnitz, Chapter 11 Business Reorga-
nizations and Shareholder Meetings: Will the Meeting Please Come to Order, or Should
the Meeting Be Cancelled Altogether?, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1214 (1990); Anna Y.
Chou, Corporate Governance in Chapter 11: Electing a New Board, 65 AM. BANKI.
L.J. 559 (1991); Carlos J. Cuevas, The Myth of Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Reorga-
nization Cases, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 385 (1998); Christopher W. Frost, Running
the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 89
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regarding control of "derivative" litigation;3 0 and (4) arms the
estate with an arsenal of unique federal causes of action in the
form of the so-called avoiding powers 21 -all under the watchful
supervision of official constituent committees, 22 the Justice De-
partment,3 2 and a federal bankruptcy court.
(1992); Christopher W. Frost, The Theory, Reality and Pragmatism of Corporate Gover-
nance in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103 (1998) [hereinafter
Frost, Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy]; Michael A. Gerber, The Election of Direc-
tors and Chapter 11-The Second Circuit Tells Stockholders to Walk Softly and Carry
a Big Lever, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 295 (1987); Thomas G. Kelch, The Phantom Fiduciary:
The Debtor in Possession in Chapter 11, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 1323 (1992); Thomas G.
Kelch, Shareholder Control Rights in Bankruptcy: Disassembling the Withering Mirage
of Corporate Democracy, 52 MD. L. REV. 264 (1993); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C.
Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly
Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669 (1993); Harvey R. Miller, Corporate Gover-
nance in Chapter 11: The Fiduciary Relationship Between Directors and Stockholders
of Solvent and Insolvent Corporations, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1467 (1993); Raymond
T. Nimmer & Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciary Duties,
Business Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 1 (1989); Scott F.
Norberg, Debtor Incentives, Agency Costs, and Voting Theory in Chapter 11, 46 U.
KAN. L. REV. 507 (1998); David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate
Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461 (1992).
320. The estate's representative in litigation is not limited to a trustee or debtor-in-
possession. In certain circumstances, it may be appropriate for some other party, such
as a creditor or a statutory committee, to prosecute litigation on behalf of the estate
in a manner analogous to the process by which a shareholder pursues derivative
litigation on behalf of a corporation outside of bankruptcy. See generally 2 CHAPTER
11 THEORY AND PRACTICE: A GUtDE TO REORGANIZATION § 10.26 (James F. Queenan,
Jr. et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter CHAPTER 11 THEORY AND PRACTICE]; 7 COLLIER
(15th ed.), supra note 66, 1103.05[5]-[6]; Lawrence K. Snider, The Chapter 11
Creditors' Committee Right to Institute Suit, 2 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 779 (1992). In-
deed, in the context of litigating creditors' claims against the estate, this concept
receives express recognition in the Code itself, which authorizes a "party in interest"
to object to the allowance of a creditor's claim. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a); see FED. R. BANKR.
P. 3007 advisory committee's note; 3 CHAPTER 11 THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra, §
21.46, at 21:129-131; 4 COLLIER (15th ed.), supra note 66, 502.02[2].
321. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544-553.
322. See id. §§ 1102-1103 (appointment, powers, and duties of creditors' and equity
security holders' committees); cf id. § 1109 (right of the SEC and other parties in
interest to appear and be heard on any issue); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2018(d) (right of a
labor union or employees' association "to be heard on the economic soundness of a
plan affecting the interests of the employees"). For excellent accounts of the important
role of creditors' committees in the reorganization process, see Daniel J. Bussel, Co-
alition-Building Through Bankruptcy Creditors' Committees, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1547
(1996); Kenneth N. Klee & K. John Shaffer, Creditors' Committees Under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code, 44 S.C. L. REV. 995 (1993).
323. The office of United States trustee, appointed by the Attorney General, is
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A reorganization estate, then, even with a debtor-in-posses-
sion at the helm, truly exists as a unique federal entity and not
a mere jurisdiction-conferring sham. It is an intricate being
designed to effect the historical task of transfer of a debtor's
assets to creditors, while concurrently undertaking the formida-
ble responsibility of managing a business that has no owners."
The mere act of filing the Chapter 11 petition so drastically
alters the rights and obligations of the prebankruptcy debtor2 5
charged with "supervis[ing the administration of [bankruptcy] cases and trustees in
[bankruptcy] cases," including Chapter 11 reorganizations. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3) (1994);
see 1997 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 168, at 844-57; NATIONAL BANKR. CONF., supra
note 314, at 11-15; Peter C. Alexander, A Proposal to Abolish the Office of United
States Trustee, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (1996).
324. As Professor Frost has noted, "[gloverning a corporation during a Chapter 11 re-
organization presents a special case of the age-old problem of the separation of owner-
ship and control." Frost, Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy, supra note 319, at 103.
325. Professor Warren put it very effectively:.
When a bankruptcy petition is filed, a new entity is created-the
bankruptcy estate. Metaphorically, bankruptcy is much like death: One
entity ceases to function, and an estate succeeds to the obligations and
property of the deceased. Much like the law of decedants' estates, the
law of bankruptcy governs the operation of the post-filing business and
the disposition of property of the pre-bankruptcy debtor. In effect, the
old, pre-bankruptcy debtor has no more property, no more contractual
rights, and no more power to pay bills or to incur new obligations. At
filing, the new bankruptcy estate succeeds to all the rights-and receives
some new ones of its own.
The cleavage between the old debtor and the post-filing estate occa-
sioned by the act of filing a bankruptcy petition is critical to the bank-
ruptcy system. The conceptual separation between the old debtor and the
new estate helps to explain both the new powers enjoyed by the post-
filing estate and the new limitations imposed on the estate's operation.
The bankruptcy court exercises supervision over the estate that no court
would ordinarily exercise over a non-bankrupt business. At the same
time, the creditors' rights are sharply curtailed, in that collection against
the estate is modified and channeled through the bankruptcy court.
WARREN, supra note 281, at 41-42. Even though the Supreme Court has for a particu-
lar purpose said "it is sensible to view the debtor-in-possession as the same 'entity'
which existed before the filing of the bankruptcy petition," the Court immediately
qualified this as the same entity, but not really the same entity: "but empowered by
virtue of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with its contracts and property in a manner it
could not have employed absent the bankruptcy filing." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,
465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984). As Michael Andrew points out, the Court's confusion was of
the same ilk as that infecting "original ingredient" analysis:
A number of courts in executory contracts cases [including Bildisco]
have puzzled over whether the debtor in possession is a "new entity" as
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that any action by or against the newly constituted federal
bankruptcy estate, even on a state-law claim, contains an origi-
nal federal ingredient within the meaning of Osborn.2 '
Osborn and a federal entity theory of constitutional federal
questions, therefore, fully explain Justice Story's idea of a general
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over all claims by and against
the bankruptcy estate, whether the estate is represented by a
trustee or a debtor-in-possession. Federal bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion has come to encompass more, however, and through the
statute's "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, it embraces federal
adjudication of nondiverse state-law claims to which the bank-
ruptcy estate is not a party. Osborn's original federal ingredient
theory simply cannot be stretched to reach such third-party
claims without running afoul of the Court's edict that the juris-
dictional statute itself does not furnish the original ingredient
for federal jurisdiction. 27 The constitutional basis for federal
compared to the debtor... What is important, however, is that the
estate clearly is a new entity. The debtor in possession is the debtor, act-
ing in a trust capacity as representative of that estate. The debtor can
be displaced at any time by an independent trustee; thus, nothing should
turn on whether the debtor and debtor in possession are the same entity.
Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection," 59
U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 855 n.51 (1988) (citations omitted); cf Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 235-
36 (1989) (concluding that whether the estate is a "new entity' is unhelpful in exec-
utory contract analysis); Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts Revisited: A Reply to
Professor Westbrook, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 24 (1991) ("What the courts have puzzled
over is not that question, but (needlessly) the question whether the debtor in posses-
sion is a 'new entity' as compared to the debtor.").
326. It is worth noting that the Marathon case involved a Chapter 11 debtor-in-pos-
session suing on a state-law cause of action, and Justice Brennan's brief footnote
approving the constitutionality of federal jurisdiction over such an action, in addition
to references to the Court's previous bankruptcy cases, cited for support Osborn, Jus-
tice Rutledge's Tidewater opinion regarding bankruptcy as constitutional federal ques-
tion jurisdiction, and the portion of Justice Frankfurter's Lincoln Mills dissent that
discussed bankruptcy jurisdiction in the same terms. See Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 72 n.26 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion); supra notes 217, 280, and 287.
327. See supra note 250 and accompanying text; accord Cross, supra note 7, at 1232
(reasoning that "third-party suits accordingly lack even the minimal federal ingredient
required to fit within Article III"). Professor Block-Lieb constructs an argument that
would bring all "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction within the sweep of Osborn, by
positing the original federal ingredient in third-party "related to" claims as the
debtor's bankruptcy filing. See Block-Lieb, supra note 20, at 778-79. Since the debtor's
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bankruptcy jurisdiction over these third-party claims does find
support, however, in a different aspect of the Osborn opinion:
that portion suggesting principles of supplemental jurisdiction.
Properly identifying the constitutional nature of these third-
party claims also unveils the obscured meaning of the statutory
grant of federal jurisdiction over all claims "related to" a bank-
ruptcy case.
C. Constitutional Supplemental Jurisdiction
In addition to establishing the original federal ingredient
theory of constitutional federal questions, Justice Marshall's
Osborn opinion also revealed another constitutional basis for
federal adjudication of state-law claims, in what has come to be
known as supplemental jurisdiction. Justice Marshall reasoned
that "when a question to which the judicial power.., is extended
by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it
is in the power of Congress to give the [federal] Courts juris-
diction of that cause, although other questions of fact or law
may be involved in it,"32 8 because "the constitution declares, that
the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the
constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States,"32 9 and
"[t]here is scarcely any case, every part of which depends on the
constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."130 That ra-
tionale supported federal adjudication of state-law claims to
which the Bank of the United States was a party as constitu-
tional federal questions. In addition, though, it also portended
the now-familiar Gibbs supplemental jurisdiction formula for
adjudication of nondiverse state-law claims that contain no fed-
estate is not a party, though, the only possible federal ingredient in a third-party
claim would be the fact that the claim is "related to" the debtor's bankruptcy case-a
federal ingredient supplied solely for jurisdictional purposes and, thus, an insufficient
basis for federal jurisdiction. Moreover, as Professor Block-Lieb rightly concludes: "Put
so broadly ...an 'original ingredient' theory of Article HI may be difficult to distin-
guish from the theory of protective jurisdiction." Id. at 779. Accordingly, like protec-
tive jurisdiction theories, such an approach offers no guidance for determining whether
a third-party claim is or is not "related to" the debtor's bankruptcy case. See supra
notes 241-48 and accompanying text.
328. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
329. Id. at 819 (emphasis added).
330. Id. at 820.
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eral ingredient at all, if "the relationship between [a constitu-
tional federal question] claim and the state claim permits the
conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but
one constitutional 'case.'
33
'
The prevailing model for a supplemental theory of federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction depicts state-law claims in bankruptcy
as ancillary to the debtor's federal bankruptcy "case." This Part
I1.C analyzes and critiques that model, which is founded upon
an inapt in rem theory of supplemental jurisdiction that is insuf-
ficient to fully explain "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction over
third-party claims. The bankruptcy "case" is not the primary
jurisdictional unit in bankruptcy; individual bankruptcy "pro-
ceedings" present the justiciable controversies for exercise of the
federal judicial power in bankruptcy. Reconstructing the bank-
ruptcy model around these "proceedings" produces a more flexi-
ble in personam theory of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. Addi-
tionally, this in personam model is fully consistent with estab-
lished supplemental jurisdiction theory and Congress's desire, in
enacting the 1978 Reform Act, to loose federal bankruptcy juris-
diction from the in rem constraints of the past. Most significant-
ly, though, this in personam theory bears the principled inter-
pretive standards for third-party "related to" bankruptcy juris-
diction that are so sorely lacking in extant jurisprudence.
1. The Equitable Receivership Paradigm
Many have played with the prospect that federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction over state-law claims is a species of supplemental
jurisdiction, an idea that seems to have entered the academic
discourse through Professor Mishkin 3  and that Justice Frank-
furter also tendered at one point.333 The model for this approach
331. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13 (1976) (characterizing Osborn as the "lineal ancestor" of
Gibbs).
332. See Mishkin, supra note 247, at 194 n.161. Having made the suggestion, Pro-
fessor Mishkin then concluded that "use of some other approach seems more apt." Id
333. Justice Frankfurter's version was as follows:
[I]f all the suits by the trustee ... are regarded as one litigation for the
collection and apportionment of the bankrupt's property, a particular suit
by the trustee, under state law, to recover a specific piece of property
might be analogized to the ancillary or pendent jurisdiction cases in
[Vol. 41:743832
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comes from the common-law precursor to statutory bankruptcy
reorganizations,3" federal equity receivership proceedings.3 5
The jurisdictional basis for receivership proceedings in federal
court was by way of an equitable creditors' bill, seeking an appli-
cation of a debtor's assets toward satisfaction of creditors'
claims336 and founded upon diversity of citizenship as between a
plaintiff, judgment creditor and the defendant debtor.3 7 Once
which, in the disposition of a cause of action, federal courts may pass on
state grounds for recovery that are joined to federal grounds.
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 483 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting); cf Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 92
(1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the "problems arising from today's judg-
ment can be resolved simply by providing that ancillary common-law actions, such as
the one involved in these cases, be routed to the United States district court" (empha-
sis added)).
334. See CHARLES ELIHU NADLER, THE LAW OF DEBTOR RELIEF: BANKRUPTCY AND
NON-BANKRUPTCY DEVICES § 114 (1954); Richard I. Aaron, Theory and History of
Chapter 11, in 1 CHAPTER 11 THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 320, § 1.15. Al-
though Chapter 11 has largely replaced receivership as a means for business reorga-
nization, there is still occasional use of the receivership apparatus. See NADLER, su-
pra, § 111, at 96 (characterizing the "equity receivership as a device for rehabilitation
and reorganization" that is "presently obsolete"); What It's Like To Be a Receiver for a
Ski Resort, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. Wkly. News & Comment (LRP) No. 11, at Al (Apr. 1,
1997) (describing a rare contemporary federal receivership-reorganization proceeding).
335. See Matasar, supra note 7, at 1470 (analogizing bankruptcy jurisdiction to equi-
ty receivership jurisdiction); Mishkin, supra note 247, at 194 n.161 (same). The con-
verse also seems to be true. In its receivership cases, the Supreme Court was prone
to analogize to general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. See, e.g., Riehle v. Margolies,
279 U.S. 218, 223 (1929) (citing the bankruptcy case of Kelley v. Gill, 245 U.S. 116
(1917)); White v. Ewing, 159 U.S. 36, 40 (1895) ("In this particular, the jurisdiction of
the [federal] Court does not materially differ from that of the District Court in bank-
ruptcy, the right of which to collect the assets of a bankrupt estate we do not under-
stand ever to have been doubted.").
336. See FINLETTER, supra note 106, at 3-10; 1 MOORE & OGLEBAY, supra note 106,
0.04, at 30-33; Garrard Glenn, The Basis of the Federal Receivership, 25 COLUM. L.
REV. 434 (1925). The intervention of equity, premised upon inadequacy of legal reme-
dies, required the plaintiff, judgment creditor to present an execution on the judgment
that had been returned unsatisfied. Consent by the defendant to the receivership
petition, however, removed this requisite. See Stanley L. Sabel, Equity Jurisdiction in
the United States Courts with Reference to Consent Receiverships, 20 IOWA L. REV. 83
(1934). In the late 1920s, though, the Supreme Court began to overtly question the
continuing validity of the consent receivership device. See Henry J. Friendly, Some
Comments on the Corporate Reorganizations Act, 48 HARV. L. REV. 39, 41-45 (1934).
337. See GARRARD GLENN, THE LAW GOVERNING LIQUIDATION § 154, at 256 (1935); 1
MOORE & OGLEBAY, supra note 106, 0.04, at 34; David McC. Wright, Jurisdiction
and Venue in Federal Equity Receivership of Corporations, 24 VA. L. REV. 29, 33 (1937).
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this diversity jurisdiction attached, ancillary jurisdiction enabled
the federal receivership court to consider the claims of any of the
debtor's creditors, regardless of citizenship, 38 as well as any suit
by the receiver to collect the debtor's assets.339
Efforts to both develop 4° and refute ' an ancillary or supple-
mental theory of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction have employed
the receivership paradigm that state-law claims can be enter-
tained in federal bankruptcy court if they are ancillary to the
federal petition for bankruptcy relief, forming one constitutional
bankruptcy "case."3 42 There are a number of problems, however,
with attempts to transport the receivership exemplar into the
bankruptcy context-problems that incipiently misdirected these
previous experiments with a supplemental approach to bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction. Using an appropriate bankruptcy model,
however, supplemental jurisdiction does, indeed, supply the
338. See Baggs v. Martin, 179 U.S. 206, 207-09 (1900); Rouse v. Hornsby, 161 U.S.
588, 588-91 (1896); Rouse v. Letcher, 156 U.S. 47, 49-50 (1895); People's Bank v.
Calhoun, 102 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1880). Grant Gilmore cited the equity receivership as
one of the few post-Civil War examples of a pre-Civil War "tradition of judicial cre-
ativity" in the federal courts, which, "proceeding without statutory warrant, invented
the equity receivership for the reorganization of insolvent corporations-a remarkable
instance of an innovative judicial response to an unprecedented economic situation."
GRANT GiLMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 60-61 (1977). The degree of inventive-
ness involved is illustrated by the fact that federal receivership jurisdiction over all
creditors' claims, regardless of citizenship, seems inconsistent with the complete diver-
sity rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). See Friendly, supra
note 336, at 45 n.24.
339. See Pope v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. Co., 173 U.S. 573, 576-81
(1899); White v. Ewing, 159 U.S. at 38-40.
340. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 483 (1957) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting); Block-Lieb, supra note 20, at 767, 773 & n.301, 786, 788-89 &
n.376, 802-03 & n.452; Cross, supra note 7, at 1235-38, 1241-44, 1247-48; Matasar,
supra note 7, at 1470-74; Martha Clark Lofgren, Comment, Product Liability Claims
in the Bankruptcy Courts After the 1984 Amendments: Four Standards to Limit "Re-
lated to" Jurisdiction, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1247, 1252-53 n.20, 1255-56, 1263, 1267,
1283-84 (1984).
341. See S. REP. No. 98-55, at 18 & n.53c (1983); 130 CONG. REC. 20,087 (1984)
(statement of Sen. Hatch); Galligan, supra note 7, at 36-40; Goldberg-Ambrose, supra
note 7, at 551-52; Mishkin, supra note 247, at 194 n.161; Note, Bankruptcy and the
Limits of Federal Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 703, 710 n.37 (1982); Note, Over-
Protective Jurisdiction?: A State Sovereignty Theory of Federal Questions, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1948, 1967-68 (1989); Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 977-80, app. at 1027-30.
342. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303(b) (1994) (providing that a bankruptcy "case . . . is
commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition").
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crucial missing component for a comprehensive, cohesive theory
of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.
2. Clarifying the Jurisdictional Unit in a Bankruptcy "Case"
The equitable receivership model is unsuitable for federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction, because it improperly characterizes the
basic jurisdictional unit in bankruptcy as a bankruptcy "case."
As explored in this Part 11..2, however, it is unclear whether
the so-called bankruptcy case, in and of itself, presents any
justiciable "case" or "controversy" within the meaning of Article
III of the Constitution. A bankruptcy "case" is much like an
empty box, into which are placed all of the bankruptcy "proceed-
ings" that arise in the course of administration of a particular
debtor's bankruptcy estate, and the relevant jurisdictional unit
to which the judicial power attaches in bankruptcy is an individ-
ual bankruptcy "proceeding." Thus, our constitutional theory
must explain the basis for federal jurisdiction over each of these
bankruptcy "proceedings," not the debtor's bankruptcy "case."
The "hook" for ancillary federal jurisdiction in the equitable
receivership cases was the creditors' bill of a diverse plaintiff, to
which all subsequent ancillary claims were appended, and whose
bankruptcy analogue would be the initial bankruptcy petition
commencing a debtor's bankruptcy "case" in federal court. Such
a supplemental approach for federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is
problematic, though, due to the considerable uncertainty sur-
rounding the question whether the mere filing of a bankruptcy
petition-in particular, the typical voluntary petition filed by the
debtor-creates any justiciable "case or controversy" to which
the judicial power and supplemental jurisdiction can attach. 3
343. Compare Ralph E. Avery, Article M1I and Title 11: A Constitutional Collision, 12
BANKR. DEv. J. 397, 417-18 n.137 (1996) (arguing that the bankruptcy petition itself
does not present any justiciable controversies), and Hon. Robert E. DeMascio, For
Fourteen Years, in ROBERT E. DEMASCIO ET AL., FOURTEEN YEARS OR LIFE: TnE
BANKRUPTcY COURT DILEMMA 1, 3 (1983) (same), with Block-Lieb, supra note 20, at
773 n.301 (concluding that a bankruptcy case is a justiciable controversy, analogizing
to naturalization proceedings), and Galligan, supra note 7, at 39-40 & n.145 (same).
For an interesting discussion of how justiciability and joinder doctrines, in combina-
tion, define a constitutional "case," see Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 227 (1990); see also ALI, JUDICIAL CODE PROJECT, supra note 112, at 106
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In drafting the Bankruptcy Code, Congress recognized that
the vast majority of all bankruptcies present no disputes at all
and, consequently, expressed a desire to restrict the role of the
federal bankruptcy court to adjudication of actual controversies
that do arise.-' Thus, the filing of a voluntary bankruptcy peti-
tion by a debtor, in and of itself, "constitutes an order for [bank-
ruptcy] relief,"345 and that bankruptcy "relief" does not necessarily
present the court with any justiciable controversies between
adverse parties. 46 In the equitable receivership context, the
justiciable controversy to which ancillary federal jurisdiction was
incident was the unpaid claim of the plaintiff creditor against
the defendant debtor,37 not the creditor's request for appoint-
ment of a receiver to administer the debtor's assets for the bene-
fit of creditors."8 Although the Supreme Court never ruled on
("[Tihe restrictive sense in which a 'case or controversy' is used for purposes of the
requirement of justiciability coexists with the expansive sense used to determine
whether a justiciable civil dispute is part of a 'case or controversy' within one of the
categories specified by Article III.").
344. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 4, 49, 50-51, 107-08, 111 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5965-66, 6011-12, 6068-69, 6072-73; 1973 COMM'N REPORT, supra
note 110, pt. I, at 5-6, 81, 85-86, 94, 112, 120-21, 126. The largely administrative
character of most bankruptcies was emphasized by the comprehensive Brookings Insti-
tute study of DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRuPTc: PROBLEM, PROCESS,
REFORM (1971).
345. 11 U.S.C. § 301; see 1973 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 110, pt. I, at 121 (stat-
ing that "voluntary petitions do not pose any issues requiring judicial resolution").
346. For example, take the case of a corporate debtor with no remaining assets that
files a Chapter 7 petition for purposes of "waving the white flag" to creditors. See
Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation Problem in Bankruptcy, 11 INTL REV. L. & ECON.
223, 225-27 (1991). The petition is not seeking a distribution of assets to unpaid cred-
itors, because the debtor has no assets, and the petition is not requesting discharge of
indebtedness, because a corporation is ineligible for discharge in a Chapter 7 case.
See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1). The only "relief' at stake seems to be access to a stay of
creditor collection actions, but that relief is automatically granted without any involve-
ment by the court. See id. § 362(a).
347. See In re Metropolitan Ry. Receivership, 208 U.S. 90, 107-09 (1908).
348. Thus, the Court opined that the mere fact a railroad is engaged in interstate
commerce does not present a justiciable controversy warranting appointment of a
federal receiver. "Jurisdiction to appoint a receiver . . . in cases of railroads engaged
in interstate commerce has existed by reason of diversity of citizenship in the various
cases between the parties to the litigation ... ." Id. at 109 (emphasis added); cf.
Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1934) (holding that a federal court could
not grant a state court receiver an ancillary receivership in federal court, because
"such an application is not ancillary to any proceedings in any federal court").
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the controversial practice of a debtor itself initiating federal
receivership proceedings without creditor involvement, 49 it did
characterize such a procedure as "certainly one of unusual char-
acter."350 A voluntary bankruptcy petition filed by a debtor,
therefore, does not neatly fit the receivership pattern of a dis-
tinct controversy between a creditor and the debtor, initiating a
justiciable "case" in federal court.
It is entirely unnecessary, however, to resolve the speculative
issue of the justiciability of a bankruptcy petition, because focus
upon the bankruptcy petition and ensuing bankruptcy "case" is
misplaced and misconstrues the applicable jurisdictional unit in
bankruptcy. Equating a bankruptcy "cash," within the meaning
of the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute,3 51 with a "case" under
Article III of the Constitution underestimates the complexity
and uniqueness of the bankruptcy "case."3 52 In fact, as a jurisdic-
tional unit, a bankruptcy "case" is an invention of the drafters of
the 1978 Reform Act. Every prior jurisdictional statute autho-
rized federal jurisdiction over bankruptcy "proceedings," spe-
cifically identified as various "cases and controversies" arising
349. See 1 MOORE & OGLEBAY, supra note 106, 0.04, at 32.
350. United States Trust Co. v. Wabash W. Ry., 150 U.S. 287, 300 (1893).
351. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1994), quoted supra text accompanying note 187.
352. Cf Letter from Professor Jo Desha Lucas to Representative Peter W. Rodino,
Jr., Chair, House Judiciary Committee (June 23, 1976) (stating that "[tihe position of
cases 'in bankruptcy' constitutionally is not altogether free from doubt" and raising
the issue "whether the bankruptcy proceeding itself is a 'case in equity' [under Article
HI] or a thing sui generis provided for by Article I"), reprinted in CONST. BANKR.
CTS., supra note 6, app. II, at 58. As Professor King has noted, in the bankruptcy
jurisdiction statute, the "word 'case' is a term of art," and the statute "carefully dis-
tinguish[es] between the words 'case' and 'proceeding,' recognizing that a case com-
menced under the Bankruptcy Code differs substantially from a typical civil action
commenced in state or federal court to resolve a two-party dispute." King, supra note
178, at 676-77. Professor Tabb also emphasizes "the unique nature of bankruptcy
cases," which are "composed of many different types of matters and 'proceedings.'
These proceedings range in complexity from uncontested administrative tasks to full-
scale adversarial litigation. Traditional civil lawsuits of the 'A versus B' variety com-
prise only a small portion of a typical bankruptcy case." TABB, supra note 302, § 4.1,
at 217. Likewise, the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules recently stated that
"the bankruptcy case is not, in and of itself, litigation involving a legal dispute in the
traditional sense." COMITEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE OF THE U.S., REQUEST FOR COMMENT ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 5 (1998).
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during the administration of a bankruptcy estate.3 3 Indeed, the
1973 Commission's proposed statute, in introducing statutory
"case" jurisdiction,3 4 referred to the bankruptcy "case" solely in
terms of jurisdiction over such "controversies." "'
A bankruptcy "case," then, has no content in and of itself, but
rather is defined by the various "proceedings" over which the
statute also grants the federal courts jurisdiction." The only
reason for a separate grant of exclusive jurisdiction over
bankruptcy "cases,"357 in light of the seemingly contradictory
353. See supra Part I.A-B.1, notes 37-111 and accompanying text.
354. The concept was simultaneously incorporated into the 1973 Bankruptcy Rules,
as described in the Advisory Committee notes:
A proceeding initiated by a petition for an adjudication under the
Bankruptcy Act is designated a "bankruptcy case" for the purpose of
these rules. The term embraces all the controversies determinable by the
court of bankruptcy ... arising during the pendency of the case. This
usage of the word "case" conforms to that employed in many provisions
of the Bankruptcy Act. The word "proceeding" as used in these rules
generally refers to a litigated matter arising within a case during the
course of administration of an estate.
FED. R. BANKI. P. 101 advisory committee's note (1973) (superseded 1983) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added), reprinted in 12 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, J 101.01.
355. "The jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts shall extend to the determination of
all controversies that arise out of a case commenced under this Act." 1973 COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 110, pt. II, § 2-201, at 30 (emphasis added); see also id., pt. I, at
6, 81-82, 85, 90, 126; id. pt. II, at 31-32. Congress employed similar language in
describing the new jurisdictional scheme as a "comprehensive grant of jurisdiction to
the bankruptcy courts over all controversies arising out of any bankruptcy or reha-
bilitation case." H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 46 (1977) (emphasis added), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6007; see also S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 153 (1978) (stating that
jurisdiction "is expanded to include all controversies arising out of or related to a
case" (emphasis added)), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5939.
356. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), quoted supra text accompanying note 188; see S. REP. No.
95-989, at 153 ("As used in this section everything that occurs in a bankruptcy case
is a proceeding."), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5939; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at
445 (same), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.AN. at 6400-01; id. at 48 (stating that the
statute "grants the bankruptcy courts broad and complete jurisdiction over all matters
and proceedings that arise in connection with bankruptcy cases"), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6010; John D. Ayer, The Forms of Action in Bankruptcy Practice: An
Exposition and a Critique, 1985 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 307, 308-09, 311-12; King,
supra note 178, at 676-77; William L. Norton, Jr., Bankruptcy Terminology and Pro-
ceedings Procedure, 1984 ANN. SURV. BANKI. L. 1, 2-5. The Bankruptcy Rules then
further subdivide bankruptcy "proceedings" into adversary proceedings, contested mat-
ters, and uncontested administrative matters requiring judicial action. See Ayer, su-
pra, at 312-14; Kennedy, supra note 178, at 425-27; Norton, supra, at 7-14 & n.10.
357. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a). Likewise, the statute also contains an in rem grant of
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grant of concurrent jurisdiction over bankruptcy "proceedings,"358
appears to be a statutory recognition of the concept that the
federal bankruptcy court "has an exclusive and nondelegable
control over the administration of an estate in its possession.3 59
"exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the
commencement of such [bankruptcy] case, and of property of the estate." Id. § 1334(e).
Such exclusive in rem jurisdiction is closely linked to the power to enjoin interfer-
ences with property within the control of a federal court. See Brubaker, supra note
13, at 1035-42; Frank R. Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 175, 187-89, 203-04, 210-11, 238 (1978), [hereinafter Kennedy, Automatic
Stay I]; Frank R. Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U.
MICH. J.L. REFoRM 1, 16-17, 63 (1978).
358. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). The extent to which federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is
exclusive of state court jurisdiction, historically, has been a persistent source of confu-
sion. The various bankruptcy acts have always contained their own jurisdictional
provisions. Nonetheless, in compiling federal statutory law into the Revised Statutes
of 1874, Congress included "all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy" among the
"exclusive" jurisdiction of the federal courts. See BUMP, supra note 62, at 316 (reprint-
ing Revised Statutes § 711(6)). This provision, though, was manifestly inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's conclusion that jurisdiction of "all matters and proceedings
in bankruptcy" under the 1867 Act was, in fact, concurrent and not exclusive of state
court jurisdiction. See Wilson v. Goodrich, 154 U.S. 640, 641 (1878); McHenry v. La
Soci~t6 Franqaise D!Epargnes, 95 U.S. 58, 59-60 (1877); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S.
130, 133-36, 143 (1876); Eyster v. Gaff, 91 U.S. 521, 525-26 (1875); see also COLLIER
(2d ed.), supra note 96, at 215-18 (discussing the inconsistency and suggesting that
the 1898 Act implicitly repealed the Revised Statutes provision). The parallel "exclu-
sive" jurisdiction provision, however, endured and was carried forward into the Judi-
cial Codes of 1911 and 1948. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, § 256(6),
36 Stat. 1087, 1160-61, superseded by Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62
Stat. 869, 931 (enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (superseded 1978)). Yet, the Supreme Court
continued to recognize the concurrent nature of bankruptcy jurisdiction, see infra note
360, despite frequent cavalier statements regarding the exclusivity of federal bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Bray, 225 U.S.
205, 217 (1912) ("We think it is a necessary conclusion.., that the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy courts in all 'proceedings in bankruptcy' is intended to be exclusive of
all other courts."); cf supra note 110.
359. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 483 (1940) (emphasis added);
see Young v. Sultan Ltd. (In re Lucasa Int'l Ltd.), 6 B.R. 717, 719 n.5 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Babitt, B.J.) (stating that "case" as used in the bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion statute "is a word of art embracing only the filing of a petition and the attach-
ment, therefrom, of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to administer the case [and] all
civil proceedings therein"); Hon. Roy Babitt, The Bankruptcy Court, Its Judges, Their
Jurisdiction and Powers and Appeals, Under Title II of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform
Act: Transition and Beyond, 1979 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 89, 103 (emphasizing "that
the word 'case' here means the commencement of the Bankruptcy Court's judicial and
administrative process from the filing of the petition"); cf Michael H. Reed et al.,
Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Abstention and Removal Under the New Federal Bank-
ruptcy Law, 56 AM. BANKI. L.J. 121, 137 (1982) (suggesting that the exclusive in rem
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That exclusive "case" control over estate administration includes
the power to permissively abstain from any given bankruptcy
"proceeding" and direct the litigation into a state court, which
retains a concurrent jurisdiction over the proceeding.860 Not-
bankruptcy jurisdiction provision "should probably be read to mean that the bankrupt-
cy court in which a [bankruptcy] case ... is pending will have exclusive jurisdiction
to administer the estate of the debtor"). For an extremely thoughtful recent opinion
exploring the jurisdictional essence of the bankruptcy "case" and emphasizing its role
as a control mechanism for estate administration, see Menk v. Lapaglia (In re Menk),
241 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999):
In short, virtually every act a bankruptcy judge is called upon to
perform in a judicial capacity is a "civil proceeding" within § 1334(b).
If virtually all judicial acts are taken in "civil proceedings" within
the subject-matter jurisdiction of § 1334(b), then the existence of a "case"
under § 1334(a) has less importance in bankruptcy litigation.
This brings us back to the "case" and to the puzzle of how § 1334(a)
fits into the scheme, given our conclusion that the main source of sub-
jict-matter jurisdiction for judicial acts is § 1334(b).
The § 1334(a) "case" has two main functions. It provides for the ex-
istence, and the nonjudicial administration, of the estate under which the
prime function is the performance of the duties of the trustee under the
supervision of the U.S. Trustee. Second, it serves as the administrative
mechanism by which the debtor receives a discharge and a fresh start.
In other words, the bankruptcy 'case" is an administrative exercise
that occurs under the auspices of the court ....
Id. at 909-10 (emphasis added).
360. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1). Indeed, the Thompson Court's statement regarding
an "exclusive and nondelegable control" is immediately followed by: "But the proper
exercise of that control may, where the interests of the estate and the parties will
best be served, lead the bankruptcy court to consent to submission to state courts of
particular controversies ... ." Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum, 309 U.S. at 483; see
also 1973 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 110, pt. II, at 32-33 ("Although it is often said
that the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over the administration of debtors' es-
tates under the present Act is nondelegable, this proposition has never prevented the
court's consent to submission of particular litigation to other courts."); Kennedy, Auto-
matic Stay I, supra note 357, at 189 & n.67 (noting that although "Congress has
manifestly concluded that the bankruptcy court must have control of litigation against
the debtor . . . in order to be able to supervise and facilitate its rehabilitation," the
"bankruptcy court's need for control of litigation does not necessarily require the court
to conduct all litigation against the debtor"). In fact, the Supreme Court's discussions
of "exclusive" federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over estate administration consistently
recognize the corollary discretionary power to abstain from hearing particular proceed-
ings. See Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S. 132, 142 n.11 (1949); Gardner v. New Jersey,
329 U.S. 565, 577, 583-84 (1947); Thompson v. Texas Mexican Ry. Co., 328 U.S. 134,
138-41 (1946); Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U.S. 161, 163-64, 169 (1946); Mangus v. Miller,
317 U.S. 178, 185-88 (1942); Foust v. Munson S.S. Lines, 299 U.S. 77, 83-84 (1936);
Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U.S. 610, 615-19 (1934); Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318, 320-23,
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withstanding this overarching, aggregative "case" jurisdiction to
control conduct of all the "proceedings" involved in administra-
tion of the estate, the primary jurisdictional unit in bankruptcy
-the equivalent of a nonbankruptcy "case" or "civil ac-
tion"36 -- has always been and remains a particular, individual
bankruptcy "proceeding" raising a justiciable controversy. 62 Ac-
326-27 (1931); Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734, 737-39 (1931); 1
COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, 1 2.07.
In addition to the permissive abstention provision contained in the bankruptcy
jurisdiction statute, the Bankruptcy Code itself also recognizes one aspect of discre-
tionary abstention, by providing for relief from the automatic stay of creditor collec-
tion actions, to permit litigation of creditor claims in a nonbankruptcy forum "for
cause." 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1994); see H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 343 (1977) (stating
that "a desire to permit an action to proceed to completion in another tribunal may
provide ... cause"), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5963, 6300. The 1898 Act con-
tained a similar provision for adjudication of claims against the estate in a
nonbankruptcy forum, at the discretion of the bankruptcy judge. See Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, supra note 66, § 57d (providing "[tihat an unliquidated or contingent claim
shall not be allowed unless liquidated or the amount thereof estimated in the manner
and within the time directed by the court"); id. § lb ("The court may order the
receiver or trustee to enter his appearance and defend any pending suit against the
bankrupt."); 1A COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, 1 11.09; 3 id. [ 57.1513.21-[3.3]; see
also Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 21, 14 Stat. 517, 527 (repealed 1878) (provid-
ing in a clause for stay of creditors' suits "that if the amount due the creditor is in
dispute, the suit, by leave of the court in bankruptcy, may proceed to judgment for
the purpose of ascertaining the amount due, which amount may be proved in
bankruptcy, but execution shall be stayed as aforesaid").
361. In nonbankruptcy federal jurisdiction, the Judicial Code consistently employs the
jurisdictional unit of a "civil action." See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (jurisdiction of "civil
actions" arising under federal law); id. § 1332(a) (jurisdiction of "civil actions in con-
troversies between citizens of different states); cf. id. § 1333(1) (jurisdiction of any
"civil case" in admiralty); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (establishing that the Federal
Rules govern procedure "in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at
law or in equity or in admiralty" (emphasis added)); FED. R. CIrV. P. 2 ("There shall
be one form of action to be known as 'civil action."); FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(1) (provid-
ing that the Federal Rules do not apply to "proceedings in bankruptcy," except to the
extent specified in the Bankruptcy Rules). See generally ALI, JUDICIAL CODE PROJECT,
supra note 112, at xv, 29-30.
362. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9001(2) (defining "action" or "civil action" for purposes of
the Bankruptcy Rules to mean "an adversary proceeding or, when appropriate,...
proceedings to ... determine any other contested matter"); Ayer, supra note 356, at
312; cf ALI, JUDICIAL CODE PROJECT, supra note 112, at 29 (discussing other jurisdic-
tional provisions in the Judicial Code that use "proceedings" as the jurisdictional unit
in lieu of "civil action"). This is illustrated most clearly with respect to bankruptcy
appellate jurisdiction, where it is firmly established that the relevant unit is a "pro-
ceeding," not the entire bankruptcy "case." See 1 COLLIER (15th ed.), supra note 66,
5.07[1][b]; John P. Hennigan, Jr., Toward Regularizing Appealability in Bankruptcy,
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cordingly, at an early date the Supreme Court recognized in a
particular bankruptcy "proceeding," an assignee's plenary suit in
federal court under the 1867 Act, that "the jurisdiction intended
to be conferred is the regular jurisdiction between party and
party, as described in the Judiciary Act and the third article of
the Constitution." 63 Explaining the constitutional nature of
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, therefore, is a matter of ex-
plaining federal jurisdiction over each of the assorted bankrupt-
cy "proceedings" that may arise in the administration of a given
debtor's bankruptcy case.
Recognizing that the conceptual jurisdictional unit in bank-
ruptcy is something less than the whole bankruptcy "case" is
significant, because it means that the entirety of bankruptcy
jurisdiction over state-law claims need not be justified by one
uniform constitutional theory. Indeed, a search for the one true
theory seems to be the primary stumbling block for many prior
scholarly endeavors."' An Osborn federal entity theory, though,
sustains federal jurisdiction over any claim or cause of action to
which the bankruptcy estate is party, which subsumes all of
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction except third-party "related to"
12 BANKR. DEv. J. 583, 584, 599-603 (1996); Richard B. Levin, Bankruptcy Appeals,
58 N.C. L. REv. 967, 983-87 (1980). In fact, in Connecticut National Bank v. Germain,
503 U.S. 249 (1992), the Supreme Court held that a court of appeals may entertain
an interlocutory appeal in such a bankruptcy "proceeding" pursuant to the general
interlocutory appeals provision, governing an appeal in a "civil action." See id, at 251-
54 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)); cf Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516
U.S. 124, 129 (1995) (opining that the general Judicial Code provisions for removal
and remand of "civil actions" and "cases" can "comfortably coexist" with the bankrupt-
cy removal and remand provisions).
363. Morgan v. Thornhill, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 65, 80 (1870).
364. For example, after rejecting (1) protective jurisdiction as theoretically unpalat-
able, and (2) Osborn as insufficient to explain bankruptcy jurisdiction over third-party
disputes, Professor Cross concludes that a new, expanded theory of ancillary jurisdic-
tion must be devised "to include atypical federal cases such as bankruptcy." Cross,
supra note 7, at 1214-24, 1229-33, 1240-51, 1242; see also infra note 380. Likewise,
Professor Block-Lieb initially attempts to formulate an Osborn theory that would
reach even third-party "related to" claims, but concludes that this approach essentially
is indistinguishable from protective jurisdiction. See Block-Lieb, supra note 20, at 778-
79; see also supra note 327. Thus, she also explores Cross's ancillary theory to explain
bankruptcy jurisdiction over state-law claims and alternates between the all-encom-
passing Osborn and all-encompassing ancillary theories in her analysis. See Block-
Lieb, supra note 20, at 779-91.
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disputes. 6 5 Thus, in only this narrow class of third-party "re-
lated to" bankruptcy jurisdiction do we need resort to an alter-
native jurisdictional theory, such as supplemental jurisdiction.
Realigning the jurisdictional unit in bankruptcy also permits
an entirely different formulation for a theory of supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction. The constitutionality of third-party
"related to" claims is not dependent upon an ancillary relation-
ship to the bankruptcy petition (A la the receivership model) if
such claims share a supplemental nexus with some other claim
having an independent jurisdictional basis in one of the constitu-
tional "categories" of federal jurisdiction. 66 Because any claim to
which the bankruptcy estate is a party has an independent ju-
risdictional basis in Article III's federal question category (the
"freestanding" claim), 6 ' federal courts can constitutionally enter-
tain any third-party dispute (the "supplemental" claim) with a
relationship to the estate claim sufficient to conclude that the
freestanding estate claim and supplemental third-party claim
are "but one constitutional 'case. 368
In terms of constitutional jurisdiction theory, then, a bank-
ruptcy "case" is a misnomer. The so-called bankruptcy case can
contain multiple "cases" in the constitutional sense of the term
"case": "a cluster of claims for relief by various parties ... that
would ordinarily be subject to joint adjudication in a single pro-
ceeding in the interests of 'judicial economy, convenience, and
fairness to litigants." 69 Proper conceptualization of the jurisdic-
365. See supra Part II.B, notes 253-327 and accompanying text.
366. For an illuminating discussion on linking a "freestanding" claim in a constitu-
tional "category" with "supplemental" claims forming part of the same constitutional
"case," see Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute-A
Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849, 891-93 (1992); see also
ALI, JUDICIAL CODE PROJECT, supra note 112, at xvii, 20, 102, 103, 106, 113. "If
federal judicial power is extended by Article I to any one of these factually or
transactionally related claims on the basis of its federal nature .... federal judicial
power extends as well to the entire 'case or controversy' of which that claim is a
part." Id. at 106. "Thus, there is constitutional authority for original jurisdiction to be
conferred on the district courts over an entire action, or 'case,' based upon the pres-
ence of a federal 'ingredient' as to any claim in that action." Id. at 113.
367. The terminology of the jurisdictionally "freestanding" claim is borrowed from
ALI, JUDICIAL CODE PROJECT, supra note 112, at xvii, 37, 53.
368. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
369. ALI, JUDICIAL CODE PROJECT, supra note 112, at 106 (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at
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tional unit in bankruptcy in this manner clears the way for a
more flexible, in personam theory of supplemental bankruptcy
jurisdiction that was unavailable in the equitable receivership
context, which relied upon an in rem theory of ancillary jurisdic-
tion.
3. Shifting from an In Rem to an In Personam Model of
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
Explaining the constitutionality of third-party "related to"
bankruptcy jurisdiction hinges on the constitutional theory on
which we premise our general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
over all claims by and against a bankruptcy estate. The Osborn
federal entity theory regards all claims to which a bankruptcy
estate is party as constitutional federal questions, whereas the
receivership model would portray state-law claims by and
against a bankruptcy estate as supplemental claims. In explor-
ing these competing theories in this Part II.C.3, though, princi-
ples of ancillary receivership jurisdiction prove somewhat mis-
placed in the bankruptcy context, because unlike bankruptcy,
there has never been a statute giving the federal courts general
jurisdiction over all claims by and against a receivership estate.
Thus, since federal jurisdiction is dependent upon both constitu-
tional and congressional authorization,7 0 an Osborn federal
entity theory was simply unavailable to buttress federal receiv-
ership jurisdiction, for lack of statutory imprimatur. Federal re-
ceivership jurisdiction over nondiverse state-law claims, then,
could look only to an in rem theory of ancillary jurisdiction for
support. Such an in rem theory, though, will not sustain "related
to" bankruptcy jurisdiction over third-party disputes. If, however,
we regard the federal bankruptcy estate as a jurisdictional per-
son (per Osborn), rather than a jurisdictional res (per the receiv-
ership paradigm), the independent constitutional federal ques-
tion jurisdiction over all in personam claims by and against the
bankruptcy estate will furnish supplemental jurisdiction in any
"related" third-party dispute (per Gibbs).
726).
370. See Ex parte Mcardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512-13 (1869); Sheldon v. Sill, 49
U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850); ALI, JUDICIAL CODE PROJECT, supra note 112, at 107.
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What is regarded as the earliest form of ancillary jurisdiction
posited that when a federal court, in the course of a suit with a
proper jurisdictional basis, obtained possession and control of
property, that court could entertain all conflicting claims to that
property, regardless of the state or federal character of the
claims or the citizenship of the parties, through the court's ancil-
lary jurisdiction." 1 For a federal receivership court sitting in
diversity under a creditors' bill, resulting in the appointment of
a receiver for all of the debtor-defendant's property, this in rem
brand of ancillary jurisdiction provided authority to entertain all
creditors' claims to the res thus created. 72 Moreover, the Su-
preme Court later expanded this in rem rationale to include the
receiver's suits to enhance the res by pursuing the debtor's causes
of action in federal court.
This in rem ancillary scheme of receivership jurisdiction
could, of course, be transformed into an Osborn federal entity
jurisdiction by simply recharacterizing it as a jurisdiction over
all claims by and against a federally created entity: the federal
371. One of the earliest cases credited with recognizing this principle is Freeman v.
Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 460 (1860). See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger,
437 U.S. 365, 375 n.18 (1978) (noting that "[t]he ancillary jurisdiction of the federal
courts derives originally from cases such as Freeman v. Howe"); Aldinger v. Howard,
427 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1976). For other early cases applying this principle, see Gregory v.
Van Ee, 160 U.S. 643, 645-46 (1896); Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61, 62-64 (1885);"
Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 280-86 (1884).
372. See Rouse v. Letcher, 156 U.S. 47, 49-50 (1895) (citing Stewart v. Dunham);
People's Bank v. Calhoun, 102 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1880) (citing Freeman v. Howe); cf
Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. at 283 (stating that "Ithe same practice prevails in
cases where property is put into the hands of a receiver").
373. See White v. Ewing, 159 U.S. 36, 39 (1895) (citing Freeman v. Howe,
Krippendorf v. Hyde, and Rouse v. Letcher); cf Dewey v. West Fairmont Gas Coal
Co., 123 U.S. 329, 331-33 (1887) (in a diversity suit for breach of contract, holding
that ancillary jurisdiction existed to seek recovery of a fraudulent conveyance by the
insolvent defendant, without regard to citizenship of the recipient of the transfer);
Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. at 64 (holding that nondiverse claimants could join a
creditors' bill against fraudulent conveyance defendants, because "it would be merely a
matter of form whether the new parties should come in as co-complainants, or before
a master, under a decree ordering a reference to prove the claims of all persons en-
titled to ... benefit" from any assets recovered). As Justice Brandeis stated: "The ap-
pointment of a receiver of a debtor's property by a federal court confers upon it, re-
gardless of citizenship and of the amount in controversy, federal jurisdiction to decide
all questions incident to the preservation, collection and distribution of the assets."
Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 223 (1929).
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receivership estate. 74 In fact, when the Court construed the
general federal question statute itself as incorporating Osborn in
toto37 5 the Court indicated that general federal receivership jur-
isdiction was, indeed, merely an exercise of statutory federal
question jurisdiction.7 6 Subsequent prudential limitations on the
scope of the federal question statute,7 though, removed this
statutory grounding for general federal receivership jurisdiction
and left in rem ancillary concepts as the only basis for federal
jurisdiction of nondiverse state-law claims by and against the
receivership res.3
374. See, e.g., White v. Ewing, 159 U.S. at 39-40 (stating that "where parties are
brought before the court for the purpose of the payment to them of claims they may
hold against the estate, and cases where it is sought to recover of them claims which
the receiver insists they owe the estate," that "the receiver in such cases appears as
a party to the suit . . . only because he represents . . . the estate of an insolvent
corporation," and [in this particular, the jurisdiction of the [federal] Court does not
materially differ from that of the District Court in bankruptcy"); McNulta v.
Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 331-32 (1891) (stating that a receiver's 'position is somewhat
analogous to that of a corporation sole," and T[i]f actions were brought against the
receivership generally . . . without stating the name of the individual, it would more
accurately represent the character or status of the defendant," because "[aictions
against the receiver are in law actions against the receivership, or the funds in the
hands of the receiver").
375. See Pacific Ry. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 10-14 (1885) (construing the federal
question statute to encompass all suits against federally chartered railroads).
376. See Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cox, 145 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1892) (Fuller, J.); see
also Rouse v. Hornsby, 161 U.S. 588, 590-91 (1896) (dictum); Tennessee v. Union &
Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1894) (dictum); id. at 472 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. at 330-32 (interpreting the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction statute).
377. The dissent's view in the Pacific Railway Renoval Cases, that statutory federal
question jurisdiction is not coextensive with the constitutional provision, ultimately
prevailed. See 115 U.S. at 24 (Waite, C.J., dissenting). With respect to federally char-
tered corporations, Congress subsequently restricted the holding of that case by stat-
ute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1994). The Court also distanced itself from that case's
broad construction of the federal question statute. See Romero v. International Ter-
minal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 n.50 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.) (characterizing
the case as an "unfortunate decision"); Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 114
(1936) (Cardozo, J.) (stating that "the doctrine of the charter cases was to be treated
as exceptional"); Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 485 (1933) (Stone, J.)
(stating that "their doctrine has not been extended to other classes of cases").
378. Justice Fuller, therefore, was forced to perform a fairly clumsy logical gymnas-
tics routine in an attempt to escape from his previous Cox opinion. See Pope v. Louis-
ville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. Co., 173 U.S. 573, 578-80 (1899) (Fuller, J.) (opining
that the receivership estate as a party does not create a statutory federal question);
see also Gableman v. Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Ry. Co., 179 U.S. 335, 339-41
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The bankruptcy jurisdiction statute unquestionably contains a
general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over all claims by and
against the bankruptcy estate. Therefore, we could, in a similar
manner, alternatively characterize the federal bankruptcy estate
as either a jurisdictional person or a jurisdictional res. General
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction could be explained as either (1)
Osborn federal entity jurisdiction over all claims by and against
our jurisdictional person, the federally created bankruptcy es-
tate, or (2) in rem ancillary jurisdiction over all claims by and
against the jurisdictional res of the bankruptcy estate. The con-
text in which an in rem versus an in personam theory makes a
difference, though, is not with respect to the constitutionality of
a general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over all claims by and
against the bankruptcy estate; the sticking point for federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction is "related to" jurisdiction of third-party
disputes to which the estate is not a party. Only through an in
personam, Osborn federal entity theory of general federal bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction can we explain the constitutionality of these
third-party claims that the Osborn federal entity theory itself
does not reach.
In the context of bankruptcy jurisdiction over third-party
actions, the Supreme Court has stated "that the 'related to' lan-
guage of § 1334(b) must be read to give [federal] jurisdiction
over more than simply proceedings involving the property of the
debtor or the estate."379 In receivership proceedings, by contrast,
any such third-party dispute that did not directly involve the
ancillary res of the receivership estate was beyond the reach of
the in rem ancillary jurisdiction of a federal receivership
court.8 ° Our current bankruptcy jurisdiction statute, therefore,
(1900) (Fuller, J.) (same); cf Bausman v. Dixon, 173 U.S. 113, 114-15 (1899) (Fuller,
J.) (reaching the same conclusion under the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction
statute). Justice Brandeis subsequently characterized such a construction of the feder-
al question statute as "in harmony with the trend of legislation providing that the
federal character of the litigant should not alone confer jurisdiction upon a federal
court." Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25, 35 (1934).
379. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995).
380. In rejecting ancillary jurisdiction over a nondiverse third-party dispute in re-
ceivership proceedings, the Supreme Court stated that "no controversy can be regarded
as dependent or ancillary unless it has direct relation to property or assets actually
or constructively drawn into the court's possession or control by the principal suit."
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clearly extends federal bankruptcy jurisdiction beyond the capac-
ity of the in rem foundation undergirding receivership jurisdic-
tion, and it is also that pervasive statute that frees federal bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction from the strictures of such an in rem model.
Because the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute gives the federal
courts bankruptcy jurisdiction over all claims by or against a
federal bankruptcy estate, 81 all such claims have both an inde-
pendent statutory and constitutional basis for federal jurisdic-
tion, using an Osborn federal entity theory of bankruptcy juris-
diction, without any need for resort to principles of ancillary or
supplemental jurisdiction. Consequently, this independent statu-
tory and constitutional jurisdiction of the federal courts over our
jurisdictional person, the federal bankruptcy estate, will anchor
supplemental jurisdiction over third-party disputes "related to"
constitutional federal question claims by and against our juris-
Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925); cf Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Comm'n v. Chilcott Portfolio Management, Inc., 713 F.2d 1477, 1485-86 (1Oth Cir.
1983) (opining that federal receivership proceedings did not reach damages suits by
individual investors against nondebtor defendants).
Professor Cross proffers an expanded ancillary jurisdiction theory that would
encompass all state-law claims adjudicated in a bankruptcy "case" as the equivalent of
a single constitutional "case," including third-party "related to" disputes. See Cross,
supra note 7, at 1240-48; see also supra note 364. To the extent it includes third-
party disputes, this theory finds no support in the Court's in rem receivership cases,
and to the extent individual state-law claims entertained in the bankruptcy "case" are
factually or transactionally unrelated to each other, Cross's theory admittedly finds no
support in the Gibbs test for the requisite supplemental nexus. See Cross, supra note
7, at 1240-41. Nonetheless, Cross posits that the statutory requirement in bankruptcy
that all state-law claims be "related to" the bankruptcy case is a sufficient ancillary
connection. See id. at 1242-44. Cross relies upon postjudgment ancillary enforcement
jurisdiction for his expanded supplemental linkage. See id. at 1244. Subsequently,
however, the Court has held that such postjudgment enforcement jurisdiction cannot
be used to impose liability upon a third party through an independent, unrelated
cause of action that is beyond the scope of Gibbs's supplemental relationship test. See
Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 354-59 (1996). Additionally, and like protective
jurisdiction, Cross's theory offers no suggestions for determining when a state-law
claim is sufficiently "related to" a bankruptcy case to invoke federal jurisdiction. Thus,
Cross's theory reintroduces the circularity of protective jurisdiction that frustrates
efforts to delineate principled limits for third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion. See supra notes 241-48 and accompanying text. Not surprisingly, then, Cross,
who emphatically rejects "protective jurisdiction, in each of its variants, [as] funda-
mentally unsound" nonetheless states that his "expanded view of ancillary jurisdiction
resembles the doctrine of protective jurisdiction." Cross, supra note 7, at 1224, 1248.
381. See supra Part II.B, notes 253-327 and accompanying text.
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dictional person-an in personam approach to supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction. Such an in personam theory of supple-
mental bankruptcy jurisdiction is entirely consistent with the
simultaneous maturation of both general principles of supple-
mental jurisdiction and federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.
From a notional perspective, linking a theory of supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction to the federal receivership paradigm
freezes bankruptcy jurisdiction in an extremely anachronistic
stage of supplemental jurisdiction. Supplemental jurisdiction has
long since evolved beyond the in rem concepts employed in the
receivership cases, which were justified under a strict "necessity"
rationale,..2 to now encompass logical groupings of in personam
disputes in the interest of broader "considerations of judicial
economy, convenience and fairness to litigants."3" In rem no-
tions, of course, figured prominently in the bankruptcy jurisdic-
tional scheme of the 1898 Act,38 and its statutory version of sup-
plemental bankruptcy jurisdiction likewise was expressly restric-
ted to cases of "necessity" in the administration of the res.38 5 The
inequities and inefficiencies of such a restrictive in rem regime,
however, produced clear strands of in personam supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction even under the 1898 Act.
As early as 1901, the obiter dictum of the Bryan v.
Bernheimer 86 opinion, although couched in terms of the 1898
382. See Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 285 (1884) (characterizing such juris-
diction as "a necessary resort to prevent a failure of justice"); Minnesota Co. v. St.
Paul Co., 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 609, 632-33 (1864) (stating that if "property is still in the
hands of the receiver of the court," then "nothing can be plainer than that any litiga-
tion for its possession must take place in that court, without regard to the citizenship
of the parties," characterizing such in rem jurisdiction as "necessary" and citing
Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 460 (1860)); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS § 9, at 34-35 (5th ed. 1994). But cf Richard D. Freer, A Princi-
pled Statutory Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction, 1987 DUKE L.J. 34, 50-51 (sug-
gesting that the "necessity" rationale was, in reality, a veiled efficiency determina-
tion); Richard A. Matasar, A Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction Primer: The Scope
and Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 153 (1983)
(noting that "[sluch necessity is more akin to fairness").
383. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
384. See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text. Of course, the content of this in
rem bankruptcy jurisdiction, to the extent it did not include the estate's suits against
adverse parties, was somewhat different than that of the receivership model.
385. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 66, § 2a(6)-(7), discussed supra Part
I.B.2.b, notes 124-42 and accompanying text.
386. 181 U.S. 188, 198 (1901), discussed supra Part I.B.2.b, notes 12442 and accom-
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Act's "necessity" jurisdiction over third-party claims, actually
foreshadowed the most expansive uses of supplemental jurisdic-
tion in third-party disputes that the Gibbs standard would sub-
sequently bring to the federal courts.38 7 Moreover, in the same
year as Gibbs itself, Katchen v. Landy,3" drawing on the
Hillman case and similar tendencies in the receivership con-
text,8 ' plainly ushered into bankruptcy the modern in personam
rationale for supplemental jurisdiction. In fact, the Hillman case
itself seems to mark the general transition in the federal courts
from an in rem to an in personam approach to supplemental
jurisdiction by recognizing that a relationship to a jurisdictional
res is not the only supplemental connection of consequence.3 90
Thus, although the receiver's counterclaims in that case could
enhance the receivership res and were within accepted limits of
in rem ancillary jurisdiction,39' the litigation efficiencies from re-
solving related claims and counterclaims together meant that in
personam ancillary concepts were also at play.392
The 1978 Reform Act's expansion of federal bankruptcy juris-
diction mirrors the conceptual progression of supplemental juris-
diction principles. One of Congress's clearer messages in enact-
ing "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction was that this pervasive
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction means abandoning in rem con-
fines in favor of full in rem and in personam bankruptcy juris-
diction.393 In fact, this all-encompassing jurisdictional scheme was
justified as a policy matter on precisely the same grounds of pro-
panying text.
387. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994) (providing that general "supplemental jurisdiction
shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties").
388. 382 U.S. 323 (1966), discussed supra Part I.B.2.c, notes 143-56 and accompany-
ing text.
389. See Katchen, 382 U.S. at 335 (quoting Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 241-
42 (1935)).
390. The Court, therefore, now acknowledges that its statement in Fulton National
Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925), that "no controversy can be regarded as
dependent or ancillary unless it has direct relation to property or assets actually or
constructively drawn into the court's possession or control by the principal suit," was
"an excessively limited description of the doctrine." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379 (1994).
391. See Hilman, 296 U.S. at 237-38.
392. See id. at 238-43.
393. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
850 [Vol. 41:743
2000] A THEORY OF FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION 851
cedural convenience, fairness, and judicial economy that have
driven the parallel transformation of supplemental jurisdiction. 94
Personification of the federal res as a bankruptcy "estate,"
then, to the extent fully accommodated in the jurisdictional
statute providing a federal forum for all claims by and against
the bankruptcy estate, accomplishes a full-scale in rem to in
personam jurisdictional shift. Claims by and against the bank-
ruptcy estate, while having in rem counterparts in the receiver-
ship cases and 1898 Act jurisprudence, also take on a distinctly
in personam character 95 as freestanding constitutional federal
question claims to which a federal entity is a party. Moreover,
these freestanding in personam claims will sustain supplemental
jurisdiction over "related" in personam disputes between third
parties.
394. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
395. Of course, the 1898 Act jurisprudence itself recognized the in personam aspect
of the estate's claims against adverse parties. See supra notes 174-75 and accompa-
nying text. Even the Supreme Courts receivership cases, with their heavy emphasis
on the in rem nature of claims by and against the receivership estate, at times ac-
knowledged the in personam facets of such claims. Thus, in Riehle v. Margolies, 279
U.S. 218 (1929), Justice Brandeis stated that despite exclusive in rem jurisdiction
over the receivership estate, "the appointment of the receiver does not necessarily
draw to the federal court the exclusive right to determine all questions or rights of
action affecting the debtor's estate." Id. at 223. He then expounded upon the dual
nature of creditors' claims against the estate:
[Aln order which results in the distribution of assets among creditors has
ordinarily a twofold aspect. In so far as it directs distribution, and fixes
the time and manner of distribution, it deals directly with the property.
In so far [sic] as it determines, or recognizes a prior determination of the
existence and amount of the indebtedness of the defendant to the several
creditors seeking to participate, it does not deal directly with any of the
property. The latter function, which is spoken of as the liquidation of a
claim, is strictly a proceeding in personam. Of course, no one can obtain
any part of the assets, or enforce a right to specific property in the pos-
session of a receiver, except upon application to the court which appoint-
ed him.
Id. at 224; cf. supra notes 357-60 and accompanying text (discussing the extent of ex-
clusive federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over the res of the bankruptcy estate and its ad-
ministration). But cf. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 329-30 (1966) (in the bankrupt-
cy context, stating that "[t]he whole process of proof, allowance, and distribution [on
creditors' claims] is, shortly speaking, an adjudication of interests claimed in a res'"
(quoting Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 574 (1947))); Meyer v. Fleming, 327
U.S. 161, 170 (1946) (stating that "the filing of a claim in bankruptcy... is a claim
against assets in the hands of the bankruptcy court, not an action in personam").
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The constitutional theory of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
developed in this Part II hence reveals itself as nothing more
than traditional, accepted principles of federal jurisdiction.
Claims on causes of action "arising under" the Bankruptcy Code
are conventional federal questions; a general federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction over all claims by and against a bankruptcy estate is
constitutional federal question jurisdiction under an Osborn
federal entity theory; and "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction
over third-party disputes is supplemental bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion under a straightforward application of Gibbs. This system-
atic articulation of the constitutional foundations of federal bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction not only brings clarity and congruity to what
has been improperly regarded as an anomalous irregularity in
Article III jurisprudence, but it also points up the deficiencies in
the courts' varying interpretations of the outer limits of statutory
bankruptcy jurisdiction. The constitutional framework outlined
in this Part II can be readily translated into a more principled
and consistent interpretive theory for the federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction statute.
III. A STATUTORY THEORY OF FEDERAL
BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
If we combine the constitutional theory of federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction developed in Part II with the history of American
bankruptcy jurisdiction traced in Part I, a theory for interpret-
ing the current jurisdictional statute emerges. Only through this
historical, constitutional prism can we compensate for the skew
that the Marathon case396 has placed upon the meaning of the
jurisdictional statute,397 recognize the serious errors of the Pacor
opinion' 98 and its seemingly indelible imprint upon "related to"
bankruptcy jurisdiction, account for the glaring contradictions in
the case law of third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdic-
396. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982),
discussed supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text and infra Part III.l, notes 418-
30 and accompanying text.
397. See infra Part III.A, notes 411-54 and accompanying text.
398. Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984), discussed infra Part II.B,
notes 455-560 and accompanying text.
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tion,3" and understand the impetus behind and senselessness of
the raging debate over so-called supplemental bankruptcy juris-
diction.400
This Part begins by identifying a rather surprising by-product
of the Marathon opinion. Although Marathon involved only an
issue of separation of powers, it nonetheless has had an inadver-
tent, invidious impact upon construction of the scope of federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction, through the 1984 BAFJA amendments'
use of the "arising under," "arising in," and "related to" jurisdic-
tional nexuses as a means of dividing federal bankruptcy juris-
diction between the district courts and the bankruptcy courts.4"1
When we interpret the jurisdictional nexuses without this sepa-
ration of powers influence, however, we discover the meaning of
third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction. "Arising under"
bankruptcy jurisdiction is conventional federal question jurisdic-
tion over claims created by the Bankruptcy Code, whether or not
the bankruptcy estate is a party to the claim. "Arising in" bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction can be seen as a grant of general federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction over all claims by and against the bank-
ruptcy estate-constitutional federal questions under an Osborn
federal entity theory. "Related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, then,
is supplemental jurisdiction over any third-party dispute sharing
a conventional supplemental relationship with a claim "arising
under" the Bankruptcy Code or a claim to which the bankruptcy
estate is party.402
This Part next critiques the Third Circuit's seminal Pacor
opinion, which promulgated the Pacor test, and which flatly con-
tradicts the thesis of this Article in its declaration that third-
party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction is not supplemental
jurisdiction.4" 3 Pacor, however, did not meaningfully address the
constitutional implications of third-party "related to" bankruptcy
jurisdiction and, indeed, announced a "conceivable effect" test
that is unconstitutionally broad on its face.40' Additionally,
399. See infra Part HI.C, notes 561-612 and accompanying text.
400. See infra Part HID, notes 613-84 and accompanying text.
401. See infra Part llI.A.1, notes 418-30 and accompanying text.
402. See infra Part III.A-2, notes 431-54 and accompanying text.
403. See Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994.
404. See infra Part I.B.1, notes 461-73 and accompanying text.
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Pacor's rejection of supplemental jurisdiction was based upon
bad bankruptcy law4 5 and a thoughtless, reflexive response to a
sudden Supreme Court brake on the expansion of supplemental
jurisdiction--one that was simply inapposite to "related to"
bankruptcy jurisdiction. 06 In rejecting a supplemental approach
to third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, Pacor instead
espoused a functional, outcome-oriented test that cannot fully
advance the adjudicative efficiency goals of federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction"7 and that locks federal bankruptcy jurisdiction into
an awkward nineteenth-century in rem jurisdictional time
warp.408
Moreover, the very courts that purport to apply the Pacor test
and heed its prohibition against supplemental jurisdiction have
simultaneously engaged in an unstated incorporation of supple-
mental jurisdiction principles into third-party "related to" bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction and, consequently, have produced a body of
case law riddled with conspicuous contradictions and inconsis-
tencies.409 It is this very same Pacor paradox that has precipitated
the melee over "supplemental" bankruptcy jurisdiction.410 Con-
gress gave the bankruptcy courts unrestricted supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction in 1978 in the form of third-party "related
to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, and we must cut the Gordian knot
and simply acknowledge that Pacor was badly mistaken.
A. Deconstructing the Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Statute
Consistent with the premise developed in Part II that the con-
ceptual jurisdictional unit in bankruptcy is an individual "pro-
ceeding" rather than the bankruptcy "case,"'11 the methodology
employed in this Part III.A utilizes the three nexuses contained
in the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute--"arising under," "arising
in," and "related to" ---to identify those "claims""3 that each
405. See infra Part III.B.2, notes 474-83 and accompanying text.
406. See infra Part III.B.3, notes 484-96 and accompanying text.
407. See infra Part III.B.4, notes 497-517 and accompanying text.
408. See infra Part III.B.5, notes 518-60 and accompanying text.
409. See infra Part III.C, notes 561-612 and accompanying text.
410. See infra Part III.D, notes 613-84 and accompanying text.
411. See supra Part II.C.2, notes 343-69 and accompanying text.
412. "IT]he district courts shall have original.. . jurisdiction of all civil proceedings
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type of proceeding was designed to envelop. This approach, of
course, also proceeds from the assumption that the bankruptcy
jurisdiction statute operates in the same fashion as all other
federal jurisdiction statutes: "[Original jurisdiction attaches on
a claim-by-claim or 'claim-specific' basis."414 This Article departs
from the prevailing analysis ofbankruptcy's jurisdictional nexuses,
though, because it is employed for a very different purpose.
The statute's jurisdictional nexuses have evolved into cata-
chrestic compartments that mark the boundaries between the
limited jurisdiction of non-Article III bankruptcy judges and the
residual authority of the Article III district courts. The nexuses
could not have been designed for such a purpose, however, as
their original function was to vest the entirety of this federal
jurisdiction in non-Article III bankruptcy judges,415 and the ex
post separation of powers gloss impedes the task at hand, which
is delineating the outer bounds of federal bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion-implicating principles of judicial federalism rather than
arising under [the Bankruptcy Code] or arising in or related to [bankruptcy] cases...."
28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
413. The term "claim" is used here in its jurisdictional sense, as "an assertion by one
claiming party of a right to some form of judicial relief [against] one defending party"
and "is defined in terms both of a particular pair of parties and of a particular legal
theory of the right to relief." ALI, JUDICIAL CODE PROJECT, supra note 112, at 19-20.
414. Id. at 4; accord Haper v. Halper, 164 F.3d 830, 838 (3d Cir. 1999) (expressly
adopting "a claim by claim analysis to determine the extent of a Bankruptcy Court's
jurisdiction"). Recognizing the claim-specific nature of federal jurisdiction statutes is
one of the primary conceptual foundations for the ALI's project for the revision of the
supplemental jurisdiction statute. Indeed, the ALI described its project as "assert[ing]
that the original jurisdiction of the district courts is claim-specific in a pervasive and
fundamental sense that pertains to the entire statutory and constitutional structure of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction." ALI, JUDICIAL CODE PROJECT, supra note 112, at 29.
"Thus jurisdictional analysis requires a conception of the fundamental unit of litiga-
tion that breaks down the litigative unit. . . into every theory of relief.., as be-
tween every claiming and defending party... so that claims arising under federal
law may be distinguished from claims that do not . . . ." Id. at 35; see John B.
Oakley, The Christianson Case, Federal Jurisdiction, and the Problem of the Litigative
Unit: When Does What 'Arise Under" Federal Law?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1829, 1831-32,
1858-59 (1998); John B. Oakley, Integrating Supplemental Jurisdiction and Diversity
Jurisdiction: A Progress Report on the Work of the American Law Institute, 74 IND.
L.J. 25 (1998).
415. "Obviously, then, Congress did not select these terms in 1978 to assure that it
would be able to allocate the exercise of jurisdiction the way it did six years later in
the 1984 amendments." Simmons v. Johnson, Curney & Fields, P.C. (In re Simmons),
205 B.R. 834, 844 n.22 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997).
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separation of powers. In particular, we seek to capture the elu-
sive meaning of the statutory grant of "related to" jurisdiction in
third-party disputes. For that purpose, then, we must reinvent
bankruptcy's jurisdictional nexuses, through an experimental
interpretive exercise.
By embarking on that course in this Part III.A, we will dis-
cover that Congress actually codified throwaway dicta from the
Marathon case in the 1984 BAFJA amendments. As a result, a
bankruptcy estate's suit on a debtor's state-law action is now
regarded as a "related to" bankruptcy proceeding.4"' Our histori-
cal survey of the development of American bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion, however, suggests that such a Marathon action by the es-
tate is characterized more suitably as an "arising in" proceed-
ing-as part of Justice Story's original vision of a general federal
jurisdiction over "all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy."4i7
"Arising under" and "arising in" proceedings, therefore, can be
seen as statutory grants of federal jurisdiction over all constitu-
tional federal question claims "arising" during the administra-
tion of a bankruptcy case-claims created by the Bankruptcy
Code ("arising under") and claims by and against a bankruptcy
estate ("arising in"). Hence, this interpretive exercise reserves
"related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction for third-party disputes,
which our constitutional theory indicates is supplemental juris-
diction. The significance of hypothetically removing Marathon
claims from the "related to" category in this manner comes from
its crystallization of the appropriate test for third-party "related
to" bankruptcy jurisdiction: A third-party claim is "related to" a
debtor's bankruptcy case if it shares a conventional supplemen-
tal relationship with one of bankruptcy's constitutional federal
question claims.
1. Marathon's Transmogrification of "Related to" Jurisdiction
A statutory theory of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction for pur-
poses of exploring the outermost limits of federal jurisdiction
(vis-h-vis that of the state courts) must begin with a recognition
416. See Brubaker, supra note 13, at 1062-64.
417. See Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292 (1845) (Story, J.), discussed supra
Part I.A.2, notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
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that the basic grant of federal jurisdiction over "arising under,"
"arising in," and "related to" proceedings was constructed in the
1978 Reform Act, long before the Marathon holding necessitated
the complicated allocation of that jurisdiction between the dis-
trict courts and their adjunct bankruptcy courts in the 1984
BAFJA amendments.41 s Although Marathon and BAFJA contem-
plated no change whatsoever in the sum total of federal bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction,419 they have nonetheless converted the
statute's three jurisdictional nexuses into terms of art that draw
a divide in this federal bankruptcy jurisdiction between: (1)
"core" proceedings "arising under" or "arising in," in which a
bankruptcy judge can enter final orders,420 and (2) noncore "re-
lated to" proceedings, in which only a district court can enter
final orders42 ' absent consent of the parties to a bankruptcy
court adjudication.422 This separation of powers function of the
jurisdictional nexuses has yielded the unwitting, unnatural, and
unnoticed side effect of obfuscating the intended reach and sup-
plemental nature of "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction.
Marathon declared the bankruptcy estate's suits on a debtor's
state-law actions to be beyond the constitutional capacity for
final adjudication by a limited tenure, non-Article III bankruptcy
judge. In so doing, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion repeatedly
depicted such an action by the bankruptcy estate as falling with-
in the "related to" jurisdictional grant of the 1978 Reform Act.4'
418. See supra notes 217-24 and accompanying text and Part I.C, notes 162-211 and
accompanying text.
419. "Because Marathon did not compel Congress to reduce the scope of bankruptcy
jurisdiction, it seems plain that Congress intended no change in the scope of juris-
diction set forth in the 1978 Act when it later enacted section 1334 of the 1984 Act."
Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1987).
420. "Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine . . . all core proceedings arising
under [the Bankruptcy Code], or arising in a [bankruptcy] case . . . and may enter
appropriate orders and judgments, subject to [appellate] review .... " 28 U.S.C. §
157(b)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
421. "A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but
that is otherwise related to a [bankruptcy] case" and "shall submit proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, and any final order or judgment
shall be entered by the district judge ... after reviewing de novo .... " Id. §
157(c)(1) (emphasis added).
422. See id. § 157(c)(2).
423. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 54,
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Subsequently, then, "related to" became the jurisdictional cate-
gory in which the 1984 BAFJA amendments restricted the pow-
ers of the non-Article III bankruptcy judges. Accordingly, the
Court recently characterized "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction
as including two types of actions: (1) Marathon-like "causes of
action owned by the debtor which become property of the es-
tate.., and (2) suits between third parties which have an effect
on the bankruptcy estate." 2
When viewed in historical context, however, the all-encom-
passing, pervasive "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction was not
necessary to authorize the bankruptcy estate to pursue a Mara-
thon-like action in federal court. As Part I of this Article demon-
strated, a general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over all claims
by and against the bankruptcy estate under both the 1841 and
1867 Acts was established with "arising under" and "in bank-
ruptcy" terminology, alone, and nothing that even resembled
"related" jurisdiction.42' Likewise, under the 1898 Act such a
general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction in corporate reorganiza-
tion cases was accomplished with a simple reference to "bank-
ruptcy proceedings" and "proceedings under this [18981 Act."42 6
The broader "related" language of section 2a(7) of the 1898 Act,
in conjunction with and as constrained by section 2a(6), were the
vehicles for the narrow "necessity" jurisdiction of certain third-
party disputes. 7
As recognized in the 1978 Reform Act's legislative process,
then, the primary significance of the "related to" grant was to
bring "related" third-party disputes into federal court.428 Al-
though it was unnecessary to specify the precise jurisdictional
nexus for an estate's suits before Marathon,9 the estate's action
74, 76, 81, 85, 87 n.40 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (emphasizing "related
to" jurisdiction).
424. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 307-08 n.5 (1995); accord 1 COLLIER
(15th ed.), supra note 66, 3.01[41[c][ii], at 3-23 to -24.
425. See supra Part I.A2-3, notes 45-63 and accompanying text.
426. See supra Part I.B.l.b, notes 101-11 and accompanying text.
427. See supra Part I.B.2.b, notes 124-42 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 190-91, 206 and accompanying text.
429. "Nor did the relevant authorities interpreting the 1978 Act treat the three bas-
es of jurisdiction as distinct from one another." William L. Norton, Jr. & Richard
Lieb, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 1985 AN.
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in Marathon, nevertheless, could easily be characterized as a
proceeding "arising in" the debtor's bankruptcy case, since an
action by the bankruptcy estate itself is, in the words of Justice
Story, "necessarily involved in the due administration and settle-
ment of the bankrupt's estate." ° Thus, if we put aside the sepa-
ration of powers concerns of Marathon and BAFJA and, for the
moment, read bankruptcy's jurisdictional nexuses solely through
our historical lens of judicial federalism, a Marathon action by a
bankruptcy estate is an "arising in" proceeding, not a "related
to" proceeding.
2. Reconstructing Bankruptcy's Jurisdictional Nexuses
Placing Marathon actions in the "arising in" category, rather
than the "related to" category, means that "arising under" and
"arising in" proceedings are synonymous with all constitutional
federal questions in bankruptcy, and "related to" bankruptcy
jurisdiction is conventional supplemental jurisdiction over third-
party disputes "related to" these constitutional federal questions.
a. "Arising Under" and "Arising in" Proceedings:
Constitutional Federal Questions
If a Marathon action is an "arising in!' proceeding, as suggested
by the history of American bankruptcy jurisdiction, then federal
jurisdiction over all proceedings "arising in" a bankruptcy case
equates nicely with the historical and constitutional concept of a
general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over all claims by and
SURV. BANKR. L. 53, 58.
430. Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 313 (1845), discussed supra Part IA.2,
notes 45-57 and accompanying text; see also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 153 (1978) ("The
adjunct bankruptcy courts will exercise in personam jurisdiction as well as in rem
jurisdiction in order that they may handle everything that arises in a bankruptcy
case." (emphasis added)), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5939; H.R. REP. No.
95-595, at 445 (1977) (describing 1978 Reform Act jurisdiction as "the broadest grant
of jurisdiction to dispose of proceedings that arise in bankruptcy cases" (emphasis
added)), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6400; Reed et al., supra note 359, at
129 ("An action brought by the trustee or debtor-in-possession based upon pre-petition
events might also be deemed to 'arise in' the bankruptcy case . . . ."); Note, Bank-
ruptcy and the Limits of Federal Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 703, 707 (1982)
(same); Lofgren, supra note 340, at 1254 n.27 (same).
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against a bankruptcy estate. Our constitutional theory tells us
that this general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction of claims by
and against the estate is constitutional federal question jurisdic-
tion under an Osborn federal entity theory.
43
'
Under this view, then, the bankruptcy version of statutory
federal question jurisdiction-jurisdiction over proceedings "aris-
ing under" the Bankruptcy Code-assures a federal bankruptcy
forum for federally created, conventional federal question claims
that do not directly involve the estate, such as those concerning
an individual debtor's discharge of indebtedness. The "fresh
start" surrounding an individual debtor's discharge implicates
an object somewhat distinct from the asset-transfer function of
the bankruptcy estate, 2 but one that likewise raises Article III
claims "arising under" federal law-as conventional federal
questions. Thus, for example, when a particular creditor objects
to discharge of its debt, asserting that the debt is one excepted
from the discharge pursuant to section 523 of the Bankruptcy
Code,' the parties to that action are the creditor and the indi-
vidual debtor; the bankruptcy estate is not a party.4 Nonethe-
less, because the bankruptcy discharge is solely a creature of the
federal Bankruptcy Code, the nondischargeability action is within
both statutory and constitutional "arising under" jurisdiction. 5
431. See supra Part II.B, notes 253-327 and accompanying text.
432. See Charles G. Hallinan, The 'Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A
Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 143-46
(1986); Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1047, 1049-50 (1987); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bank-
ruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1395-98 (1985). Indeed, the concept of a bank-
ruptcy estate, as a device to collect and distribute a debtor's assets, predates the
development of discharge of indebtedness. See Jay Cohen, The History of Imprison-
ment for Debt and Its Relation to the Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J.
LEGAL HIsT. 153, 155-57 (1982); John C. McCoid, II, Discharge: The Most Important
Development in Bankruptcy History, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 163, 164-65 (1996); Tabb,
supra note 233, at 326-33.
433. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1994).
434. See Brady v. McAllister (In re Brady), 101 F.3d 1165, 1170 (6th Cir. 1996)
(noting that "a trustee may not file a nondischargeability complaint"); In re Farmer,
786 F.2d 618, 620-21 (4th Cir. 1986) (same); 1 THOMAS J. SALERNO ET AL., BANKRUPT-
CY LITIGATION AND PRACTICE § 8.55, at 472, 474 (2d ed. 1995).
435. Another example of a third-party claim "arising under" the Bankruptcy Code is
section 506(c), which provides for surcharge of a secured creditor's collateral for "the
reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property
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Thus, if we remove the separation of powers influence from
the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute, "arising under" and "arising
in" bankruptcy jurisdiction can be seen as grants of federal juris-
diction over all constitutional federal question claims that arise
during a bankruptcy case-those involving bankruptcy causes of
action and those involving the bankruptcy estate.43 6 The most
to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim." 11 U.S.C. § 506(c). In those
courts that construe this provision as granting a preservation claimant standing to re-
cover such expenses directly from a secured creditor, a federal bankruptcy court has
jurisdiction to hear such a third-party action as one "arising under" section 506(c) of
the Bankruptcy Code. See Publicker Indus. Inc. v. United States (In re Cuyahoga
Equip. Corp.), 980 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Parque Forestal, Inc., 949 F.2d
504, 510 (1st Cir. 1991); see also Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust,
123 F.3d 777, 784 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding bankruptcy jurisdiction to declare the tax
effects of a third-party sale where the bankruptcy court determined that section 1146
of the Bankruptcy Code governed such sales).
436. See National City Bank v. Coopers & Lybrand, 802 F.2d 990, 993-94, 993 (8th
Cir. 1986) (concurring in the district court's assessment of a third-party dispute, that
"the action did not 'arise under' or 'arise in' . . . because [the Chapter 11] bankruptcy
debtor is not a party to the action and no relief under [the Bankruptcy Code] is
sought"); Holloway v. HECI Exploration Co. Employees' Profit Sharing Plan, 76 B.R.
563, 568 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (indicating that a third-party action "does not arise under
[the Bankruptcy Code] because it [does not] state[] a cause of action created by [the
Bankruptcy Code]" and it "does not arise in a [bankruptcy] case because the [defen-
dant] is not a [bankruptcy] debtor"), affd, 862 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1988); Young v.
Sultan Ltd. (In re Lucasa Int'l Ltd.), 6 B.R. 717, 719 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (charac-
terizing the trustee's preference action as "plainly a civil proceeding arising under or
in the case for which he stands as trustee" (emphasis added)). The House Report
faintly echoes this approach in its enumeration of specific matters encompassed within
the jurisdictional grant:
[Tihe jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court [will] includ[e] proceedings to
which the trustee [as representative of the estate] is a party, proceedings
to which the debtor is a party if the outcome of the proceeding will have
an impact on the case (such as determination of exemptions, determina-
tion of dischargeability of debts, liquidation of non-dischargeable debts,
and determination of any right granted under [the Bankruptcy Code]),
and all proceedings involving the administration of the case.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 49 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5963, 6010 (cita-
tions omitted). An individual debtor's exemption proceedings can involve both bases for
constitutional federal question jurisdiction, as their availability can be a matter deter-
mined solely by reference to the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). In addition,
the bankruptcy estate, as the recipient of the debtor's nonexempt property, is a party to
exemption proceedings, at the behest of the trustee or any creditor. See FED. R. BANKI.
P. 4003(b). Likewise, administrative proceedings invariably involve either matters of
federal bankruptcy law or the estate and its representative as a party. See Block-Lieb,
supra note 20, at 733, 773-75, 780-81 n.338. Proceedings to liquidate nondischargeable
debts are discussed infra Part HLC.2, notes 583-612 and accompanying text.
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revealing aspect of this exercise, however, is its effect upon con-
struction of the broadest of bankruptcy's jurisdictional catego-
ries-related to" bankruptcy proceedings.
b. "Related to" Proceedings:
Supplemental Jurisdiction over Third-Party Disputes
If "arising under" proceedings account for all claims under
bankruptcy causes of action and "arising in" proceedings sub-
sume all claims to which a bankruptcy estate is party, then the
unique role of bankruptcy's "related to" jurisdiction is in the
realm of claims that do not "arise under" the Bankruptcy Code,
such as state-law claims, and to which the bankruptcy estate is
not a party. Our constitutional theory tells us that federal bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction over such third-party state-law claims is a
species of supplemental jurisdiction. 7
This interpretation of "related to" proceedings not only finds
support in the 1978 Reform Act's legislative history," s it also ac-
cords with common usage of the jurisdictional nomenclature of
"related" proceedings. 9 In the isolated instances in which Con-
437. See supra Part II.C, notes 328-95 and accompanying text.
438. For a discussion of the 1978 Reform Act legislative history that characterizes
"related to" jurisdiction as directed toward third-party disputes, see supra notes 190-
91, 206 and accompanying text. It was not until the legislative deliberations concern-
ing the 1984 BAFJA amendments, however, that there was any express acknowledg-
ment in Congress that "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction may be a form of supple-
mental jurisdiction. The most extensive expression of this view came in the form of
Representative Sawyer's "questioning" of witnesses in committee hearings. See Bank-
ruptcy Court Act of 1983: Hearing on H.R. 3 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 243-45, 252 (1983).
One witness, Joseph E. Friend, President of the Commercial Law League of America,
appended to his testimony an article that noted "the judicially developed doctrines of
ancillary and pendent jurisdiction ... can be the basis for district courts' acting with
respect to matters within the compass of 'civil proceedings related to [bankruptcy]
cases under title 11.'" Id. at 151 (reprinting Charles F. Vihon, Delegation of Authority
and the Model Rule: The Continuing Saga of Northern Pipeline, 88 CoM. L.J. 64, 68
(1983)).
439. See Block-Lieb, supra note 20, at 780-81. Thus, Congress's 1990 Federal Courts
Study Committee, in recommending codification of supplemental jurisdiction, described
it in general terms as "the authority of federal courts to hear and determine, without
an independent basis of federal jurisdiction, claims related to matters properly before
them." REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITEE 47 (1990) (emphasis add-
ed).
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gress has sought to expressly create supplemental jurisdiction, it
has used the "related" terminology," and to the extent that a
grant of "related" jurisdiction has a plain or ordinary meaning, it
is recognized as connoting supplemental jurisdiction.44 1 Further-
more, the symbiosis between pervasive "related to" bankruptcy
jurisdiction and bankruptcy's discretionary, permissive absten-
tion "in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with
State courts or respect for State law"' 2 replicates that of supple-
mental jurisdiction, which likewise "is a doctrine of discretion"'
informed by "the values of judicial economy, convenience, fair-
ness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdic-
tion."4' Indeed, Professor Kennedy, who served as Executive
440. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1994) ('The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action asserting a [state-law] claim of unfair competition when joined
with a substantial and related claim under the [federal] copyright, patent, plant vari-
ety protection or trade-mark laws." (emphasis added)); id. § 1367(a) (giving "the dis-
trict courts ...supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within [statutory] original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III" (emphasis added)).
441. Thus, in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989), Justice Scalia
characterized section 1338(b)'s "related" claim jurisdiction, enacted in 1948, as a cod-
ification of pendent-claim jurisdiction "accomplished by wording that could not be
mistaken." Id. at 555. By contrast, under the prevailing Pacor test for third-party "re-
lated to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, discussed infra Part III.B, notes 455-560 and accom-
panying text, "there is a cause component in 'related to' such that "'[rielated to' is a
term of art in bankruptcy jurisdiction, where its meaning is not as broad as it is in
ordinary parlance." Bass v. Denney (In re Bass), 171 F.3d 1016, 1022 (5th Cir. 1999).
442. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1), discussed supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
443. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
444. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988); see Publicker Indus.
Inc. v. United States (In re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp.), 980 F.2d 110, 115 (2d Cir. 1992)
(equating bankruptcy abstention from third-party "related to" claims with discretion to
decline supplemental jurisdiction); Masterwear Corp. v. Rubin Baum Levin Constant &
Friedman (In re Masterwear Corp.), 241 B.R. 511, 519 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating
that although decline of supplemental jurisdiction and bankruptcy abstention from
third-party "related to" claims "pose[] two separate questions," nonetheless "[tihe anal-
yses overlap"); cf ALI, JUDICIAL CODE PROJECT, supra note 112, at 78-79 (comparing
the general federal abstention doctrines to discretionary decline of supplemental ju-
risdiction). Like permissive bankruptcy abstention, the power of discretionary decline
of supplemental jurisdiction has been codified in the Judicial Code's general supple-
mental jurisdiction statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); City of Chicago v. International
College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172-74 (1997). The parallel between permissive
bankruptcy abstention and discretionary decline of supplemental jurisdiction is most
striking with respect to comity considerations and "novel or complex issue[s] of State
law." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). As a matter of general principle "difficulties of ascertain-
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ing what the state courts may ... determine the state law to be do not in them-
selves afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to decline to exercise its jurisdic-
tion to decide a case which is properly brought to it for decision." Meredith v. City of
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943). Yet, "[a] bankruptcy court commonly sends
its trustee into state courts to have complex questions of local law adjudicated." Eng-
land v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 423 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (citing Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940)). Like-
wise, "the unsettled nature of state law" is an "entirely appropriate factor[] for the
District Court to consider" in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Moor v.
County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 716 (1973).
Professor Block-Lieb notes the "logic of th[e] position" that permissive bankruptcy
abstention is analogous to federal courts' discretion to decline an exercise of supple-
mental jurisdiction. Block-Lieb, supra note 172, at 835. Yet, she rejects such a broad,
discretionary role for permissive bankruptcy abstention, apparently on the rationale
that, like other grants of federal jurisdiction, federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is grant-
ed to the district courts in unequivocal, nondiscretionary terms. See 28 U.S.C. §
1334(b) (providing that "the district courts shall have original but not exclusive juris-
diction of all" bankruptcy proceedings (emphasis added)). Thus, Professor Block-Lieb
sees bankruptcy abstention as more akin to nonbankruptcy abstention doctrines, which
"are narrowly defined because these judicially-crafted doctrines exist in apparent con-
flict with the obligation of a federal court to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it
by statute." Block-Lieb, supra note 172, at 836. The bankruptcy jurisdiction statute,
however, is an obligatory, nondiscretionary grant of federal jurisdiction only when one
subdivision of the jurisdictional statute is read in complete isolation from the immedi-
ately succeeding subdivision of the same statutory section, which qualifies the seem-
ingly nondiscretionary grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction with the proviso that "[njothing
in this section prevents a district court . . . from abstaining from hearing a particular
[bankruptcy] proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, because the
bankruptcy jurisdiction statute itself expressly authorizes abstention broadly "in the
interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State
law," id., bankruptcy abstention is fundamentally different than the nonbankruptcy
abstention doctrines, which carry no express statutory countenance at all. As Professor
Shapiro sagely observed, "Congress has undoubted authority to expand or narrow the
range of permissible discretion, and the challenge of responsible statutory construction
is to determine the extent to which it has done so." David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction
and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 583 (1985); cf Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515
U.S. 277, 286-87 (1995) ("The statute's textual commitment to discretion, and the
breadth of leeway we have always understood it to suggest, distinguish the declarato-
ry judgment context from other areas of the law in which concepts of discretion sur-
face.").
To some extent, Professor Block-Lieb's more constrictive view of the bankruptcy
abstention statute also seems to be a product of the prevailing functional approach to
"related to" jurisdiction:
If related to jurisdiction is narrowly defined according to its functional
purpose, then there would be no need to abstain from bankruptcy juris-
diction in order to achieve this functional goal. Where resolution of the
proceeding would not expedite administration of the bankruptcy case,
bankruptcy jurisdiction would not exist, thus rendering a determination
to abstain on this ground irrelevant.
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Director of the 1973 Commission and who was an active partici-
pant in the congressional process for the 1978 Reform Act," 5
contemporaneously opined that "related to" jurisdiction of third-
party disputes "requires a consideration of the potential reach of
a concept or doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction."446
This revisionist version of bankruptcy's jurisdictional nexuses,
thus, views (1) "arising under" jurisdiction as including federally
created bankruptcy claims, whether or not the estate is a party,
(2) "arising in" jurisdiction as all claims to which the bankruptcy
estate is a party, and (3) "related to" jurisdiction as supplemen-
tal jurisdiction over third-party claims. Of course, this view dif-
fers significantly from the popular version of the jurisdictional
nexuses only insofar as it casts a Marathon action as an "arising
in" rather than a "related to" proceeding. The object of this exer-
cise, however, is not an attempt to relabel Marathon actions,
which now will be forever coupled with "related to" bankruptcy
jurisdiction as codified by BAFJA. For purposes of determining
those core proceedings that can be finally adjudicated by a non-
Article III bankruptcy court, a Marathon action cannot be con-
sidered a core "arising in" proceeding and must be characterized
as a noncore "related to" proceeding; nothing in this analysis is
meant to suggest otherwise. Again, though, that separation of
powers concern is not the focus of this Article, which addresses
only the judicial federalism dimension of "related to" jurisdic-
tion, regarding the reach of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. 7
Block-Lieb, supra note 172, at 842. As this Article discusses, though, infra Part
llI.B.4, notes 497-517 and accompanying text, a functional approach to "related to"
bankruptcy jurisdiction is misguided precisely because it ignores Congress's clear de-
sign for permissive abstention, not "related to" jurisdiction, to serve such a functional
role. Cf infra note 665 (discussing Block-Lieb's concerns about "supplemental" bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction). A proper construction of both "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction
and permissive bankruptcy abstention simply cannot be obtained by considering each
in isolation from the other; they were enacted and must be interpreted in tandem, as
an integrated package. Cf Shapiro, supra, at 575 ("The specific context and terms of
a statutory grant of jurisdiction may either broaden or narrow the scope of normally
permissible discretion (both as to the meaning of the grant and as to its exercise).").
445. See supra note 206.
446. Frank R. Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Court Under the New Bankruptcy Law: Its
Structure, Jurisdiction, Venue, and Procedure, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 251, 285-88, 287
(1979).
447. As Professor Tabb has correctly noted, finding the "proper scope of related pro-
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The troublesome aspect of "related to" jurisdiction in determin-
ing the scope of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is third-party
"related to" jurisdiction, not Marathon jurisdiction. Marathon
actions are unquestionably a component of federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction, whether categorized as "arising in" or "related to"
proceedings. The modest ambition of this analytical decon-
struction, that hypothetically recharacterizes Marathon actions
as "arising in" proceedings, is merely to correct widely held mis-
conceptions regarding the supplemental nature of "related to"
bankruptcy jurisdiction, solely in an effort to properly construe
the parameters of third-party "related to" jurisdiction.
From the standpoint of judicial federalism and the scope of
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, classifying a Marathon action as
a "related to" proceeding is misleading only when combined with
the proposition that "related to" jurisdiction is a form of supple-
mental jurisdiction. As our constitutional theory demonstrates,
Marathon claims are not supplemental claims; a Marathon claim
is a freestanding constitutional federal question claim.' 8 The
insinuation of Marathon claims into the "related to" category, to
the extent this carries the implication that Marathon claims are
supplemental claims, actually perpetuates the misplaced in rem
receivership model of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction, 9
ceedings arises in two [distinct] ways." TABB, supra note 302, § 4.5, at 238. One of
those, of course, is the core/noncore separation of powers determination required by
Marathon and BAFJA. Quite apart from that determination, though, the "second sce-
nario in which the question arises is in determining whether bankruptcy jurisdiction
exists at all[:] the outer limits of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction." Id.
448. See supra Part II.B & C.3, notes 253-327, 370-95 and accompanying text.
449. See, e.g., Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1994); In
re Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 794 F.2d 1182, 1186-87 (7th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Gordon Sel-Way, Inc. (In re Gordon Sel-Way, Inc.), 239 B.R. 741,
745-46, 749 (E.D. Mich. 1999); My Favorite Year, Inc. v. Thomas Jefferson Constr.
Corp., No. CIV.A. 97-2423, 1999 WL 64932, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 4, 1999); Lone Star
Indus., Inc. v. Compania Naviera Perez Companc (In re New York Trap Rock Corp.),
160 B.R. 876, 881-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd in part, rev'd and vacated in part on other
grounds, 42 F.3d 747 (2d Cir. 1994); Ram Constr. Co. v. Port Auth., 49 B.R. 363, 366
(W.D. Pa. 1985); Eisenberg v. Resource Dynamics, Inc. (In re Environmental Research
& Dev., Inc.), 46 B.R. 774, 778-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Chemical Bank v. Grisby's World
of Carpet, Inc. (In re WWG Indus., Inc.), 44 B.R. 287, 290 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Hartley v.
Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. (In re Elder-Beerman Stores Corp.), 222 B.R. 309, 311
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1998); Sonnyco Coal, Inc. v. Bartley (In re Sonnyco Coal, Inc.), 89
B.R. 658, 665-68 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988), affd in part, rev'd in part on other
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and Part DI.D of this Article demonstrates how this has con-
founded analysis of "supplemental" bankruptcy jurisdiction.450
The only "related to" claims that are properly considered supple-
mental are third-party "related to" claims.
The other virtue of this alternative, experimental rendering of
bankruptcy's jurisdictional nexuses is that it clarifies the appro-
priate relationship necessary for an exercise of third-party "re-
lated to" jurisdiction. The statutory grant affords "jurisdiction of
all civil proceedings ... related to [bankruptcy] cases,"451 which
of course, requires some conception of the bankruptcy "case" and
how the proceeding is "related to" the bankruptcy case. If a Mar-
athon claim is "related to" a bankruptcy case, then it must be
because the claim has the potential to enhance the bankruptcy
estate-a formulation very much in accord with an in rem juris-
dictional model and the dominant outcome-oriented, functional
test for third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction.452 A
bankruptcy "case" within the meaning of the jurisdictional stat-
ute, however, is merely a collective reference to all of the civil
"proceedings" associated with a particular debtor's bankruptcy
filing.453 A proceeding "related to" the "case," then, is one that is
grounds, 131 B.R. 799, 802 (S.D. Ohio 1990); McGraw v. Liberty Airlines, Inc. (In re
Bell & Beckwith), 55 B.R. 872, 876 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); Allard v. Benjamin (In
re DeLorean Motor Co.), 49 B.R. 900, 907 n.6 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985). Several cir-
cuits have employed this model for determining the fate of a pending bankruptcy
proceeding upon dismissal of the debtor's bankruptcy case, analogizing to the discre-
tion to retain or dismiss supplemental claims upon final disposition of all freestanding
federal claims. See Chapman v. Currie Motors, Inc., 65 F.3d 78, 80-82 (7th Cir. 1995);
Querner v. Querner (In re Querner), 7 F.3d 1199, 1201-03 (5th Cir. 1993); Carraher v.
Morgan Elecs., Inc. (In re Carraher), 971 F.2d 327, 328 (9th Cir. 1992); Smith v.
Commercial Banking Corp. (In re Smith), 866 F.2d 576, 579-80 (3d Cir. 1989). But cf
Porges v. Gruntal & Co. (In re Porges), 44 F.3d 159, 162-63 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1995)
(noting the imperfection in the analogy, because "unlike a lawsuit in which a claim
that gives rise to federal subject matter jurisdiction coexists with pendent or ancillary
state claims, an adversary proceeding and the companion bankruptcy case constitute
two distinct proceedings"); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Morris (In re Morris), 950 F.2d
1531, 1533-34 (11th Cir. 1992) (same). The same result, of course, could be achieved
more directly through a straightforward application of the permissive bankruptcy
abstention statute.
450. See infra Part III.D.2, notes 659-84 and accompanying text.
451. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994).
452. See supra notes 371-73 and accompanying text and infra Part III.B.1 & 5, notes
461-73, 518-60 and accompanying text.
453. See supra notes 351-63 and accompanying text.
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"related to" another proceeding in the case, and supplemental
jurisdiction theory tells us that both our (1) "arising under"
bankruptcy claims and (2) "arising in" estate-as-a-party claims
are freestanding constitutional federal questions that will sus-
tain supplemental jurisdiction over (3) "related" third-party
claims. Thus, rethinking the jurisdictional nexuses, freed from
BAFJA's separation of powers taint, replaces the outcome-orient-
ed, functional test for third-party "related to" bankruptcy juris-
diction, which has proven so unmanageable, with a conventional
supplemental jurisdiction test.
Hence, the key interpretive insight that springs from this
Article's comprehensive, unifying constitutional and statutory
theory of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is not in regard to Mar-
athon actions; rather, it is in the solution this theory yields for
the statutory interpretation quandary presented by the seem-
ingly limitless "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction over third-
party disputes. Stripped of the hypothetical, revisionist nexus
labels used in its derivation, the interpretive theory pro-
pounded by this Article is that a third-party claim should be
considered "related to" a debtor's bankruptcy case if it shares a
conventional supplemental linkage with either (1) a claim as-
serted under a cause of action created by the Bankruptcy Code,
or (2) a claim asserted by or against the debtor's bankruptcy
estate.4" Equipped with this more accurate understanding of the
supplemental nature of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction in third-
party disputes, one can readily appreciate how and why the
extant jurisprudence of third-party "related to" bankruptcy juris-
454. In tabular form, this Article's theory can be summarized as follows:
Statutory Bankruptcy
Jurisdiction Claims Encompassed Constitutional Basis
"arising under" (1) claims created by the "arising under" federal law
proceedings Bankruptcy Code conventional federal
questions
"arising in (2) claims by and against "ansming under" federal law
proceedings a bankruptcy estate Osborn federal entity
theory
"related to" third-party claims constitutional 'case"
proceedings "refated to" (1) or (2) Gibbs supplemental
jurisdiction
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diction has gone awry. This Article's interpretive theory also
brings a thoroughly illuminating perspective to the cognate
struggle with so-called supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction.
B. Pacor's Mutilation of Third-Party "Related to" Jurisdiction
One of the first circuit-level cases to grapple with "related to"
bankruptcy jurisdiction in a third-party dispute was the Third
Circuit's opinion in Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins.455 Although the Pacor
court boldly announced what would become the almost univer-
sally accepted standard for third-party "related to" bankruptcy
jurisdiction,4 56 its opinion transparently displays the contradic-
tory impulses that portend the ensuing havoc that the Pacor test
has wrought.
Pacor is fundamentally at odds with the interpretive theory
developed in this Article. The thesis of this Article is that third-
party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction is supplemental juris-
diction; Pacor says that third-party "related to" bankruptcy juris-
diction is not supplemental jurisdiction. Pacor, though, has been
widely influential in the courts and commentary as the unques-
tioned, eminent authority on third-party "related to" bankruptcy
jurisdiction. Thus, the remainder of this Article will take great
pains to discredit Pacor and demonstrate not only that its test
should be abandoned, but for all practical purposes, that has
already occurred. Given the disheartening disorder of the deci-
sions, the real issue is formulating a suitable replacement test
that accommodates all of the underlying tensions in the case
law, which is the object of the interpretive theory proposed in
this Article.
This Part LI.B initially examines how Pacor recognized but
did not deal with the constitutional implications of third-party
"related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction. In fact, Pacor's functional
"conceivable effect" test has such conceptual vastness that it is
almost certainly unconstitutionally overreaching. Pacor express-
ly rejected principles of supplemental jurisdiction as a curb on
third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction. Pacor's hostility
to supplemental jurisdiction, though, can be attributed to both a
455. 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984).
456. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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fundamental misunderstanding of bankruptcy law and a mis-
reading of the Supreme Court's misgivings about general supple-
mental jurisdiction doctrine. Thus, while Pacor also recognized
the adjudicative efficiency goals of "related to" bankruptcy juris-
diction, it needlessly ignored the contributions that supplemen-
tal jurisdiction holds in that regard, opting instead for an out-
come-oriented, functional test that is not designed to facilitate
such efficiencies. Pacor attempted to confine the expanse of
third-party "related to" jurisdiction with an ill-conceived "auto-
matic liability" principle that has fertilized jurisdictional litiga-
tion and that is inconsistent with the flexibility built into the
jurisdictional structure through the abstention provisions.
The ultimate contradiction in Pacor that this Part III.B expos-
es is that its test is a supplemental jurisdiction test, but an
anachronistic in rem test that precludes modern in personam
principles of supplemental jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Pacor
test is a gauche in rem test that negates some of the most basic
in rem functions of bankruptcy jurisdiction. In the end, then,
Pacor discredits itself; third-party "related to" bankruptcy ju-
risdiction is supplemental jurisdiction even under the Pacor test,
and there is no legitimate basis on which to restrict it to an in
rem supplemental relationship. Third-party "related to" bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction must be recognized as a form of both in rem
and in personam supplemental jurisdiction.
The dispute that propagated the Pacor opinion originated in
state court with an asbestos personal injury suit against an
asbestos supplier, Pacor, Inc., in which Pacor impleaded the
asbestos manufacturer, Johns-Manville Corp., on a third-party
complaint for indemnification.457 When Johns-Manville sub-
457. The parties' claims can be represented graphically as follows:
Johns-ManvilleT
indemnification
Plaintiff personal injuries bi Pacor
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sequently commenced Chapter 11 proceedings, Pacor removed
the entire suit to federal court, asserting the existence of federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction over both its indemnification claim
against Johns-Manville's Chapter 11 estate and the "related"
third-party personal injuy claim against Pacor.458 While the
Third Circuit acknowledged that Pacor's indemnification claim
against Manville was a proper subject of federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction,459 it held that the third-party personal injury claim
against Pacor fell outside "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction.410
1. The "Conceivable Effect" Test and Unlimited Bankruptcy
Jurisdiction
The Pacor court began its search for the meaning of third-,
party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction by correctly noting
that "Congress intended to grant comprehensive jurisdiction to
the bankruptcy courts so that they might deal efficiently and
expeditiously with all matters connected with the bankruptcy es-
tate," and the court added that even a grant of such breadth
nonetheless evokes "a statutory, and eventually constitutional,
limitation to the power of a bankruptcy court."41 Rather than
probe those constitutional limits, however, Pacor perpetuated
the constitutional dilemma of third-party "related to" jurisdiction
In the ordinary parlance of civil procedure, Pacor's impleader claim against Manville
would be considered the "third-party" claim. Because that was the claim against
Manville's bankruptcy estate, though, the "third-party" claim for purposes of "related
to" bankruptcy jurisdiction was the personal injury claim against Pacor.
458. See Pacor, 743 F.2d at 986. The current version of the bankruptcy removal
statute, which is substantially identical to the 1978 Reform Act version at issue in
Pacor, provides that "[a] party may remove any claim or cause of action in a civil
action ... to the district court for the district where such civil action is pending, if
such district court has [bankruptcy] jurisdiction of such claim or cause of action." 28
U.S.C. § 1452(a) (1994). Upon removal of the state-court action to federal court, Pacer
simultaneously sought transfer of the entire action to the district in which Manville's
Chapter 11 proceedings were pending, so that both the personal injury claim against
Pacer and Pacor's indemnification claim against Manville could be heard in the same
forum. See Pacor, 743 F.2d at 986.
459. See Pacor, 743 F.2d at 987, 994.
460. See id. at 994-96.
461. Id. at 994 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 43-48 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6004-08); accord Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308
(1995) (quoting and citing Pacor).
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by announcing a functional test that permits plainly unconstitu-
tional exercises of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.
Employing the constitutional limits of federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction developed in this Article, as embodied in the inter-
pretive theory for third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction
set forth above,462 would have made easy work of the Pacor case.
Pacor's indemnification claim against Manville's Chapter 11
estate had an independent constitutional basis for federal juris-
diction as an Osborn federal question claim against a federal
entity. Thus, the third-party personal injury claim against Pacor
could be heard in federal court if it shared a supplemental nexus
with the Pacor-Manville indemnification claim. Under the "com-
mon nucleus of operative fact" supplemental linkage, endorsed
by the Supreme Court in the Gibbs case,463 an impleader claim
for indemnification or contribution is uniformly considered part
of the same constitutional "case" as the claim that triggers the
impleader.4 4 In fact, that sort of "logical dependence" between
two claims is generally considered a much closer coupling than
the more permissive "common nucleus of operative fact" stan-
dard."5 Thus, constitutional principles of federal jurisdiction
would lead one to conclude that there was federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction over both (1) the Pacor-Manville indemnification
claim, as a freestanding constitutional federal question, and (2)
the third-party claim against Pacor that gave rise to the indem-
nification claim, as a matter of accepted principles of supplemen-
tal jurisdiction.
Other than acknowledging that there must be some constitu-
tional limit to third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction,
though, the Pacor court made no attempt to discern that limit or
462. See supra Part III.A, notes 411-54 and accompanying text.
463. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
464. See sources cited supra note 138.
465. Thus, as the Supreme Court stated in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v.
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978), an impleader "complaint depends at least in part upon
the resolution of the primary lawsuit. Its relation to the original complaint is thus
not mere factual similarity, but logical dependence." Id. at 376 (emphasis added) (cita-
tion omitted); see Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity:
Life After Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445, 459
(1991); Freer, supra note 382, at 70-71; Matasar, supra note 382, at 171-72;
McLaughlin, supra note 366, at 881 n.177.
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examine the constitutionality of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
over the third-party dispute before it. Rather, the court seemed
intent on announcing a "test---one that actually defies princi-
pled limits:
The usual articulation of the test for determining whether
a civil proceeding is related to bankruptcy is whether the out-
come of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on
the estate being administered in bankruptcy.... An action is
related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor's
rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either posi-
tively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the
handling and administration of the bankrupt estate.'
The Pacor test, then, requires a functional, case-specific inquiry
into the utility of the bankruptcy forum with respect to any
particular third-party dispute, as judged by the outcome-oriented
impact of the dispute on administration of the bankruptcy es-
tate. Such a case-by-case functional query, though, seems mani-
festly inconsistent with the legislative process that brought
about "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction in the 1978 Reform Act.
The functionality of the Pacor test reverberates with clear over-
tones of the defeated "jurisdiction by detriment" proposal-re-
quiring a determination of the need for a federal forum in a
given dispute. Such a functional approach to bankruptcy juris-
diction was repudiated as inconsistent with the objects of com-
prehensive "related to" jurisdiction,47 which itself was premised
on an explicit rejection of any such case-specific approach to
determining the existence of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.468
In addition, the Pacor test, originally suggested by the Collier
treatise,4 69 is so broad on its face that literal application could
466. Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994.
467. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
468. See supra note 206. But see Richard Lieb, Jurisdiction and Venue in Bankruptcy
Litigation, 1982 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 69, 107 (arguing that "the scope of subject
matter jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Courts is elastic," and the "related to" jurisdic-
tion "is flexible and ... may be telescopically expanded or contracted by a court to
reach a just result"). Mr. Lieb's approach, like Pacor, overlooks the role of permissive
abstention in assuring the necessary flexibility in the exercise of federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction. See infra notes 506-14 and accompanying text.
469. See Reed et al., supra note 359, at 131 (quoting Colliers proposed test of
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lead to patently unconstitutional exercises of federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction over nondiverse state-law claims.470 For example,
were an individual to file bankruptcy owning stock in a corpora-
tion, the Pacor test apparently would permit federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction over any claim by or against the corporation with a
potential impact on the value of the corporation's stock, because
of the "conceivable effect" on the value of the individual
shareholder's bankruptcy estate-regardless of whether the
claim itself contains any "federal ingredient" and regardless of
whether the claim shares a supplemental relationship with an-
other claim pending in federal court.
47 1
"whether the outcome of the proceeding could conceivably have any effect upon the
estate being administered"); David L. Bryant, Note, Selective Exercise of Jurisdiction
in Bankruptcy-Related Civil Proceedings, 59 TEX. L. REV. 325, 329-30 (1981) (quoting
the same proposed test).
470. In espousing the proposed test, Collier also opined that "[clonceptually, there is
no limit to the reach of this jurisdiction." Reed et al., supra note 359, at 131 (quoting
Collier); see also S. REP. No. 98-55, at 18 n.53a (1983) (quoting Collier as claiming
"'no conceptual limits' to Federal jurisdiction under 1978 Act"); 130 CoNG. REc. 13,066
(1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (citing Collier for the proposition "that the Bankrupt-
cy Reform Act jurisdictional grant has no conceptual limit"). Many have noted the
difficulties in constraining a functional, utilitarian approach to federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction. See In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 794 F.2d 1182, 1188 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.) (rejecting an argument that "amounts to saying that
courts have jurisdiction when there is a utilitarian reason for them to do so. But
jurisdiction is the power to decide. It must be conferred, not assumed."); Brubaker,
supra note 13, at 1075-77; Dunne, supra note 13, at 957 (noting "the soaring juris-
diction afforded ... in a universe where everything is related to everything else");
Reed et al., supra note 359, at 131-32 (arguing that "the determination of whether a
particular proceeding is 'related to' the [bankruptcy] case is a jurisdictional determi-
nation, not a utilitarian assessment of whether . . . it would be more efficient or just
for the bankruptcy court to" assume jurisdiction, and "almost any proceeding in
which . . . the property rights or interests of the debtor will be directly or indirectly
affected will have to be deemed to be 'related to' the debtor's [bankruptcy] case" un-
der the proposed Collier, now Pacor test); supra note 13 and accompanying text.
471. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit so indicated in the context of litigation involving a
corporation wholly owned by an individual who had filed bankruptcy proceedings,
because "[riesolution of the state court action would have a substantial effect on the
monetary value of [the corporation's] shares, and thus would have a substantial effect
on the value of [the individual shareholders] bankruptcy estate." 8300 Newburgh Rd.
Partnership v. Time Constr., Inc. (In re Time Constr., Inc.), 43 F.3d 1041, 1045 & n.7
(6th Cir. 1995). On the same principle, then, if I have invested heavily (or maybe
even not so heavily) in a particular public corporation, my bankruptcy filing will con-
fer federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over any state-law dispute involving the public
corporation that could have a "substantial effect" on the value of my stockholdings or,
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Perceptiblywary of the irresolute specter of an unconstitutional
exercise of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction,472 the Pacor court
concluded that the outcome of the third-party personal injury
claim against Pacor, on which the Pacor indemnification claim
against Manville's bankruptcy estate was wholly dependent,
could not have any conceivable effect on Manville's bankruptcy
estate.473 The means by which the Pacor court came to this in-
credible non sequitur speaks volumes for the confusion the
courts have encountered and escalated by following the lead of
Pacor.
2. Frenville Strikes Again
Pacor's first misstep, and a substantial factor contributing to
Pacor's assault on supplemental jurisdiction principles, is attrib-
utable to the Third Circuit's notoriously misguided jurisprudence
with respect to a correlative provision of the Bankruptcy
Code-that which defines the "claims" that can be made against
using the Pacor formulation itself, a "conceivable effect" on the value of my shares.
This relationship can be represented graphically as follows:
Individual Debtor's
Bankruptcy Estate
stock
ownership
Plaintiff - * Corporation -- Defendant
472. The court's only other mention of the constitutional issue was to note that in
enacting the 1984 BAFJA amendments, "Itihe legislative history reveals that Congress
was concerned about the constitutionality of granting to the federal courts 'related to'
jurisdiction in cases where no independent basis for federal jurisdiction existed."
Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 996 n.16 (3d Cir. 1984); see infra note 510; see
also Home Ins. Co. v. Cooper & Cooper, Ltd., 889 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Easterbrook, J.) ("We have read [related to' bankruptcy jurisdiction] narrowly not
only out of respect for Article III, but also to preserve the jurisdiction of state courts
over questions of state law involving persons not party to the bankruptcy.").
473. See Pacor, 743 F.2d at 995-96.
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a bankruptcy estate. The Pacor court seemed to assume that the
Pacor-Manville indemnification claim, although properly re-
moved to federal court according to the Third Circuit,'74 was not
ripe for consideration by a federal bankruptcy court until the
third-party personal injury claim against Pacor was finally re-
solved: "The fact remains that any judgment received by the
plaintiff [against Pacor] could not itself result in even a contin-
gent claim against Manville, since Pacor would still be obligated
to bring an entirely separate proceeding to receive indemnifica-
tion."75 "At best, [the third-party personal injury claim] is a
mere precursor to the potential... claim for indemnification by
Pacor against Manville." 7 6 "Thus, the bankruptcy estate could
not be affected in any way until the Pacor-Manville... action is
actually brought and tried."77
This aspect of the Pacor opinion is an unfortunate by-product
of the Third Circuit's unduly narrow view, contemporaneously
memorialized in the infamous Frenville case,478 regarding the
sweep of bankruptcy and the "claims" against a bankruptcy es-
tate that are cognizable in bankruptcy proceedings. Contrary to
the myopic approach of Pacor and Frenville, a "claim" against a
bankruptcy estate is broadly defined in the Bankruptcy Code'7 9
in a manner that would not only permit, but also require Pacor
(under compulsion of bankruptcy's automatic stay and discharge
injunction)8 0 to assert its contingent indemnification rights ag-
474. See supra note 459 and accompanying text. In fact, the district court had re-
manded this indemnification claim to the bankruptcy court for consideration of Pacor's
motion to transfer venue of the claim to the district in which Manville's Chapter 11
proceedings were pending. See Pacor, 743 F.2d at 987.
475. Pacor, 743 F.2d at 995.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d
Cir. 1984).
479. As used in the Bankruptcy Code, "'claim' means .. . right to payment, whether
or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." 11
U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1994).
480. Commencement of a bankruptcy case, in and of itself, operates as an automatic
stay of all creditor collection actions of whatever nature. See id. § 362(a). Thereafter,
creditors can pursue their rights against the debtor only by way of a proof of claim
against the debtor's bankruptcy estate, filed in the bankruptcy court, with the bank-
ruptcy court determining the allowability of any claim to which an objection is posed.
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ainst Manville's bankruptcy estate, even without final resolution
of the third-party personal injury action against Pacor for which
indemnification was sought.4"' Indeed, the bankruptcy court pre-
siding over Manville's reorganization proceedings so held.48 2
Significantly, bankruptcy's "acceleration" of Pacor's indemnifi-
cation claim is not unlike the procedural rules that permitted
Pacor to assert its indemnification claim in the same action in
which Pacor was sued as a defendant.4" By invoking the
Frenville rationale, then, Pacor was bucking the spirit of both (1)
comprehensive bankruptcy relief and (2) modern joinder practice
in federal court, which of course, is dependent upon principles of
supplemental jurisdiction. A third-party "related to" jurisdiction
that would permit the federal bankruptcy court to hear both
Pacor's bankruptcy "claim" against Manville's bankruptcy estate
and the third-party personal injury claim against Pacor that
gives rise to that bankruptcy "claim" would seem to complement
and facilitate the smooth functioning of the Bankruptcy Code's
liberal definition of bankruptcy "claims." Pacor's nullification of
such a supplemental approach to third-party "related to" juris-
diction, though, did not stop at the indirect implications of its
Frenville rationale.
See id. §§ 501(a), 502(a)-(b). A bankruptcy discharge then extinguishes "claims" that
are not fully satisfied from the debtor's bankruptcy estate, and the debtor's discharge
replaces the automatic stay with a permanent discharge injunction. See id. §§ 101(5)
& (12), 362(c)(2)(C), 524(a), 727(b), 1141(d)(1)(A), 1228(c), 1328(c).
481. See Brubaker, supra note 13, at 1004-07. The Bankruptcy Code provides that a
bankruptcy court "shall . . . estimate[] for purposes of allowance . . . any contingent
or unliquidated claim, the fixing or liquidation of which, as the case may be, would
unduly delay the administration of the [bankruptcy] case." 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1).
482. In In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), parties who
found themselves in the same position as Pacor, defendants in state-court asbestos
actions, sought to assert contribution and indemnification rights against Manville in
those suits. See id. at 682-84. Disagreeing with Frenville, the Manville court held that
the admittedly contingent contribution and indemnification rights of the defendants
were, nonetheless, existing bankruptcy "claims" against Manville's bankruptcy estate
that were automatically stayed by and assertable in Manville's bankruptcy proceed-
ings. See id. at 685-90.
483. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a). See generally Freer, supra note 138, § 14.05121 (dis-
cussing Rule 14's "acceleration" of state-law contribution and indemnification claims).
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3. An Unwarranted Repudiation of Supplemental Jurisdiction
If Pacor had rested its holding merely on the faulty supposi-
tion that there was not yet any Pacor-Manville indemnification
"claim" over which the federal courts could exercise bankruptcy
jurisdiction, the conclusion that there could be no "related to"
bankruptcy jurisdiction in the third-party claim against Pacor
would not be at all bothersome.4 In fact, if one were to properly
view third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction as a grant
of conventional supplemental jurisdiction, that conclusion would
be mandated, because supplemental jurisdiction cannot be based
upon a relationship to a claim that has not been asserted in
federal court.4"' The Pacor court, however, compounded its initial
error by disavowing any role at all for supplemental jurisdiction
principles in the realm of third-party "related to" bankruptcy
jurisdiction.
Although not part of the "test" announced by the Third Circuit
and adopted in its sister circuits, the Pacor opinion nonetheless
appended the following commentary:
On the other hand, the mere fact that there may be com-
mon issues of fact between a civil proceeding and a contro-
versy involving the bankruptcy estate does not bring the
matter within the scope of ["related to" bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion]. Judicial economy itself does not justify federal jurisdic-
tion. See generally Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15, 96
S.Ct. 2413, 2420, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976).48
484. Thus, in a situation similar to Pacor, where a third-party claim gave rise to
potential indemnification responsibility for a debtor's bankruptcy estate, the First
Circuit, in contradistinction to Pacor, correctly assumed that there was an existing
indemnification claim against the debtor's bankruptcy estate and, thus, concluded that
there was also "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction over the third-party claim, specifi-
cally noting that the defending party with potential indemnification rights had "timely
filed a proof of claim against the estate, thereby preserving its rights." In re G.S.F.
Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1476 (1st Cir. 1991); cf Specialty Mills, Inc. v. Citizens State
Bank, 51 F.3d 770, 771-74 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding no "related to" jurisdiction over a
third-party dispute that was not filed until after the parties' claims against the bank-
ruptcy estate were already fully resolved); Home Ins. Co. v. Cooper & Cooper, Ltd.,
889 F.2d 746, 750 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting in a third-party suit that an "effect on the
estate is possible only if the [defendants]-whose contingent claims make them the
estate's 'creditors' for purposes of bankruptcy law-have filed [proofs of claim] by the
bar date" (citation omitted)).
485. See ALI, JUDICIAL CODE PROJECT, supra note 112, at 39.
486. Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984).
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The unmistakable target of this missive was Gibbs's "common
nucleus of operative fact" test and supplemental jurisdiction in
general, as evidenced by the reference to Aldinger.87
The Pacor court made no effort to actually engage in the sup-
plemental jurisdiction analysis prescribed by Aldinger, which
undoubtedly would not have precluded an application of supple-
mental jurisdiction in this particular context. s8 Nonetheless,
Aldinger and the Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in Finley
v. United States4 9 did, indeed, present a significant obstacle to
the unrestricted exercise of supplemental jurisdiction by the fed-
eral courts. Those cases, however, were reacting to a quirk in
general supplemental jurisdiction 'doctrine, which had developed
"without specific examination of jurisdictional statutes"49 and
thus did not appear entirely consistent with "the necessity that
jurisdiction be explicitly conferred."49' Of course, if third-party
"related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction is itself a grant of supple-
mental jurisdiction, as its phrasing and legislative purposes sug-
gest, then the statutory authorization hurdle confronting the
Aldinger and Finley cases is completely nonexistent in the bank-
ruptcy context.492 As the Aldinger opinion specifically noted,
487. In Bobroff v. Continental Bank (In re Bobrofi), 766 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1985), the
court made this point abundantly clear. In the face of an argument that "related to"
jurisdiction "is intended to mirror the principle of pendent jurisdiction7 in order to
"avoid fragmentation of litigation and duplication of effort, and further judicial economy,"
the court's curt response was to note their recent exposition of the Pacor test and
that "jlust as explicitly, we rejected the construction of 'related to' that appellants
advance now." Id at 802.
488. See infra note 652.
489. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
490. Id. at 548.
491. Id. at 556; see ALI, JUDIcIAL CODE PROJECT, supra note 112, at 11-12. The
Finley majority refused to acknowledge, however, the compelling arguments of Pro-
fessor Freer that a grant of jurisdiction over an entire "civil action," itself, contains
authority for full exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. See Finley, 490 U.S. at 571
n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Freer, supra note 382, at 56-58).
492. Thus, while employing an inappropriate in rem receivership model for federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction, Judge Posner was entirely accurate when he stated that "Itihe
doubts expressed in Finley, though, were doubts . . . about the propriety of the juris-
diction itself because of its judge-made character. The 'related to' provision of the
Bankruptcy Code, being an explicit statutory provision well grounded in the constitu-
tional conferral of bankruptcy jurisdiction, stills any such doubts here." Chapman v.
Currie Motors, Inc., 65 F.3d 78, 82 (7th Cir. 1995); see supra note 449 and accompa-
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"[tihere are, of course, many variations in the language which
Congress has employed to confer jurisdiction upon the federal
courts," and "[olther statutory grants... might call for a differ-
ent result."
493
The general principle of the Aldinger case on which Pacor
relied, then, and its restrictions on the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction in the absence of any express statutory authoriza-
tion, were utterly inapposite to the task before the Pacor court,
which was presented with construction of a specific grant of
"related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction. Indeed, Congress subse-
quently overturned both Aldinger and Finley by vesting the
federal courts with general "related to" jurisdiction in the 1990
supplemental jurisdiction statute.4  Thus, it is not "judicial
economy itself" that gives federal courts supplemental bankrupt-
cy jurisdiction; it is the statutory grant of "related to" bankrupt-
cy jurisdiction that does so-a prospect that the Pacor court
refused to even consider.
So while Pacor purported to effectuate congressional intent
regarding this "comprehensive" third-party "related to" bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction, in order to enable federal bankruptcy courts
to "deal efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected
with the bankruptcy estate,"495 the court cavalierly discarded the
body of jurisdictional tenets developed precisely for such an end.
Moreover, subsequent courts have entrenched Pacor's faux pas
by repeatedly and mechanically parroting its reasoning.496
nying text (discussing Chapman's use of an in rem model of supplemental bankruptcy
jurisdiction).
493. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976).
494. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994) ("[The district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution." (emphasis added)). For further discus-
sion of the general supplemental jurisdiction statute, see supra notes 439-40 and ac-
companying text.
495. Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984).
496. See, e.g., Lindsey v. O'Brien, Tanski, Tanzer & Young Health Care Providers
(In re Dow Corning Corp.), 86 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir. 1996); Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re
Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746, 753-54 (5th Cir. 1995); Specialty Mills, Inc. v. Citizens State
Bank, 51 F.3d 770, 774 (8th Cir. 1995); Miller v. Kemira, Inc. (In re Lemco Gypsum,
Inc.), 910 F.2d 784, 789 (11th Cir. 1990); Home Ins. Co. v. Cooper & Cooper, Ltd.,
889 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1989).
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4. Disregard of First Principles and the Role of Abstention
By repudiating principles of supplemental jurisdiction, the
Pacor court was forced to look elsewhere for checks on its "con-
ceptually limitless"497 test for third-party "related to" bankruptcy
jurisdiction. Thus, considerations of convenience and judicial
economy mysteriously gave way to preclusion doctrine. In the
process, the Third Circuit pressed a wooden "automatic liability"
limitation into a role reserved by Congress for the flexible ab-
stention provisions. As a result, Pacor has multiplied jurisdic-
tional litigation and undermined the essential purpose of perva-
sive federal bankruptcy jurisdiction in facilitating adjudicative
efficacy.
According to the Third Circuit, the third-party personal injury
claim against Pacor was not "related to" Manville's bankruptcy
case, because "the outcome of [that third-party personal injury]
action would in no way bind Manville... [slince Manville is not
a party" and "could not be bound by res judicata or collateral
estoppel."' 8 Of course, strict adherence to preclusion principles
would mean there is virtually no "related to" jurisdiction of
third-party disputes, as res judicata can bind only parties and
their privies.499 Thus, the Pacor opinion held out the possibility
that the outcome of other third-party claims might be "related
to" a bankruptcy case if, as a practical matter, they give rise to
"automatic liability" for the bankruptcy estate, such as a debtor's
contractual liability that might arise when a creditor recovers
from the debtor's guarantor. 00
Lost in Pacor's search for "automatic liability" for the estate,
though, is the initial inquiry the Third Circuit acknowledged as
497. See supra note 470.
498. Pacor, 743 F.2d at 995.
499. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 34(3) & reporters note, at 347
(1982).
500. See Pacor, 743 F.2d at 995; see also Belcufine v. Aloe, 112 F.3d 633, 636-37 (3d
Cir. 1997) (finding creditors' claims against the Chapter 11 debtor's officers/directors
were within "related to" jurisdiction where the estate had "automatic liability" under
corporate indemnification provisions); IRS v. Kaplan (In re Kaplan), 104 F.3d 589,
591-95 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding "related to" jurisdiction over a nondebtor corporation's
trust fund tax liability to the IRS, because of the automatic liability of the offi-
cer/director Chapter 11 debtors for those taxes).
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the function of third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction:
whether entertaining the third-party personal injury action
against Pacor in federal court would promote "efficient and expe-
ditious" resolution of Pacor's indemnification rights vis-a-vis
Manville's bankruptcy estate.0 1 One suspects that the Pacor
court thought not and that Pacor was seizing upon Manville's
bankruptcy filing as a means of delaying the plaintiffs personal
injury suit, which Pacor removed to federal court "on the eve
of the commencement of trial" in state court."2 Hence, the Third
Circuit admonished Pacor that "[b]ankruptcy jurisdiction...
was not conferred for the convenience of those not in bank-
ruptcy."50 3
501. See supra note 461 and accompanying text. As the Fourth Circuit noted in a
similar circumstance, any recovery on the third-party claim would "chang[e] the char-
acter of [the] indemnification claim against [the debtor's estate] from contingent and
unliquidated to certain and liquidated" and 'would obviate the need to estimate the
amount of [the indemnification] claim under Bankruptcy Code § 502(c), which requires
that a contingent or unliquidated claim be estimated if the bankruptcy court deter-
mines that the fixing or liquidation of a claim would unduly delay the administration
of the bankruptcy case." Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Rapid Am. Corp. (In re Celotex Corp.),
124 F.3d 619, 626 (4th Cir. 1997).
502. Hanna v. Philadelphia Asbestos Co., 743 F.2d 996, 998 n.1 (3d Cir. 1984).
Hanna was a companion case to Pacor, decided on the same day and also involving
Pacor in an identical procedural posture, as both defendant and indemnification claimant
against Manville, attempting removal of the entire action to federal court. See id. at 998.
503. Pacor, 743 F.2d at 996; see also Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d
746, 757 n.28 (5th Cir. 1995) (arguing that "[o]therwise, creditors would have too
much incentive to push a failing enterprise into bankruptcy not for the debtor's sake,
but for their own interests"). In the identical-twin Hanna case, the Third Circuit
quoted at length from the district court opinion:
[I]t does seem to me that the move to remove and then transfer to New
York is primarily a tactical ploy on the part of Pacor, Incorporated.
[Tihe plaintiffs who have a claim for serious personal injuries and pre-
sumably a death action and a survival action, based on Pennsylvania
law, may be delayed in the trial of the case for a very extensive period
of time and . . . I don't see how the transferring from one district to
another and then possibly back again here or to state court, can possibly
be in the interest of judicial economy. It is that type of juggling of cases
and moving them around that causes delay and I think it rightly causes
many persons to be discouraged with the whole judicial system.
We agree with the district court that the Hanna-Pacor dispute must
be remanded. Indeed, we rest our decision on a consideration even more
basic than the equities of the situation. As we discussed at length in
[Pacor], an action by a consumer such as Hanna or Higgins against a
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The Third Circuit's belief that Congress did not design bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction to accommodate the convenience and economy
interests of any litigant other than the bankruptcy estate is
demonstrably at odds with Congress's express desire to "pro-
vid[e] a mechanism for assuring convenience to all parties to
particular litigation and ensuring that the more general public
interest in a fair and expeditious disposition of the litigation will
be appropriately balanced in the final selection of a forum."'o,
Pacor, by contrast, imposes a jurisdictional regime that not only
tolerates, but essentially requires the litigation of factually related
claims in separate tribunals, given the restrictions imposed upon
creditors' forum choice by bankruptcy's automatic stay. If fair
and efficient bundling of all related claims is unavailable in
federal bankruptcy court, then oftentimes such bundling will not
be attainable at all, as bankruptcy's automatic stay precludes
assertion of claims against the debtor in any forum other than
the bankruptcy court.50 5 Moreover, and paradoxically, Pacor's
single-minded focus upon the bankruptcy estate turns a blind eye
to any added expense and inconvenience visited upon creditors
(such as Pacor)-the very constituency for whose ultimate bene-
fit bankruptcy proceedings are supposedly conducted-in the
prosecution of their claims against the bankruptcy estate.
An equally disturbing aspect of Pacor, and an outgrowth of its
functional approach to third-party "related to" bankruptcy juris-
diction,0" is that it completely ignores the role of permissive ab-
stention and its interplay with pervasive "related to" jurisdiction
in "insur[ing] that the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is
exercised only when appropriate to the expeditious disposition of
bankruptcy cases."0 7 Thus, in the Pacor case, exerting federal
distributor of asbestos, such as Pacor, is not "related to" the Manville
bankruptcy.
Hanna, 743 F.2d at 1001 (citations omitted).
504. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 45 (1977) (quoting 1973 COMMN REPORT, supra note
110, pt. I, at 90), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6006-07.
505. See supra note 480 and accompanying text.
506. See supra notes 466-68 and accompanying text.
507. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 51, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6012; see 28
U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (1994), discussed supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text. As
the Sixth Circuit recognized:
We note that this ['related to' bankruptcy] jurisdictional grant was
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bankruptcy jurisdiction over the third-party personal injury
claim against Pacor, merely for the sake of any marginal effi-
ciencies that could be obtained in resolving Pacor's indemnifica-
tion rights against Manville's bankruptcy estate, was likely
wholly insufficient to justify the extreme delay and duplication
of effort that Manville's complex reorganization proceedings
would impose upon the ultimate determination of the personal
injury claim against Pacor. °8 The most that this establishes,
however, is that the third-party personal injury claim at issue in
Pacor presented an appropriate case for permissive0 9 or even
mandatory abstention,50 a conclusion that may frequently follow
where the "federal" claim that moors a "related to" third-party
dispute is a creditor's claim against the bankruptcy estate.511
simultaneously qualified by the abstention provision ... [which is] suffi-
cient to keep federal jurisdiction from becoming overextended. Congress
wisely chose a broad jurisdictional grant and a broad abstention doctrine
over a narrower jurisdictional grant so that the district court could de-
termine in each individual case whether hearing it would promote or
impair efficient and fair adjudication of bankruptcy cases.
Kelley v. Nodine (In re Salem Mortgage Co.), 783 F.2d 626, 635 (6th Cir. 1986); ac-
cord Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1987) ("The abstention
provisions of the Act demonstrate the intent of Congress that concerns of comity and
judicial convenience should be met, not by rigid limitations on the jurisdiction of
federal courts, but by the discretionary exercise of abstention when appropriate in a
particular case."); Bryant, supra note 469, at 331-36.
508. See supra notes 501-03 and accompanying text.
509. Indeed, this was precisely the basis on which the district court declined juris-
diction in Pacor's companion case, by remand to state court. See Hanna v. Philadel-
phia Asbestos Co., 743 F.2d 996, 1001-02 (3d Cir. 1984), discussed supra notes 502-03.
510. Because the third-party personal injury claim at issue in Pacor was already
pending and ready for trial in state court, it would likely fall within the mandatory
abstention provision of the 1984 BAFJA amendments. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2), dis-
cussed supra note 220 and accompanying text. Indeed, even though the BAFJA
amendments were inapplicable to the Pacor case itself, the court specifically noted
that the newly enacted mandatory abstention provision would preclude any exercise of
federal jurisdiction over the third-party personal injury claim against Pacor, a pros-
pect that the Pacor court, like many in Congress, erroneously believed was a reason
to doubt the constitutional validity of "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction over the
third-party personal injury claim. See Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 996 n.16
(3d Cir. 1984); supra notes 218-24, 472 and accompanying text.
511. The significant differences in procedure and litigation incentives between adju-
dication of a "core" claim against the bankruptcy estate and a "noncore" third-party
"related to" claim may often erase any countervailing procedural efficiencies from join-
der of those core and noncore claims. For example, litigation of creditors' claims,
which typically yield mere cents on the dollar, is notoriously "summary," to use the
884
20001 A THEORY OF FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION 885
Pacor's rigid jurisdictional bar in the absence of "automatic lia-
bility," however, forecloses h federal forum even in those instances
where the federal bankruptcy court would prove more expedi-
tious than state-court litigation.
"Automatic liability" as a curb on Pacor's conceptually limit-
less "conceivable effect" test has not found much favor in other
circuits,51 nor has any other limiting principle. Little wonder,
then, that Pacor's legacy is a fairly arbitrary body of case law on
without any jury trial rights. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), (b)(2)(B); Langenkamp v.
Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 44-45 (1990); Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 58-59
& n.14 (1989). By contrast, conduct of noncore "related to" proceedings, which yield
100g dollars, is essentially indistinguishable from nonbankruptcy civil litigation, in-
cluding retention of any constitutional right to a jury trial in an Article IH district
court. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(d)-(e); 6 NORTON, supra note 16, § 143:13; 1 SALERNO ET
AL., supra note 434, § 3.46. Even in such a circumstance, though, joinder of the
creditor's claim with a related third-party claim may yield pretrial efficiencies, while
also preserving the possibility of subsequent severance of the claims for separate
trials if necessary. Cf., e.g., Masterwear Corp. v. Rubin Baum Levin Constant &
Friedman (In re Masterwear Corp.), 241 B.R. 511, 519-21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(abstaining from a defendant's third-party impleader claims after the estate's claim
against the defendant had settled and summary judgment on the third-party claims
was denied, because the third-party claims would have to be tried to a jury in a
district court if retained in federal court). See generally Hawkins v. Eads (In re Eads),
135 B.R. 387, 397-98 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991) (noting that "the interests of judicial
economy during the pretrial stage and .. . the convenience of the parties" comes from
"comprehensive, discovery in a single forum" and acknowledging that "there is a possi-
bility that the calculus of judicial economy and convenience could change as trial
nears if the third-party claims become cumbersome to try in view of the circumscribed
power of bankruptcy judges" and the potential jury trial rights of some parties, but
concluding that "those are problems that may or may not arise and do not affect the
analysis of subject-matter jurisdiction" since "the exercise of the discretion to assume
jurisdiction [or abstain] remains open throughout the litigation); infra note 515 and
accompanying text (discussing pretrial efficiencies from joinder of related claims).
Moreover, with respect to creditors' personal injury and wrongful death claims against
a bankruptcy estate, special provisions of the Judicial Code preserve such a tort
creditor's right to a jury trial in a district court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(B), (b)(5),
1411(a). Therefore, such a tort claim against the estate and a related third-party
claim could advance in tandem on similar procedural tracks.
512. "It has become clear following Pacor that 'automatic! liability is not necessarily
a prerequisite for a finding of 'related to' jurisdiction." Lindsey v. O'Brien, Tanski,
Tanzer & Young Health Care Providers (In re Dow Coming Corp.), 86 F.3d 482, 491
(6th Cir. 1996); see also Kelley v. Nodine (In re Salem Mortgage Co.), 783 F.2d 626,
635 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting "that the statute does not require a finding of definite
liability of the estate as a condition precedent to holding an action related to a bank-
ruptcy proceeding").
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third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction. Accordingly,
Pacor's construction of an awkward, functional jurisdictional
test-which is conceptually limitless yet simultaneously expected
to do the work of the abstention provisions-has vastly prolif-
erated jurisdictional litigation, with prerequisite jurisdictional
issues regularly contested in appeals to the circuit courts. Ab-
stention decisions, by contrast, are discretionary determinations
on which such appeals are expressly prohibited by statute.513
Pacor, then, frustrates another primary goal of the 1978 Reform
Act's expansion of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction-that of reduc-
ing wasteful jurisdictional litigation.514
The internal contradictions of Pacor's limitless, but not limit-
less" schizophrenia go to the core purpose of third-party "related
to" jurisdiction. At the same time that the "conceivable effect"
aspect of the Pacor test seems unconstitutionally overinclusive,
another aspect of the Pacor test makes it decidedly
underinclusive with respect to its stated goal of facilitating effi-
cient and expeditious litigation of all matters connected with a
bankruptcy estate. Because of its outcome-oriented focus, the
Pacor test simply cannot fully effectuate efficient adjudication.
In asking whether the "outcome" of a third-party dispute can
have a conceivable effect upon the bankruptcy estate, the Pacor
test assigns no significance to the process of resolving the third-
party claim that precedes final judgment. Of course, it is in the
pre-outcome stage of dispute resolution where adjudicative effi-
ciencies are achieved, by placing logically and factually related
claims before the same court for consolidated or coordinated
pretrial and/or trial proceedings-a fact that is completely ig-
nored by Pacor's "outcome" blinders.5 '
513. An abstention decision by a bankruptcy judge may be reviewed by a district
court or bankruptcy appellate panel, but further review by appeal to a circuit court of
appeals is limited to reviewing a lower court's denial of a request for mandatory
abstention. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d); 1 COLLIER (15th ed.), supra note 66, 3.05[5]-[6].
514. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
515. See Robert G. Bone, Revisiting the Policy Case for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74
IND. L.J. 139, 142 (1998) (noting that whereas "most lawsuits settle . . the cost
savings that matter most to an efficiency analysis are those at the pretrial stage").
Indeed, Judge Easterbrook as much as acknowledged this gap in the outcome-oriented
approach in Home Insurance Co. v. Cooper & Cooper, Ltd., 889 F.2d 746 (7th Cir.
1989), by noting that although entertaining certain third-party disputes had "a nexus
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The outcome-oriented, functional inquiry required by Pacor
actually mirrors the in rem concepts of ancillary jurisdiction
employed in the equitable receivership context.516 Thus, despite
the Third Circuit's sweeping language deriding supplemental
jurisdiction principles,517 the test itself, as established by Pacor,
is not so much a rejection of supplemental jurisdiction as it is a
rejection of a modern in personam approach to supplemental
jurisdiction. Pacor's outcome-based test has simply restricted
third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction to a more primi-
tive in rem supplemental relationship.
5. The Inartful In Rem Nature of the Pacor Test
By revisiting the in rem origins of supplemental jurisdiction,
we can easily recognize the Pacor test as an effort to articulate
an in rem supplemental nexus for third-party "related to" bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction, but in the most crude and inept fashion. In
fact, Pacor actually has thrown into question long-settled pre-
cepts regarding the in rem functions of bankruptcy jurisdiction.
Under Pacor, possession of property by a federal bankruptcy
court no longer provides the court authority to determine con-
flicting claims to the property. Moreover, resolution of
intercreditor disputes regarding the appropriate recipient of a
bankruptcy distribution has also faded from the in rem powers
of a federal court. The Pacor test is absolute folly, even in its
own niggardly in rem domain, and therefore must be abandoned.
"Related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction should exist for any third-
party dispute that shares an in rem supplemental connection
with a claim by or against a bankruptcy estate. Additionally,
though, third-party "related to" jurisdiction also should incorpo-
rate a modern in personam test for supplemental jurisdiction.
with the bankruptcy-in the sense that it would be convenient, and promote consis-
tency, to resolve all questions concerning [a particular transaction] at one go-it does
not necessarily have a financial effect on the estate (or the apportionment among its
creditors)." Id at 749. But cf National Tax Credit Partners, L.P. v. Havlk, 20 F.3d
705, 709 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J.) ("Representing the interests of the judicial
system as a whole, we are not at all content with duplicative, and potentially con-
flicting, proceedings.").
516. See supra Part II.C.3, notes 370-95 and accompanying text.
517. See supra notes 486-87 and accompanying text.
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Even though the Supreme Court has approved the "common
nucleus of operative fact" test as a constitutionally appropriate
supplemental relationship, this method of grouping related in
personam claims, looking to the shared transactional origin of the
claims, does not seem to preclude the more functional, outcome-
oriented in rem linkage that the Court utilized in its earlier
receivership cases.618 Thus, a claim to a particular res that car-
ries an independent basis for federal jurisdiction will support
federal jurisdiction over nondiverse state-law claims against the
same res, even when the claims themselves do not otherwise
share any common transactional origin.519 This in rem approach
to supplemental jurisdiction, by necessary implication, also en-
compasses third-party inter se disputes between claimants with
respect to their relative rights in the res.52 Indeed, bankruptcy's
earliest form of supplemental jurisdiction, the 1898 Act's "neces-
sity" jurisdiction over those third-party disputes considered inte-
gral to complete administration of the estate, was precisely this
brand of in rem supplemental jurisdiction.52'
The Pacor test for third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion, by asking whether the outcome of a third-party dispute will
have an effect on the bankruptcy estate, is simply an attempt at
a more expansive in rem supplemental nexus. Pacor essentially
regards the bankruptcy estate as a jurisdictional res, and a
particular claim is within federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, ac-
cording to Pacor, if the claim has a sufficient outcome-oriented,
functional relationship to the jurisdictional res-Pacor's "effect
on the estate" test.5 22 The in rem focus of such an outcome-based
518. See supra notes 371-73 and accompanying text.
519. Commentators agree that in rem supplemental concepts survive the Gibbs com-
mon-nucleus test. See Richard D. Freer, Interpleader, in 4 MOORE, supra note 138, §
22.04[21[c], at 22-62 to -63; Matasar, supra note 7, at 1463-66.
520. In the receivership context, see, for example, Morgan's La. & Tx. R.R. & S.S.
Co. v. Texas Cent. Ry. Co., 137 U.S. 171, 199-202 (1890) (finding ancillary jurisdiction
in an intercreditor dispute regarding mortgagees' relative rights in property in the
court's possession); Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 609, 631-35 (1864)
(upholding ancillary jurisdiction over a third-party dispute between two purchasers
regarding their relative rights in property in the constructive possession of the court).
521. See supra Part I.B.2.b, notes 124-42 and accompanying text.
522. Cf Richard H. Gibson, Home Court, Outpost Court: Reconciling Bankruptcy Case
Control with Venue Flexibility in Proceedings, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 37, 62-64 (1988)
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test is even clearer under.the Seventh Circuit's variation, which
examines whether the third-party dispute can "affect[] the
amount of property available for distribution or the allocation of
property among creditors."5' Moreover, several circuits have
expressly likened third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction
to the in rem "necessity" concepts of 1898 Act jurisprudence.5"
In fact, the third-party disputes in which the courts have had
the least difficulty applying the Pacor test are those that most
readily lend themselves to an in rem analysis. Thus, when
claimants assert conflicting rights in property of the estate, the
Pacor test easily affords federal jurisdiction to resolution of
(arguing that the fundamental essence of bankruptcy jurisdiction is more in rem than
in personam, relying on the Pacor test). The Third Circuit itself acknowledged that
"[proceedings affecting the res are within the court's jurisdiction; proceedings not
affecting the res are not.", Torkelsen v. Maggio (In re Guild & Gallery Plus, Inc.), 72
F.3d 1171, 1182 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Gibson, supra, at 64); see also Feld v. Zale
Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746, 753 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Those cases in which
courts have upheld 'related to' jurisdiction over third-party actions do so because the
subject of the third-party dispute is property of the estate, or because the dispute
over the asset would have an effect on the estate." (footnotes omitted)).
523. Elscint, Inc. v. First Wis. Fin. Corp. (In re Xonics, Inc.), 813 F.2d 127, 131 (7th
Cir. 1987). The Xonics court elaborated on its in rem rationale as follows:
The bankruptcy jurisdiction is designed to provide a single forum for
dealing with all claims to the bankrupts assets. It extends no farther
than its purpose. That two creditors have an internecine conflict is of no
moment, once all disputes about their stakes in the bankrupt's property
have been resolved.
Id.
524. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Best Prods. Co. (In re Best Prods. Co.), 68 F.3d
26, 32 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that "[dletermination of the priority rights of various
creditors to assets of the Debtor was necessary to administer the estate and was not
merely a dispute between two creditors"); Gardner v. United States (In re Gardner),
913 F.2d 1515, 1518 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing the 1898 Act case of Gordon v. Shirley
Duke Assocs. (In re Shirley Duke Assocs.), 611 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1979)); FDIC v. Ma-
jestic Energy Corp. (In re Majestic Energy Corp.), 835 F.2d 87, 89-91 (5th Cir. 1988)
(citing the 1898 Act case of Uranga v. Geib (In re Paso Del Norte Oil Co.), 755 F.2d
421 (5th Cir. 1985)); Xonics, 813 F.2d at 131-32 (citing the 1898 Act cases of Paso
Del Norte and Jones v. Yorke (In re Friendship Med. Ctr., Ltd.), 710 F.2d 1297 (7th
Cir. 1983)); see also Lieb, supra note 468, at 107-08, 108 (arguing that although "ne-
cessity" jurisdiction "case law developed under the former Bankruptcy Act, its theory
should be applicable in cases under the Code"). But cf. Wood v. Wood (In re Wood),
825 F.2d 90, 93 & n.12 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Paso Del Norte and comity consider-
ations as relevant to permissive abstention analysis, because "[tihere is no necessary
reason why that concern must be met by restrictive interpretations of the statutory
grant of ['related tol jurisdiction").
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intercreditor claims concerning that property." Likewise, when
the estate asserts a claim to property, assets, or a "fund" in the
hands of another, the courts have readily concluded that there is
"related to" jurisdiction over any third-party claims against the
same res.
526
525. Such claims can be represented graphically as follows:
See CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Huls Am., Inc., 176 F.3d 187, 190-93, 203-04 (3d Cir.
1999) (intercreditor claim under a contractual subordination agreement regarding enti-
tlement to funds distributed pursuant to the debtor's reorganization plan); Spartan
Mills v. Bank of Am. Ill., 112 F.3d 1251, 1256 (4th Cir. 1997) (lien priority dispute
between creditors: 'We have little difficulty in concluding that the. . . bankruptcy
court had subject matter jurisdiction over all of [the debtor's] assets and any lien
contest in respect to them."); Best Prods., 68 F.3d at 31 (intercreditor dispute regard-
ing enforcement of a contractual subordination agreement: "Fixing the order of priority
of creditor claims against a debtor is an integral and historic bankruptcy function"
and "the power to prioritize distributions has long been recognized as an essential
element of bankruptcy law"); Xonics, 813 F.2d at 131 (noting that "[aidjusting compet-
ing claims of creditors to the property of a bankrupt is the central function of bank-
ruptey law").
526. Such claims can be represented graphically as follows:
The Xonics court gave the following example: "Suppose A, B, and C claim interests in
a pool of oil. If A is a bankrupt, the bankruptcy court could determine the interests
of all three in the property under ['related to' bankruptcy jurisdiction] . .. ." 813 F.2d
at 131; see Continental Nat'l Bank v. Sanchez (In re Toledo), 170 F.3d 1340, 1342-47
(11th Cir. 1999) (action to determine the relative interests of various parties, includ-
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These in rem cases could also be explained by the interpretive
theory proposed by this Article, as follows: Claims by or against
the bankruptcy estate are freestanding constitutional federal
questions, furnishing "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction over
any third-party claim sharing an in rem supplemental nexus.
Furthermore, explicitly casting third-party "related to" jurisdic-
tion in such cases as an in rem form of supplemental jurisdiction
is actually far superior to continued adherence to Pacor, because
the Pacor formulation has led many courts to adopt a more in-
hibiting form of in rem jurisdiction than existed under the 1898
Act. This phenomenon is illustrated amply by the Tenth Circuit
ing the partner-debtor's bankruptcy estate, in proceeds of a sale of the nondebtor
partnership's property); Home Ins. Co. v. Adco Oil Co., 154 F.3d 739, 740-41 (7th Cir.
1998) (insurer's declaratory judgment action regarding coverage responsibilities to the
Chapter 11 debtor-insured and an injured party-creditor); Ateeq v. Najor (In re Najor),
152 F.3d 928, No. 97-55501, 1998 WL 416070, at *1 (9th Cir. July 1, 1998) (unpub-
lished table decision) (estate's action for cancellation of a surety bond and return of
collateral, to which a creditor also laid claim); W.A. Lang Co. v. Anderburg-Lund
Printing Co. (In re Anderberg-Lund Printing Co.), 109 F.3d 1343, 1344-47 (8th Cir.
1997) (interpleader of a fund to which the Chapter 11 debtor and a third party made
claims); Cathedral of Incarnation v. Garden City Co. (In re Cathedral of Incarnation),
90 F.3d 28, 29-31, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1996) (condemnation claims by the Chapter 11 debtor
and the third-party owner of a reversion against the village-condemnor); Nichols &
Assocs. Tryon Properties, Inc. v. United Capitol Ins. Co. (In re Nichols & Assocs.
Tryon Properties, Inc.), 36 F.3d 1093, No. 93-1753, 1994 WL 502026, at *1 (4th Cir.
Sept. 14, 1994) (unpublished table decision) (claims by the bankruptcy trustee, secured
creditors, and a purchaser of the property against its casualty insurance proceeds);
National Tax Credit Partners, L.P. v. Havlik, 20 F.3d 705, 706-09 (7th Cir. 1994)
(claims by the debtor-partnership and investors to enforce a general partner's contrac-
tual undertaking to fund the debtor's operating deficits); National Union Fire Ins. Co.
v. Titan Energy, Inc. (In re Titan Energy, Inc.), 837 F.2d 325, 326-30 (8th Cir. 1988)
(insurer's declaratory action regarding coverage responsibilities to the Chapter 7 estate
and individual creditors of the debtor); Reichman v. United States Fire Ins. Co. (In re
Kilgus), 811 F.2d 1112, 1114-15, 1117-18 (7th Cir. 1987) (claims by the Chapter 7
trustee and the debtor's coinsured against property insurance proceeds); Holland Am.
Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 993-94 (5th Cir. 1985) (insurance pro-
ceeds interpleader to which the Chapter 11 debtor and third parties were claimants);
Creasy v. Coleman Furniture Corp., 763 F.2d 656, 657-60, 662 (4th Cir. 1985) (claims
of the Chapter 7 trustee and the debtor's employees against the employee pension
fund); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Eason, 736 F.2d 130, 131-33 (4th Cir. 1984)
(interpleader of bond fund by the debtor's surety, with claims against the bond by the
bankruptcy trustee and the debtor's creditors); cf MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville
Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 90-93 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that
claims by the Chapter 11 debtor and its coinsured against an insurance fund supplied
jurisdiction to permanently enjoin the coinsured's claims against the insurance fund).
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opinion in Gardner v. United States,527 and the Seventh Circuit's
Xonics case.
5 21
a. One Step Backward:
No Jurisdiction Incident to Possession
The Pacor test actually undoes the centuries-old aim of bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction of enabling a court to determine the appropri-
ate disposition of all property within its possession. A stark
example of this bewildering result is the Tenth Circuit's Gardner
case.
In Gardner, Mr. Gardner filed a Chapter 7 petition, but only
after Mrs. Gardner had commenced divorce proceedings in state
court and after the IRS had filed a)tax lien against Mr. Gardner.
After the bankruptcy filing, the Chapter 7 trustee took posses-
sion of all of the Gardners' nonexempt property, and the
bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay to permit the
Gardners' state-court divorce action to proceed for purposes of,
inter alia, division of the marital property. The bankruptcy
court, however, specifically ordered that the state-court property
division would not be binding as against the bankruptcy trustee.
In those divorce proceedings, the state court awarded Mrs.
Gardner nearly all of the property, and Mrs. Gardner then
brought an action in bankruptcy court against the trustee and
the United States seeking to recover the property awarded to
her in the state-court divorce proceedings. The bankruptcy court
held that entry of the state-court divorce decree divested Mr.
Gardner of any interest he had in the property, thereby extin-
guishing the government's tax lien and thus awarded the prop-
erty to Mrs. Gardner.5 29 The government appealed this decision,
challenging the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the
validity of its lien, and in a slavish application of the Pacor test,
completely devoid of historical perspective, the Tenth Circuit
527. Gardner v. United States (In re Gardner), 913 F.2d 1515 (10th Cir. 1990), dis-
cussed infra Part IU.B.5.a, notes 529-39 and accompanying text.
528. Elscint, Inc. v. First Wis. Fin. Corp. (In re Xonics, Inc.), 813 F.2d 127 (7th Cir.
1987), discussed infra Part III.B.5.b, notes 540-60 and accompanying text.
529. See Gardner v. Zimmerman (In re Gardner), 101 B.R. 654 (D. Kan. 1989), affd
in part, vacated in part, 913 F.2d 1515 (10th Cir. 1990).
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agreed with the government that the bankruptcy court was with-
out jurisdiction.30
The Tenth Circuit's reasoning was as follows: Once the bank-
ruptcy court determined that Mr. Gardner (and perforce Mr.
Gardner's bankruptcy estate, which succeeded to Mr. Gardner's
property interests)53' had no interest in the property, the out-
come of the third-party dispute between Mrs. Gardner and the gov-
ernment could have no effect on the bankruptcy estate. This
third-party dispute, therefore, could not meet the Pacor threshold
for third-party "related to"jurisdiction.3 2 Initially, the court over-
looked the resolute principle that federal jurisdiction is estab-
lished as of the date a claim is asserted, and subsequent events,
such as final disposition of other related claims, cannot deprive
a federal court of jurisdiction that existed at the outset of the
suit.53
3
More fundamentally, though, the Pacor test's beguiling em-
phasis on the property interests of the bankruptcy "es-
tate"-which we can assume did not include this proper-
ty-seems to exclude one of the most historically significant de-
terminants of bankruptcy jurisdiction: possession of the prop-
erty.5 4 Mr. Gardner's bankruptcy estate, through the trustee,
was in possession of the property at all relevant times, thus
placing the property in the possession of the court itself via the
court's officer, the bankruptcy trustee. '53 5 The most basic function
530. See Gardner, 913 F.2d at 1517.
531. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994).
532. See Gardner, 913 F.2d at 1517-19.
533. See Freeport-McMoRan Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991);
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Chill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); Clarke v. Mathewson,
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 164, 171 (1838) (Story, J.); Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
537, 539 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.). For correct applications of this principle in the con-
text of third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, see Randall & Blake, Inc. v.
Evans (In re Canion), 196 F.3d 579, 586-87 & n.29 (5th Cir. 1999); Owens-Illinois,
Inc. v. Rapid Am. Corp. (In re Celotex Corp.), 124 F.3d 619, 626 (4th Cir. 1997);
Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 448, 455-56 (5th Cir. 1996).
534. See 1 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, 2.46; 2 id. 23.04[2]; supra note
174 and accompanying text. Indeed, . under the broad definition of property of the
estate in the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor's bare naked possession can itself be consid-
ered an interest in property to which the bankruptcy estate succeeds. See 3 NORTON,
supra note 16, § 51:4, at 51-14 to -15.
535. See 2 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, 1 23.05[2], at 474-75.
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of bankruptcy jurisdiction has always been to determine dis-
putes incident to proper distribution of all property in the court's
possession. And until this dispute between Mrs. Gardner and
the IRS was resolved, the bankruptcy court had no basis on
which to direct the trustee as to the appropriate disposition of
this property-with both the IRS and Mrs. Gardner asserting
conflicting claims to the property.53
Whether federal judicial resources should be devoted to such a
third-party conflict, in which the bankruptcy estate has no inter-
est other than as a mere stakeholder, is a legitimate inquiry, but
one that can be fully addressed through a discretionary determi-
nation of the propriety of abstention. In those cases, however,
where convenience, economy, and comity considerations suggest
that the bankruptcy court should resolve the third-party dispute,
the Pacor test forces the court to either deny jurisdiction none-
theless53 or disingenuously assume jurisdiction by simply ignor-
536. The dissenting opinion in Gardner pointed out both of the fundamental flaws in
the majority's jurisdictional analysis: "At the time Mrs. Gardner brought this action
seeking to be awarded the property held by the trustee, the court had jurisdiction
over the property. . . . [Olnce jurisdiction attached, that jurisdiction continued for the
full resolution of the rights to the property." Gardner, 913 F.2d at 1521 (Bright, J.,
dissenting). "Once the bankruptcy court acquired jurisdiction over the . . . property,
that jurisdiction continued to determine all controversies relating to claims of any and
all parties to that property. Thus, the bankruptcy court could determine the priorities
between the parties." Id. at 1520 (Bright, J., dissenting).
537. The dissent believed that Gardner was just such a case, where "it would be a
waste of time for a bankruptcy court to bifurcate the proceedings in the unusual
manner prescribed by the majority." Id. at 1521 (Bright, J., dissenting). The absurd
extreme is illustrated by Graziadei v. Graziadei (In re Graziadei), 32 F.3d 1408 (9th
Cir. 1994). That case also involved concurrent state-court divorce proceedings and the
husband's Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. The state court ordered the husband to
pay the wife's attorney's fees from the exempt portion of the proceeds of a sale of the
debtor's homestead, and this judgment was affirmed by the Nevada Supreme Court.
See id. at 1410 & n.1. The Chapter 7 trustee had sold the husband's homestead and
was in possession of all of the proceeds, exempt and nonexempt, and the bankruptcy
court ordered the trustee to distribute the exempt portion to the husband and the
wife's attorney in accordance with the state-court division order. The Ninth Circuit,
though, reasoning that the bankruptcy estate had no interest in the exempt property,
held that the bankruptcy court was without jurisdiction to order the trustee to dis-
tribute a portion of the husband's exempt property to the wife's attorney, even though
the state courts had already definitively determined that to be the appropriate disposi-
tion of the property! See id. at 1410-11 & n.2. The comical ending to this Pacor farce
is that the Ninth Circuit's holding required the attorney to "return the funds to the
Trustee," who was directed to "dispose of the funds in the manner required by law,"
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ing the idiom of the Pacor test and emphasizing that it is an
"expansive definition" and "is to be broadly interpreted." 38 If we
were to abandon Pacor more forthrightly, though, a more sensi-
ble and defensible resolution of such cases would be possible.
When the bankruptcy estate is in possession of property, any
party seeking to dispossess the estate is asserting a constitutional
federal question claim against a federal entity. To the extent
that more than one party seeks to recover property the estate
holds, the inter se claims of those parties with respect to their
relative rights in that property share an in rem supplemental
relationship with their claims against the estate and, therefore,
can be entertained in federal court through "related to" bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction.539 If a state court should more properly re-
solve the third-party disputes of the competing claimants, the
id. at 1411, which presumably would mean immediate return of the funds back to the
attorney from whence they came.
538. Canal Corp. v. Finnman (In re Johnson), 960 F.2d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1992). In
Johnson, defrauded pyramid-scheme investors brought a class action seeking to impose
a constructive trust on funds in the possession of a Chapter 7 trustee. The bankruptcy
court determined that the funds were held by the bankruptcy estate in constructive
trust (and thus were not the property of the bankruptcy estate, but the property of
the defrauded investors) and later ordered distribution of those funds among the de-
frauded investors. See id. at 397-99. Investors excluded from this distribution chal-
lenged the bankruptcy courtes jurisdiction over distribution of the funds on the same
grounds as that of the Gardner case-once the court determined the estate had no
interest in the property, the court no longer had jurisdiction over investors' competing
interests in the fund. See id. at 399, 401. The Fourth Circuit obviously believed that
bifurcating jurisdiction in that manner would be awkward and unmanageable, noting
that "determination of the proper beneficiaries of that trust is inextricably tied to the
finding of a constructive trust." Id. at 402. And although the Fourth Circuit had al-
ready adopted the Pacor test, the Johnson court ducked its application and, in fact,
gave it no mention whatsoever.
539. Such claims can be represented graphically as follows:
Property in Possession
of Bankruptcy Estate
Claimant 1 -- * Claimant 2
"related to"
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federal bankruptcy court remains free to abstain and allow dis-
tribution of the property to await such a state-court determi-
nation.
b. Two Steps Backward:
No Jurisdiction Incident to Distribution
The Seventh Circuit effected a more subtle, yet equally note-
worthy, degeneration in the in rem facet of third-party "related
to" bankruptcy jurisdiction in the Xonics case.' Xonics reversed
sub rosa the Seventh Circuit's own 1898 Act precedent by hold-
ing that there is no federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over an
intercreditor dispute as to the appropriate recipient of a distri-
bution from a bankruptcy estate.
In the Xonics case, two secured creditors, Elscint and First
Wisconsin, had a priority dispute over $280,000 that was being
held in escrow by an independent escrow agent, and the Chapter
11 debtor-in-possession had formally abandoned any interest in
these funds."' This property, thus, was neither property of the
bankruptcy estate nor property in the estate's possession. The
bankruptcy court, therefore, concluded that it had no jurisdiction
to determine the secured creditors' dispute as to these fumds.'
The Seventh Circuit, however, raised the possibility that there
may be "related to." jurisdiction over this third-party dispute,
because the secured creditors' relative rights in these funds
might affect distributions to unsecured creditors, for whom $1.3
million was available in the debtor's bankruptcy estate.m
Elscint and First Wisconsin had claims against the debtor in
the amount of $22 million and $17 million, respectively.'
Elscint had collateral worth only $10 million, thus leaving it
with a $12 million unsecured deficiency claim that would share
with other unsecured creditors in the bankruptcy estate's $1.3
540. Elscint, Inc. v. First Wis. Fin. Corp. (In re Xonics, Inc.), 813 F.2d 127 (7th Cir.
1987).
541. See 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1994) (allowing the trustee to abandon burdensome or
inconsequential estate property after notice and a hearing).
542. See Elscint Inc. v. First Wis. Fin. Corp. (In re Xonics, Inc.), 61 B.R. 818 (N.D.
Ill. 1986), vacated, 813 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1987).
543. See Xonics, 813 F.2d at 132.
544. See id. at 130 n.1.
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million distribution fund. 4  Elscint, therefore, asserted that
there was third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction over
the disputed $280,000, because if it recovered the $280,000, the
amount of its unsecured deficiency claim would be $280,000
smaller, thereby increasing the recoveries of other unsecured
creditors from the estate's distribution fund.'"
First Wisconsin, however, contended that the outcome of the
priority dispute would have no effect on other unsecured credi-
tors.' 7 First Wisconsin presumably made this argument because
it was in a position similar to Elscint's, with both insufficient
collateral to fully satisfy its $17 million claim and, thus, a sub-
stantial unsecured deficiency claim against the bankruptcy
estate's $1.3 million distribution fund. Under this scenario, then,
if Elscint recovered the $280,000, its unsecured deficiency claim
would fall by $280,000, but First Wisconsin's unsecured deficien-
cy claim would be $280,000 higher, and vice versa if First Wis-
consin recovered the $280,000. Thus, as far as other unsecured
creditors were concerned, regardless of the outcome of the
Elscint-First Wisconsin priority dispute, they would share the
$1.3 million distribution fund with one $280,000 unsecured
deficiency claim (of either Elscint or First Wisconsin) and distri-
butions to other unsecured creditors would be completely unaf-
fected by the outcome of this priority dispute.' The Seventh
Circuit remanded .for-findings on this factual isque, but agreed
545. See id. at 132. An undersecured creditor such as this has an unsecured claim
against the bankruptcy estate to the extent that the creditor's collateral is insufficient
to fully satisfy its claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
546. See Xonics, 813 F.2d at 132.
547. See id.
548. The relationship among these claims can be graphically represented as follows:
$280,000 Xonics
in escrow Bankruptcy Estate
$280,0e
/ficiency
Elscint + *First Wis.
Other
Unsecured Creditors
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with First Wisconsin's legal position regarding "related to" bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction over the priority dispute: "If the payments to
creditors other than Elscint and First Wisconsin... depend on
the disposition of the competing claims to the $280,000, then the
district court has ['related to' bankruptcyl jurisdiction... and if
not, not." 549
The difficulty with this approach to "related to" bankruptcy
jurisdiction is that it disregards the bankruptcy distribution
issue that was squarely presented by this third-party priority
dispute, even in the scenario where other unsecured creditors
are unaffected. The outcome of this priority dispute would, un-
questionably, affect the relative dividends of Elscint and First
Wisconsin from the bankruptcy estate's $1.3 million distribution
fund; one of the two would recover $280,000 in the priority dis-
pute, and the other would have a corresponding $280,000 unse-
cured deficiency claim against the bankruptcy estate. So the pri-
ority dispute would determine which of the two creditors would
receive this unsecured dividend from the bankruptcy estate.50 The
Seventh Circuit, though, seemed to preclude this sort of
intercreditor dispute from the purview of third-party "related to"
bankruptcy jurisdiction, and the courts have vacillated over
their power to entertain such disputes using the Pacor test.551 Yet,
549. Xonics, 813 F.2d at 132.
550. This can be represented graphically as follows:
Xonics
/ a 
k p t c E 
s t a t e
contingent contingent
$280,000 $280,000
deficiency deficiency
/ priority dispute
Elscint Ndu First Wis.
in $280,000
551. In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Rapid American Corp. (In re Celotex Corp.), 124 F.3d
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619 (4th Cir. 1997), a creditor who had filed a proof of claim against the Celotex
Chapter 11 estate also sought the same damages from a third party, who had in turn
filed a contingent claim against the debtor's estate for indemnification of any amounts
paid to the creditor. See id. at 622-23. The Fourth Circuit held that there was "related
to" jurisdiction of the creditor's third-party suit, because any recovery in that action
would reduce the creditor's claim against the bankruptcy estate and
simultaneously change the character of the defendant's contingent, unliquidated in-
demnification claim against the bankruptcy estate into a fixed, liquidated indemnifi-
cation claim. See id. at 626. Of course, this third-party action had the same potential
as in the Xonics case to merely change the identity of the creditor asserting the unse-
cured claim for these damages, with no effect on other creditors' dividends. In re-
sponse to an argument to that effect, then, the Fourth Circuit was careful to point
out that the creditor's recovery in the third-party suit would not "reduce its claim
against the Celotex bankruptcy estate by the same amount that it would increase [the
defendant's indemnity] claim," since the defendant's indemnity claim was a contractual
one, under which it was also "entitled to indemnification from Celotex for costs that
it incurs in defending itself' in the third-party suit. Id. This fact, though, seemed
completely extraneous to the court's reasoning regarding the effect of the third-party
dispute on the bankruptcy estate, which laid no emphasis on anything other than its
potential effect on the creditor's and defendant's unsecured claims against the bank-
ruptcy estate. See id. at 626-27; see also Randall & Blake, Inc. v. Evans (In re
Canion), 196 F.3d 579, 585-86 (5th Cir. 1999) (responding to a similar argument that
regardless of the outcome of the creditor's third-party suit, through subrogation the
debtor's estate "will still owe the same sum, the only possible difference being to
whom the sum is owed," by demonstrating that subrogation would likely be unavail-
able and, thus, "the total amounts due on claims against [debtor]'s bankruptcy estate
would be decreased"); infra note 559 and accompanying text. Moreover, even the
Pacor case itself indicated that a creditor's third-party claim against a guarantor
would be "related to" the debtor's bankruptcy case, because of the substitution of the
guarantor's indemnification claim against the estate for the creditor's claim against
the estate if the creditor's third-party claim against the guarantor were successful.
See Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 995-96 (3d Cir. 1984); accord Apex Inv.
Assocs. v. TJX Cos., 121 B.R. 522, 524-27 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Boco Enters., Inc. v.
Saastopankkien Keskus-Osake-Pankki (In re Boco Enters., Inc.), 204 B.R. 407, 410
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); Burns v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. (In re Rainbow Sec.
Inc.), 173 B.R. 508, 511-12 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1994). But see Work/Family Directions,
Inc. v. Children's Discovery Ctrs., Inc. (In re Santa Clara County Child Care Consor-
tium), 223 B.R. 40, 49 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998) (finding no "related to" jurisdiction of
creditor's third-party action against the debtor's guarantor, because "the substitution
of creditors in the case . . . will not affect the debt structure of the debtor"); Liddle
& Robinson, L.L.P. v. Daley (In re Daley), 224 B.R. 307, 314 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(stating that jurisdiction of such an intercreditor dispute exists only "if the other
creditors will be affected"); Royal Bank v. Selig (In re Selig), 135 B.R. 241, 245
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992) (determining that potential substitution of one creditor for an-
other is insufficient to supply "related to" jurisdiction over a third-party claim); cf
Adams v. Prudential Sec., Inc. (In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy), 201 B.R.
382, 390, 392-97 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (concluding that a third-party dispute that
would only change the identity of the creditor asserting a claim against the estate
can be "related to" a Chapter 11 case, but not a Chapter 7 case).
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under the 1898 Act, in a leading case on in rem "necessity" juris-
diction in third-party controversies, the Seventh Circuit had
already held that determining the appropriate party entitled to
receive dividends from a bankruptcy estate was, indeed, an
appropriate basis on which to entertain a third-party intercredi-
tor dispute.552
The Xonics court associated third-party "related to" bankrupt-
cy jurisdiction with the 1898 Act's in rem "necessity" jur-'
isdiction55 and proclaimed that "[a]djusting competing claims of
creditors to the property of a bankrupt is the central function of
bankruptcy law."554 However, the court then incongruously inter-
preted third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction in a more
restrictive manner than the in rem concepts of the 1898 Act.
Although such "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction does, indeed,
have ancestry in the 1898 Act,555 the former statutory language
by which the courts confined third-party jurisdiction to those in-
stances where "necessary" to estate administration556 was not
carried forward in the now-unqualified grant of third-party "re-
lated to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, and any translation that con-
stricts third-party jurisdiction even more than did the 1898 Act
is dubious at best.557 In expanding the bounds of federal bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction, the 1898 Act's requirement of administrative
necessity for entertaining a third-party dispute has been re-
placed by a case-by-case discretionary assessment of the propri-
ety of permissive abstention and, in certain instances, mandatory
abstention.558
552. See J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp. v. L.S. Brach Mfg. Corp. (In re Railroad
Supply Co.), 78 F.2d 530, 531-33 (7th Cir. 1935); accord New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Irving Trust Co. (In re United Cigar Stores Co.), 75 F.2d 290, 291-92 (2d Cir. 1935).
553. See supra note 524 and accompanying text.
554. Xonics, 813 F.2d at 131.
555. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 66, § 2a(7), quoted supra text accom-
panying note 124.
556. See id. § 2a(6), quoted supra text accompanying notes 125, 139.
557. The pervasive "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction of the 1978 Reform Act was
intended to fully subsume "all items that the bankruptcy courts are now able to bear
[sic] under [1898] Act § 2a." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 446 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6401.
558. Cf Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 93 & n.12 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing
1898 Act "necessity" jurisprudence and comity considerations as relevant to a permis-
sive abstention analysis, because "[t]here is no necessary reason why that concern
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When the validity, amount, or priority of a creditor's claim
against the bankruptcy estate is dependent upon the outcome of
a third-party dispute in which that creditor is embroiled, this
supplies an in rem supplemental connection between the
creditor's constitutional federal question claim against the estate
and the third-party claim, and this should be the touchstone of
third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction. In fact, although
couched in the language of the Pacor test rather than the in rem
supplemental test suggested here, such an in rem distributional
rationale nonetheless appears to be the basis on which many
courts have found "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction over vari-
ous third-party disputes.55 9
must be met by restrictive interpretations of the statutory grant of ['related to'] juris-
diction"). In fact, abstention seemed entirely appropriate in the Xonics case itself, as
the pro rata unsecured dividend on the disputed $280,000 amount surely would have
been a fairly insignificant sum, given the size of Elseint's and First Wisconsin's se-
cured and unsecured deficiency claims. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit specifically
noted that litigation to resolve other claims between Elscint and First Wisconsin was
already underway in another district and could easily provide an alternative forum for
resolution of this dispute over the $280,000, and final distributions to unsecured cred-
itors from the bankruptcy estate had to await the outcome of this litigation in any
event. See Xbnics, 813 F.2d at 130 n.1.
In Wisconsin Department of Industrial, Labor & Human Relations v. Marine
Bank Monroe (In re Kubly), 818 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1987), involving a priority dispute
over collateral provided by the debtors' co-obligor, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged
that the outcome of this third-party priority dispute over the co-obligor's property
would affect the amount of one creditor's unsecured deficiency claim against the
debtors' bankruptcy estate, but nevertheless held that there was no "related to" bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction because the debtors' bankruptcy case was apparently a "no asset"
Chapter 7 case, in which unsecured creditors would receive no dividend. See id. at
644-45. Of course, this leaves the existence of jurisdiction to the vagaries of whether
a trustee eventually could discover assets for the estate, or the likelihood of such an
eventuality. See Liddle & Robinson, L.L.P. v. Daley (In re Daley), 224 B.R. 307, 314-
15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (considering the jurisdictional issue and noting that "it is
impossible to tell ... whether anything would come into the estate, and if there
were funds available, whether they would be sufficient to satisfy any administrative
claims of the trustee and then yield something for creditors"); cf FED. R. BANKR. P.
3002(c)(5) (providing an extended deadline for filing proofs of claim in a "no asset"
case where "subsequently the trustee notifies the court that payment of a dividend
appears possible"). In Kulby, then, it seems preferable to conclude that the in rem
nexus with the creditor's unsecured deficiency claim against the bankruptcy estate
produces "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction over the third-party dispute regarding
priority in the co-obligor's property, but abstention is entirely appropriate or mandat-
ed where the estate may well have no assets to distribute to unsecured creditors.
559. See, e.g., Randall & Blake, Inc. v. Evans (In re Canion), 196 F.3d 579, 584-87
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(5th Cir. 1999) (finding "related to" jurisdiction in creditor's third-party action, because
it could reduce the creditor's claim against the bankruptcy estate); Continental Nat'l
Bank v. Sanchez (In re Toledo), 170 F.3d 1340, 1342-47 & n.7 (11th Cir. 1999) (find-
ing "related to" jurisdiction over an action to determine the validity of a mortgagee's
lien on a nondebtor's property, because it would affect the amount of the mortgagee's
unsecured deficiency claim against the debtor's estate); Halper v. Halper, 164 F.3d
830, 837-38 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that a creditor's action on a third-party guaranty
of the debtor's obligations could "conceivably affect" the debtor's estate, because "find-
ing the guaranty to be enforceable would provide [the] creditor... an alternative
source of recovery effectively diverting .. . claims from the bankrupt estate"); Home
Ins. Co. v. Adco Oil Co., 154 F.3d 739, 741 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that "related to"
jurisdiction extended to an injured party's third-party claim against the debtor's insurer
because the injured party "is a creditor, and the disposition of the [third-party] claim
may affect how much [the injured party] and other creditors receive"); Owens-Illinois,
Inc. v. Rapid Am. Corp. (In re Celotex Corp.), 124 F.3d 619, 626 (4th Cir. 1997) (con-
cluding that a creditor's action against the Chapter 11 debtor's codefendant was "re-
lated to" the bankruptcy case, because any recovery in the third-party action would
reduce the creditor's claim against the bankruptcy estate); Gibson v. Rotunno, 104
F.3d 367, No. 96-4076, 1996 WL 731600, at *1 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 1996) (unpublished
table decision) (finding that a dispute over ownership of the debtor's stock was within
"related to" jurisdiction, because its resolution determined the proper recipient of
reorganization plan distributions); Bergstrom v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (In re
A.H. Robins Co.), 86 F.3d 364, 371-73 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that the reorganization
court had "related to" jurisdiction to limit attorneys' contingency fees on reorganiza-
tion plan distributions, because fee levels determined the distribution amounts to
claimants); Coar v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 247, 24849 (5th Cir. 1994)
(concluding that a creditor's direct action against the debtor's insurer under the Loui-
siana direct-action statute was "related to" the debtor's Chapter 7 case, because any
insurance recovery would reduce the creditor's claim against the bankruptcy estate);
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Titan Energy, Inc. (In re Titan Energy, Inc.), 837
F.2d 325, 329-34 (8th Cir. 1988) (same, but concluding that abstention was appropri-
ate); Kaonohi Ohana, Ltd. v. Sutherland (In re Kaonohi Ohana, Ltd.), 873 F.2d 1302,
1303-05, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that a creditor's third-party action for spe-
cific performance was "related to" the debtor's bankruptcy case, because its outcome
would affect the creditor's claim for damages against the bankruptcy estate); Nation-
wide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Eason, 736 F.2d 130, 131-33 (4th Cir. 1984) (same, in the
context of creditors' claims against the debtor's surety bond); FDIC v. Majestic Energy
Corp. (In re Majestic Energy Corp.), 835 F.2d 87, 88-91 (5th Cir. 1988) (concluding
that a shareholder/creditor's dispute with a pledgee of the debtor's stock was "related
to" the debtor's Chapter 11 case, because resolution of the third-party dispute deter-
mined the proper recipient of distributions under the debtor's plan of reorganization);
Dogpatch Properties, Inc. v. Dogpatch U.SA, Inc. (In re Dogpatch U.SA, Inc.), 810
F.2d 782, 786 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding that a secured .creditor's action against the
debtor's codefendants was "related to" the debtor's bankruptcy case, because any re-
covery would reduce the creditor's claim against the bankruptcy estate); Baum v.
Roberts (In re Powell), 224 B.R. 409, 410-12 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1998) (finding that
bankruptcy jurisdiction existed in a dispute over ownership of claims, because it was
ancillary to allowance and disallowance of the creditors' claims against the bankruptcy
estate); cf Canion, 196 F.3d at 586 n.27 (noting in connection with a creditor's third-
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Under the influence of Pacor, third-party "related to" bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction has become an in rem variety of, supplemen-
tal jurisdiction, but a clumsy and inadequate one. Explicit recog-
nition that third-party "related to" jurisdiction fully incorporates
in rem supplemental relationships to all claims by and against a
bankruptcy estate would be a step in the right direction, yet
incomplete in and of itself. In enacting "related to" bankruptcy
jurisdiction, Congress unmistakably designed such comprehen-
sive jurisdiction to transcend the in rem concepts of the 1898
Act,60 and third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction must
be recognized as integrating both traditional in rem and modern
in personam philosophies of supplemental jurisdiction. Indeed,
the dissonance in the third-party "related to" case law largely
seems to be a furtive movement toward in personam supplemen-
tal jurisdiction, and the same catalyst underlies the so-called
supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction cases.
C. Inching Toward In Personam Third-Party "Related to"
Jurisdiction
The proof of Pacor's peccadillos lies in the courts' unwilling-
ness to actually adhere to its formulae. The Pacor "test" has
survived, apparently unscathed, but given the great disparities
in its application, the test itself is virtually meaningless. The
Pacor test and the case law demonstrate an evident in rem slant
on third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction. Yet, there is
also a discernible tendency to consider factual and transactional
relationships between claims, which of course, resembles the
modern in personam structure of supplemental jurisdiction em-
bodied in the Gibbs "common nucleus of operative fact" test.
Pacor's catch phrases assaulting Gibbs, although often restated,
party action that could affect the amount of the creditor's claim against the estate
that "[i]f, at the time of [creditor's] suit [debtor's] bankruptcy estate had already been
administered by the trustee-i.e., if all property of the estate were collected, liquidated,
and the proceeds distributed to creditors-then presumably... no effect on the es-
tate would have been possible"); Joel v. Arnold, 110 F.3d 68, No. 95-56783, 1997 WL
129309, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 1997) (unpublished table decision) (holding that there
was no bankruptcy jurisdiction in an interclaimant dispute over funds already distrib-
uted by the bankruptcy estate).
560. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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have been completely emptied of any content other than decep-
tiveness and delusion. In fact, at the same time that the courts,
in shows of allegiance to Pacor, decry jurisdiction founded on
shared facts and judicial economy, they nonetheless simulta-
neously chant the contradictory slogan that they must interpret
third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction to "avoid the in-
efficiencies of piecemeal adjudication and promote judicial econ-
omy."
561
Thus, the compelling merit of modern joinder practice has
provoked an inevitable clash with Pacor's platitudes, and the
courts have naturally progressed toward a transactional, in
personam view of third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion, even in the face of repeated denials. The Emperor has no
clothes! In recognition of reality, the courts should simply aban-
don the Pacor test and its hollow maxims and expressly ac-
knowledge third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction for
what it is-unrestricted in rem and in personam supplemental
jurisdiction.
This Part HI.C maintains that the courts have fashioned a
purported corollary to the Pacor test that actually functions as
an escape valve through which they can invoke in personam
principles of supplemental jurisdiction under the rubric of "inter-
twined parties" and "joint conduct"--justified on the same
fairness, convenience, and economy rationales as in personam
supplemental jurisdiction. Additionally, the courts have consis-
tently accepted, without even questioning its validity, what is
undeniably an exercise of third-party, in personam supplemental
jurisdiction that is not explained by any of the prevailing tests
for federal bankruptcy jurisdiction: adjudication of a nondis-
561. Miller v. Kemira, Inc. (In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc.), 910 F.2d 784, 787 (11th Cir.
1990) (emphasis added). But see id. at 789 ("The mere fact that there may be com-
mon issues of fact between a civil proceeding and a controversy involving the bank-
ruptcy estate does not bring the matter with the scope of ['related to' bankruptcy
jurisdiction]. Judicial economy itself does not justify federal jurisdiction." (emphasis
added) (citing Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984))). For similarly
inconsistent recitations, see Lindsey v. O'Brien, Tanski, Tanzer & Young Health Care
Providers (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 86 F.3d 482, 487, 489 (6th Cir. 1996); Feld v.
Zale Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746, 752, 753-54 (5th Cir. 1995); Specialty
Mills, Inc. v. Citizens State Bank, 51 F.3d 770, 774 (8th Cir. 1995).
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chargeable state-law claim against an individual debtor in a per-
sonal capacity.
1. Joint Conduct and Intertwined Parties
Shared facts and judicial economy, although taboo according
to Pacor's platitudes, are the driving forces behind the "joint
conduct" and "intertwined parties" adjuncts to third-party "relat-
ed to" bankruptcy jurisdiction-an obvious attempt to incorpo-
rate in personan principles of supplemental jurisdiction in spite
of Pacor's celebrity.
The drift toward a transactional, in personam approach to
third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction began in one of
the first circuit treatments after Pacor, the Sixth Circuit's opin-
ion in the Salem Mortgage case.562 In that case, the debtors were
mortgage brokers, and their Chapter 11 filings were closely
followed by a class action suit in the bankruptcy court by de-
frauded mortgagors against the debtors, against investors to
whom the debtors had assigned the mortgages, and against
various officers of the debtors."6 The bankruptcy court proposed
an order that would certify the class and approve a settlement of
the action, but the district court found no jurisdiction over the
third-party claims against the assignee-investors and the debt-
ors' officers, relying upon Pacor's reasoning.5 The Sixth Circuit,
however, disagreed. Although the Sixth Circuit subsequently
would come to embrace the Pacor test5 65 and even prattle Pacor's
platitudes,566 Salem Mortgage unveiled a very different vision of
third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction.
Rather than an outcome-oriented analysis of the third-party
claims, the Sixth Circuit found "related to" bankruptcy jurisdic-
562. Kelley v. Nodine (In re Salem Mortgage Co.), 783 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1986).
563. See id. at 629-30 & n.7.
564. See Kelley v. Salem Mortgage Co. (In re Salem Mortgage Co.), 34 B.R. 902
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983), dismissed, 41 B.R. 420, 421-23 (E.D. Mich. 1984), rev'd, 783
F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1986). The district court reasoned that "[t]he only connection tlat
these [defendants] have with the bankruptcy action is that . .. they may have poten-
tial claims against the debtors if the borrowers proceeded in state court against them.
This tenuous connection with the bankruptcy proceedings is an insufficient basis for
jurisdiction." Salem Mortgage, 41 B.R. at 423.
565. See Robinson v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 918 F.2d 579, 584 (6th Cir. 1990).
566. See Dow Corning, 86 F.3d at 489.
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tion over the third-party claims "[blecause of the nature of these
mortgage transactions" that gave rise to the defrauded mort-
gagors' claims against all of the defendants, including the debt-
ors.5"' Of course, the focus upon the shared factual/transactional
origin of the claims betrays Salem Mortgage as relying upon just
the sort of "common issues of fact between a [third-party] civil
proceeding and a controversy involving the bankruptcy estate"
that was forbidden by Pacor.568 The court, therefore, distin-
guished Pacor by emphasizing "that the parties in the mortgage
transactions in this proceeding are more intertwined than the
parties in Pacor."56 9
To the extent that the Sixth Circuit did analyze the "effects"
of the third-party claims upon the bankruptcy estate, the court
did not appraise the potential "outcome" of those claims, per the
Pacor test and the district court's opinion. 70 Instead, the Sixth
Circuit pointed out how the proposed settlement of these third-
party claims would facilitate settlement of the mortgagors' claims
against the estate. 7 ' Significantly, one of the commonly acclaimed
567. Salem Mortgage, 783 F.2d at 634. The defrauded mortgagors' claims can be rep-
resented graphically as follows:
Nondebtor Bankruptcy
Defendants Estate
"rlated to"
Defrauded
Mortgagors
568. Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984), discussed supra notes
486-87 and accompanying text.
569. Salem Mortgage, 783 F.2d at 635 (emphasis added).
570. See supra notes 475-77, 515, 564 and accompanying text.
571. See Salem Mortgage, 783 F.2d at 630 & n.12, 634. Likewise, in Munford v.
Munford, Inc. (In re Munford, Inc.), 97 F.3d 449 (11th Cir. 1996), the Eleventh Cir-
cuit acknowledged that the defendants' third-party cross-claims against each other had
no potential effect on the bankruptcy estate under the Pacor test. Nonetheless, tle
court concluded that there was "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction over the defdn-
dants' third-party cross-claims because of their "nexus" to a proposed settlement of the
estate's claims against the defendants. See id. at 453-54; accord Feld v. Zale Corp. (In
re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746, 757-59 (5th Cir. 1995); Silverman v. General Ry. Signal
Co. (In re Leco Enters., Inc.), 144 B.R. 244, 246-47, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); cf Coat v.
National Union Fire Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 247, 249 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding "related to"
jurisdiction over plane crash victims' suits against the debtor's insurer, inter alia, be-
cause of "an order by the bankruptcy judge compelling his approval of all proposed set-
tlements arising out of the crash"). Of course, the corollary, contradictory platitude, k la
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values of the modern transactional test for supplemental juris-
diction is its capacity for fostering settlement of complex multi-
party disputes through the comprehensive discovery facilitated
by joinder of logically related claims in one forum. 2
Thus, even though the Sixth Circuit chose to distinguish
Pacor on its facts rather than openly question its facile logic, the
Sixth Circuit clearly endorsed a third-party "related to" bank-
ruptcyjurisdiction that looks remarkably similar to transactional,
in personam supplemental jurisdiction, including a proper recog-
nition of the accommodating role of permissive abstention." The
Fifth Circuit quickly followed suit in the influential Wood case.574
In Wood, a claimant filed a complaint in the bankruptcy court
challenging the actions of the Chapter 11 debtors and a code-
fendant.575 The Wood court adopted the Pacor test for the Fifth
Circuit,576 but identified the pivotal determinant of "related to"
bankruptcy jurisdiction over the third-party claim at issue as
the fact that "the plaintiff challenged the combined actions of
both the debtors and.., a non-debtor."577 The court found sup-
port in the Sixth Circuit's Salem Mortgage opinion for third-
party "related to" jurisdiction "when the plaintiff alleges liability
resulting from the joint conduct of the debtor and non-debtor
defendants."57 This mutual origin of claims furnishes third-party
Pacer, is that a "desire to 'foster and encourage and then preserve settlement in
federal court does not in and of itself confer jurisdiction." Zale, 62 F.3d at 754.
572. See Freer, supra note 143, at 814-15. In fact, the context in which supplemental
jurisdiction may be most beneficial in this regard is the one at issue in third-party
"related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction-joining additional parties to a dispute through
supplemental jurisdiction. See Bone, supra note 515, at 140 & n.7, 143, 149.
573. See Salem Mortgage, 783 F.2d at 635; supra notes 442-44, 506-11 and accom-
panying text.
574. Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1987).
575. See id. at 91.
576. See id. at 93.
577. Id. at 94 (emphasis added). The Wood court also found a more functional, out-
come-oriented, in rem justification for third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction:
Success against any of the defendants will have a potential effect on the
estate. For example, if [the debtors] are held liable but [the nondebtor] is
not, the bankrupt estate may bear the entire burden of the judgment. If,
on the other hand, [the nondebtor] is found jointly liable, the estate may
bear only a portion of the judgment.
Id.
578. Id. (emphasis added).
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"related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, according to the Fifth Cir-
cuit, because of a recognized judicial economy flowing from
claims joinder through supplemental jurisdiction: "Resolution of
the dispute [involving the debtor] will necessarily involve...
consideration of [the nondebtor defendant's] involvement in
those actions," and thus, a duplication of effort if the third-party
action must be pursued as a separate, independent action in an-
other court.579
The Fifth Circuit, therefore, plainly skirted Pacor's proscrip-
tions against jurisdiction founded upon shared facts and judicial
economy. Like the Sixth Circuit, though, the Fifth Circuit has
shrouded the discord in feigned adherence to Pacor's disdain for
supplemental jurisdiction principles.8 0 Nevertheless, the "inter-
twined parties" and "joint conduct" reasoning have provided the
courts a ready and frequent escape from the in rem dictates of
Pacor.581 In fact, many decisions seem to assume that third-party
"related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction is simply the equivalent of
transactional supplemental jurisdiction.582
579. Id. In remanding the case, the Fifth Circuit advised the district court to ad-
dress any particular "concerns of comity and judicial convenience" with respect to the
plaintiffs claims through a "discretionary exercise of abstention." Id. at 93 & n.14a.
580. See Randall & Blake, Inc. v. Evans (1n" re Canion),. 196 F.3d 57.9, 585 (5th Cir.
1999); Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62"F.3d 746, 753 (5th Cir..1995).
581. See, e.g., Ateeq v. Najor (In re Najor), 152 F.3d 928, No. 97-55501, 1998 WL
416070, at *1 (9th Cir. July 1, 1998) (unpublished table decision); Lindsey v. O'Brien,
Tanski, Tanzer & Young Health Care Providers (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 86 F.3d
482, 492-94 & n.11 (6th Cir. 1996); Abramowitz v. Palmer, 999 F.2d 1274, 1278-79 &
n.3 (8th Cir. 1993); Michigan Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Wolverine Radio Co. (In re
Wolverine Radio Co.), 930 F.2d 1132, 1143 (6th Cir. 1991).
582. In Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 1996), plaintiffs' state-law
claims against several defendants were removed to federal court when one of the
defendants filed bankruptcy. See id. at 454. The Fifth Circuit held that granting the
debtor-defendant summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims had no effect on the
district court's continuing jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' third-party claims against the
nondebtor defendants. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that "the court always had subject
matter jurisdiction over the [plaintiffs claims, first by virtue of [the bankruptcy juris-
diction statute] and then through its decision to retain jurisdiction over the [plain-
tiffs'] state-law claims under [the supplemental jurisdiction statute]." Id. at 456 n.4;
accord Boco Enters., Inc. v. Saastopankkien Keskus-Osake-Pankki (In re Boco Enters.,
Inc.), 204 B.R. 407, 409-13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Fisher v. Apostolou, 155
F.3d 876, 882 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that "related to" jurisdiction of creditors'
third-party claims existed because the claims were based on "the same acts, per-
formed by the same individuals, as part of the same conspiracy" as claims by the
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The "intertwined parties" and "joint conduct" assays indicate
that third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction has already
assimilated transactional, in personam. principles of supplemen-
tal jurisdiction, despite the courts' proclamations to the contrary.
Considerations of procedural convenience, judicial economy, and
fairness are driving this facet of third-party "related to" bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction in the same manner that Gibbs transformed
debtors' estates); W.A. Lang Co. v. Anderberg-Lund Printing Co. (In re Anderberg-
Lund Printing Co.), 109 F.3d 1343, 1346-47 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding jurisdiction over a
third-party claim because the "factual and legal issues presented ... were closely re-
lated to those of" a pending claim involving the estate); Sanders Confectionery Prods.,
Inc. v. Heller Fin., Inc., 973 F.2d 474, 482, 484 & n.5 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding "related
to" jurisdiction over third-party claims against a creditor because of their factual rela-
tionship with the creditor's claim against the bankruptcy estate, variously character-
ized as "the same facts," an "[ildentity of causes of action," "identity of the facts cre-
ating the right of action and of the evidence necessary to sustain each action," and
"the same core of operative facts"); Kaonohi Ohana, Ltd. v. Sutherland (in re Kaonohi
Ohana, Ltd.), 873 F.2d 1302, 1307 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that the plaintiffs claim
against the bankruptcy estate and a "related to" claim against a nondebtor third
party "are interrelated and consolidation for trial would seem advisable"); Creasy v.
Coleman Furniture Corp.,, 763 F.2d 656, 662 (4th Cir. 1985) (upholding "related to"
jurisdiction over a third-party action that "raises the identical issues raised in the
bankruptcy proceeding" asserted by the bankruptcy estate); ABF Capital Management
v. Askin Capital Management, L.P., 957 F. Supp. 1308, 1322-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re
Ralph Lauren Womenswear, Inc., 204 B.R. 363, 374 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re
Wood, 52 B.R. 513, 522 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985); cf In re Dow Corning Corp., 187
B.R. 934, 937-38 (9.D. Mich. 1995) (noting that the supplemental jurisdiction statute
also uses "related to" terminology and holding that the court had no supplemental
jurisdiction over breast implant claims against the debtor's codefendants, because "the
non-debtors have not shown that the claims against them are so 'intertwined' with
the Debtor's interests in the bankruptcy action"), rev'd, 86 F.3d at 492-94 & n.ll
(finding "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction over the third-party claims because the
claims were sufficiently "intertwined" with the claims against the debtor).
In some complex disputes involving third-party claims with a clear transactional
relationship to claims involving the bankruptcy estate, the courts do not even bother
with a jurisdictional analysis and summarily conclude that there is "related to" bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction over all claims because of the estate's involvement. See, e.g., Robin-
son v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 918 F.2d 579, 580-84 (6th Cir. 1990); Steyr-Daimler-
Puch of Am. Corp. v. Pappas, 852 F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 1988), affg 35 B.R. 1001 (E.D.
Va. 1983); DuVoisin v. Foster (In re Southern Indus. Banking Corp.), 809 F.2d 329,
330-31 (6th Cir. 1987). For an interesting example involving both in rem and in per-
sonam claims by multiple parties in state-court foreclosure proceedings involving a
cemetary, subsequently removed to federal court when the cemetary filed bankruptcy,
see the following decisions from the case of In re Memorial Estates, Inc.: 950 F.2d
1364 (7th Cir. 1992); 797 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1986); 90 B.R. 886 (N.D. Ill. 1988); 1987
WL 16931 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 1987), denying reconsideration of 1986 WL 22008 (N.D.
Ill. July 16, 1986); 1985 WL 1750 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 1985).
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supplemental jurisdiction. This phenomenon, though, is most
evident with respect to an aspect of federal bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion that can be explained only by reference to in personam
tenets of supplemental jurisdiction-jurisdiction to enter a money
judgment against an individual debtor on a nondischargeable
debt.
2. Claims by and Against an Individual Debtor
The true supplemental nature of federal bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion over third-party claims is nicely illustrated in the context of
state-law claims made by or against an individual bankruptcy
debtor personally, as distinguished from claims by or against the
individual debtor's bankruptcy estate. Although less obvious
than other third-party disputes, a state-law claim by or against
an individual debtor personally is analytically identical to any
other state-law claim to which the federal bankruptcy estate is
not a party. Any such third-party state-law controversy contains
no independent basis for federal jurisdiction. The Pacor test has
precluded federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over state-law claims
made by an individual debtor in a personal capacity, but it has
not prevented adjudication of nondischargeable state-law claims
against an individual debtor personally. This inconsistency un-
deniably defies Pacor's proscription against transactional, in
personam supplemental jurisdiction.
If an individual debtor is pursuing a state-law action against
a third party in a personal capacity, not on behalf of the bank-
ruptcy estate, then there is no independent basis for federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction over the action. Employing the interpre-
tive theory developed above," the debtor's action is a third-
party state-law dispute to which the bankruptcy estate is not a
party and, thus, contains no "original federal ingredient" that
could sustain independent federal jurisdiction.5'8 The Pacor test
583. See supra Part III-A-2.a, notes 431-36 and accompanying text.
584. Such an action can be represented graphically as follows:
Individual Third Party
Debtor
Bankruptcy
Estate
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concurs in this result: Such an action brought solely for the ben-
efit of an individual debtor can have no effect on the bankruptcy
estate and, therefore, is not "related to" the debtor's bankruptcy
case in a Pacor sense. 85 An individual debtor's suit against a
third party has independent federal bankruptcy jurisdiction only
when the cause of action "arises under" the Bankruptcy Code, as
in the case of a damages suit for bankruptcy discrimination 86 or
willful violation of the automatic stay.8 7
Now consider our previous example of the creditor who con-
tends that its state-law claim against an individual debtor can-
not be discharged in the debtor's bankruptcy case, because the
claim is of a kind that section 523 excepts from discharge, 58 8
such as a tort claim for willful and malicious injury.8 9 The
creditor's request for a bankruptcy court declaration that the
debt is nondischargeable is, without question, a constitutional
and statutory federal question claim "arising under" the Bank-
ruptcy Code, because the bankruptcy discharge is relief estab-
lished by federal bankruptcy law and section 523 expressly au-
thorizes such a declaration regarding the effect of.the federal
bankruptcy discharge."
585. See Community Bank v. Boone (In re Boone), 52 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 1995)
(debtor's postpetition tort claims); Yerasi v. Metropolitan Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re
Yerasi), 921 F.2d 282, No. 89-56296, 1990 WL 223046, at *1-*2 (9th Cir. Dec. 28,
1990) (unpublished table decision) (debtor's damages action from postpetition foreclo-
sure sale); Bobroff v. Continental Bank (In re Bobroff), 766 F.2d 797, 798-800, 802-04
(3d Cir. 1985) (debtor's postpetition tort claims); Turner v. Ermiger (In re Turner),
724 F.2d 338, 340-41 (2d Cir. 1983) (debtor's exempted state-law cause of action); cf
Georgou v. Fritzshall, 178 F.3d 453, 454 (7th Cir. 1999) (granting a motion to amend
the pleadings to identify the debtors' bankruptcy estates, rather than the debtors
themselves, as the plaintiffs, because "[ilf they really are the plaintifi, then the suit
has no business being in federal court" (emphasis ommitted)); Black v. U.S. Postal
Service (in re Heath), 115 F.3d 521, 522-24 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding no "related to"
jurisdiction over a postconfirmation suit by the Chapter 13 trustee on behalf of an
individual debtor and not the estate). As the Boone court put it, under the Pacor test,
'[to fall within the court's jurisdiction, the . . . claims must affect the estate, not just
the debtor." Boone, 52 F.3d at 961 (quoting Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90,
94 (5th Cir. 1987)).
586. See 11 U.S.C. § 525 (1994).
587. See id. § 362(h).
588. See supra notes 433-35 and accompanying text.
589. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6); Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
590. Either the creditor or the debtor may request a declaration regarding the
dischargeability of any debt. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(a). Section 523(c)(1), in ef-
fect, gives the bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction to determine the applicability of
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By contrast, though, now imagine that the creditor requests
that the bankruptcy court, in addition to declaring the debt
nondischargeable, also liquidate the debt and enter a money
judgment on the debt against the individual debtor personally.
Under the statutory-constitutional theory expounded in this
Article, there is no independent, freestanding basis for federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction over the creditor's request for a money
judgment against the individual debtor. Such a request is purely
a state-law claim to which the federal bankruptcy estate is not
party. Just as there is no independent federal jurisdiction over a
state-law claim brought by the debtor in an individual capacity,
likewise, there is no independent federal jurisdiction over such a
state-law claim against the debtor personally. 91 Indeed, before
the 1970 discharge amendments to the 1898 Act, although many
federal courts found in the doctrine of Local Loan Co. v. Hunt
592
the authority to issue declarations as to the dischargeability of
particular debts as an incident to the federal discharge,5 9 they
certain discharge exceptions, including the 523(a)(6) exception, whereas other discharge
exceptions can be litigated collaterally. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1); FED. R. BANKI. P.
4007 & advisory committee's note. See generally 3 NORTON, supra note 16, §§ 47:65-
:66. Whereas the Bankruptcy Code itself contemplates dischargeability declarations in
federal court, the problems surrounding anticipation of a federal defense that plague
the general federal question statute are avoided. Moreover, the bankruptcy discharge
has itself become more than a mere affirmative defense to a creditor's state-law
claim. See infra notes 592-94 and accompanying text.
591. Such claims can be represented graphically as follows:
Individual Bankruptcy
Debtor Estate
(1) declare debt nondischargeable
(2) liquidate and enter money judgment
Creditor
592. 292 U.S. 234 (1934). The Hunt Court held that a federal bankruptcy court that
had issued a discharge order had injunctive jurisdiction in "unusual circumstances" to
protect or effectuate that decree by enjoining suit on a debt within the scope of the
discharge. Id. at 239-42. See generally Garrard Glenn, Effect of Discharge in Bank-
ruptcy: Ancillary Jurisdiction of Federal Court, 30 VA. L. REV. 531 (1944).
593. See Vern C. Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1,
2-10 (1971).
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refused to liquidate nondischargeable debts and enter money
judgments against debtors for lack of federal jurisdiction.r94
In 1970, Congress amended the 1898 Act to expressly codify
the authority of federal bankruptcy courts to "determine the dis-
chargeability of debts."595 Moreover, in order to address concerns
about multiplicity of suits in state and federal court,5 96 those
amendments further provided that "if any debt is determined to
be nondischargeable, [the court] shall determine the remaining
issues, render judgment, and make all orders necessary for the
enforcement thereof."9 7 In the subsequent 1978 Reform Act,
while not specifically empowering federal bankruptcy courts to
render money judgments on nondischargeable debts, Congress
594. See, e.g., Camden Lime Co. v. Borek (In re Borek), 180 F. Supp. 567, 571
(D.N.J. 1960) (finding no independent federal jurisdiction over the nondiverse state-
law claim against the debtor and noting that "entering judgment against the individ-
ual bankrupt in no way aids the administration of the bankrupts estate .. .but only
aids the individual creditor in pursuing his individual rights against the bankrupt");
In re Anthony, 42 F. Supp. 312, 316 (E.D. IM. 1941) (finding that, even in cases
where Hunt permits a federal bankruptcy court to determine dischargeability of a
debt, the court "cannot carry through and render a judgment upon a creditor's
unreleased claim upon which execution may issue against the bankrupt's after-ac-
quired assets").
The federal courts, thus, have consistently considered the dischargeability issue to
be a jurisdictional "claim" distinct from the creditor's claim on the underlying debt.
See generally Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. NGC Settlement Trust & Asbestos Claims
Management Corp. (In re National Gypsum Co.), 118 F.3d 1056, 1062-64 (5th Cir.
1997) (rejecting an argument that a federal declaratory action regarding the collateral
effects of the discharge was an improper attempt to premise federal question jurisdic-
tion upon anticipation of a federal defense); Lee-Benner v. Gergely (In re Gergely),
110 F.3d 1448, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the statute of limitations on a
federal nondischargeability action is independent of the state-law limitations period on
the underlying debt); McKendry v. Resolution Trust Co. (In re McKendry), 40 F.3d
331, 334-37 (10th Cir. 1994) (same); cf Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 132-39 (1979)
(finding that res judicata did not preclude an assertion in a federal-court
nondischargeability action that the debt was procured by fraud, despite the fact that
the creditor had not plead fraud as a basis for the debt in a prebankruptcy state-
court action liquidating the debt); see also supra notes 413-14 and accompanying text
(discussing the scope of a "claim" for jurisdictional purposes).
595. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 66, § 2a(12).
596. See IA COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 38, 1 17.28A[4], at 1742.4; Countryman,
supra note 593, at 19, 21-22, 31-32 (tracing and summarizing the legislative history of
the 1970 amendments).
597. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 66, § 17c(3); see also id. § 2a(12) (providing
for jurisdiction to "determine the dischargeability of debts, and render judgments
thereon" (emphasis added)).
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clearly intended such authority to continue under the aegis of
the Reform Act's pervasive federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.59
Notwithstanding Congress's desire that the federal courts
should have bankruptcy jurisdiction under the current statute, if
we apply the prevailing jurisdictional tests to the creditor's re-
quest for a money judgment on a nondischargeable debt, we
come to the inescapable conclusion that there is no federal bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction. A state-law claim on which a creditor seeks
a money judgment does not "arise under" the Bankruptcy Code.
Furthermore, it does not "arise in" the bankruptcy case under
the standard test for "arising in" proceedings, because the
creditor's claim against the debtor would exist in exactly the
same form even in the absence of the debtor's bankruptcy fil-
ing.599 Indeed, that is precisely the upshot of the determination
598. The 1973 Commission's proposed bill would have explicitly provided for federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction over "complaints ... requesting determination of the effect of
a discharge, and seeking judgment on a debt excepted from discharge." 1973 COM'IN
REPORT, supra note 110, pt. II, § 2-201(a)(4), at 30 (emphasis added); see id. § 4-
506(d), at 137 ("If the court determines a debt to be nondischargeable in a proceeding
commenced under this section, it shall determine any remaining issues concerning
liability on the debt unless, for cause shown and in the interest of justice, the court
suspends or declines the exercise of its jurisdiction."). Recognition of "the appropriate-
ness of suspension or declination of jurisdiction" would permit "litigation in another
court [that] has proceeded to a point where it would be wasteful of judicial resources
and inequitable to one or more of the parties to require reintroduction of evidence
and reargument of issues in the bankruptcy court." Id. at 142; see supra notes 442-44
and accompanying text (comparing permissive bankruptcy abstention and discretion to
decline an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction). The Reform Act's simplified pervasive
jurisdiction was designed to subsume "all items listed by the Bankruptcy Commission
in its proposed bill . . .as well as all items that the bankruptcy courts are now able
to bear [sic] under [1898] Act § 2a," including "determination of dischargeability of
debts [and] liquidation of non-dischargeable debts." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 446, 49
(1977) (emphasis added) (footnote referencing 1898 Act § 17c omitted), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6401, 6010; see also id. at 363 (noting that "the comprehen-
sive grant of jurisdiction prescribed in proposed [statute] . . . is adequate to cover the
full jurisdiction that the bankruptcy courts have today over dischargeability and related
issues under Bankruptcy Act § 17c), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN. at 6319; S. REP.
No. 95-989, at 77 (1978) (same), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5863.
599. This test is also a remnant of Marathon's separation of powers influence. Jus-
tice Rehnquist's concurring opinion found jurisdiction before a non-Article III bank-
ruptcy judge objectionable because the debtor's state-law contract action would exist in
essentially the same form even if the debtor had not filed bankruptcy. See Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 89-92 (1982) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring). Likewise, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion noted that "[e]ven in the
absence of the federal [bankruptcy] scheme, the plaintiff would be able to proceed
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of nondischargeability. Thus, if the claim on the underlying debt
is within federal bankruptcy jurisdiction at all, it is because it is
"related to" the debtor's bankruptcy case. Utilizing the Pacor
test, however, because the only effect of any money judgment
against the debtor would be to enhance the creditor's future
ability to collect the debt from the debtor's postbankruptcy in-
come and assets and with no effect at all on property of the
bankruptcy estate or creditors' claims against the estate,60 0 we
against the defendant on the state-law contractual claims." Id. at 72 n.26 (Brennan,
J., plurality opinion). Thus, a core "arising in" proceeding has come to be considered
one "that, by its nature, could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case" or that
"would have no existence outside of bankruptcy." Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825
F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1987); see 1 COLLIER (15th ed.), supra note 66, 3.01[4][c][iv]; 1
NORTON, supra note 16, § 4:38, at 4-231.
600. Because the estate is not a party to the dischargeabilty proceeding, Pacor
teaches us that the estate has no interest in the outcome of the creditor's claim
against the debtor, since the estate would not be bound by any money judgment
against the debtor and could fully relitigate the creditor's claim against the estate in
claims objection proceedings. See generally James N. Duca & Cori Ann C. Yokota, The
Role of Res Judicata in Bankruptcy Claim Allowance Proceedings, 17 U. HAW. L. REv.
1 (1995); Jeffrey Thomas Ferriell, The Preclusive Effect of State Court Decisions in
Bankruptcy (pt. 2), 59 AM. BANKRL L.J. 55, 80-86 (1985); Moore, supra note 151, at
28-29, 39-50. The immense judicial economy from adjudication of the creditor's claim
against both the debtor and the estate in one proceeding is, of course, meaningless
according to Pacor. The only conceivable outcome-oriented effect on the estate from
the creditor's claim against the debtor would be if the creditor is able to collect from
the debtor personally before any bankruptcy distribution. This would reduce the
creditor's claim against the estate to the benefit of all other creditors. See Bass v.
Denney, No. 3:97-CV-2043-P, 1998 WL 59486, at *2 & n.4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 1998),
rev'd, 171 F.3d 1016, 1022 (5th Cir. 1999). The relationship among these claims can
be represented graphically as follows:
Individual Bankruptcy
Debtor Estate
(1) declare debt non ~cagal
(2) liquidate and enter money udgment
Creditor Other Creditors
Yet even this Pacor-like rationale for jurisdiction will usually be unavailable because
the vast majority of individual Chapter 7 filings are "no asset" cases, in which the
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would conclude that the claim is not "related to" the bankruptcy
case. Indeed, the few courts that actually have confronted the
jurisdictional issue with the announced standards have come to
the same conclusion-there is no federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
to enter a money judgment against an individual debtor on a
nondischargeable debt.6 '
Yet, the vast majority of bankruptcy courts routinely entertain
creditor requests for money judgments on nondischargeable
debts. 2 Moreover, every circuit to address the issue has held
filing and adjudication of creditors' claims against the estate is futile. See Wisconsin
Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Marine Bank Monroe (In re Kubly), 818
F.2d 643, 644-45 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding no "related to" jurisdiction over a third-party
dispute in a no-asset case, even if it could affect the amount of a creditor's unsecured
claim); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(e) (making provision for no-asset cases, in that "[in a
chapter 7 liquidation case, if it appears from the schedules that there are no assets
from which a dividend can be paid, the notice of the meeting of creditors may include
a statement to that effect [and] that it is unnecessary to file claims"); OFFICIAL
BANKI. FORM B9A (Sept. 1997) (Chapter 7 Individual or Joint Debtor No Asset Case:
Notice of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Case, Meeting of Creditors, & Deadlines). Moreover,
even in asset cases, the remote contingency of collecting from a co-liable entity, thereby
reducing a creditor's claim against the bankruptcy estate, does not perforce establish
"related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction over the creditor's action against the codebtor
under Pacor. Compare Quattrone Accountants, Inc. v. IRS, 895 F.2d 921, 926-27 &
n.4 (3d Cir. 1990) (concluding that the possibility of collection from a third party
reducing a creditor's claim against the bankruptcy estate was insufficient to establish
"related to" jurisdiction over the creditor's claim against the third party), with Halper
v. Halper, 164 F.3d 830, 837-38 (3d Cir. 1999) (reaching precisely the opposite conclu-
sion), and Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Rapid Am. Corp. (In re Celotex Corp.), 124 F.3d 619,
626-27 (4th Cir. 1997) (same).
601. See, e.g., First Omni Bank, N.A v. Thrall (In re Thrall), 196 B.R. 959, 968-69
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1996); Barrows v. Illinois Student Assistance Comm'n (In re Bar-
rows), 182 B.R. 640, 653 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994); Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v.
Marlar (In re Marlar), 142 B.R. 304, 307 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992); cf Bass v. Denney
(In re Bass), 171 F.3d 1016, 1019-23 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding no bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion to entertain a garnishment action to collect on a bankruptcy" court's money judg-
ment on a nondischargeable debt); A.M.S. Printing Corp. v. Wernick (In re Wernick),
242 B.R. 194, 195-98 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999) (same); Hoc, Inc. v. McAllister (In re
McAllister), 216 B.R. 957, 964-69 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998) (same); Edwards v. Sieger
(In re Sieger), 200 B.R. 636, 637-40 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1996) (same). Likewise, Profes-
sor Block-Lieb, without citation of authority, concluded that a creditor's request for a
money judgment on a nondischargeable debt has no effect on the estate and, thus,
cannot be within third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction. See Block-Lieb, supra
note 20, at 749 n.173.
602. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Cohen v. De La
Cruz, addressing only a dischargeability issue, nonetheless affirmed a bankruptcy
court's entry of a money judgment against an individual debtor on debts determined
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that there is federal bankruptcy jurisdiction to liquidate and
enter a judgment on a nondischargeable debt6 0 3-not because of
any effect on the bankruptcy estate A la Pacor, but because of
to be nondischargeable. See De La Cruz v. Cohen (In re Cohen), 185 B.R. 171 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1994) (holding the debts nondischargeable), and 185 B.R. 180 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1995) (liquidating and entering a money judgment on the nondischargeable debts),
affd, 191 B.R. 599 (D.N.J. 1996), affd, 106 F.3d 52 (3d Cir. 1997), affd, 523 U.S. 213
(1998).
603. See Cowen v. Kennedy (In re Kennedy), 108 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 1997);
Hall v. Davenport, 76 F.3d 372, No. 95-1359, 1996 WL 34674, at *1-*3 (4th Cir. Jan.
30, 1996) (unpublished table decision); Longo v. McLaren (In re McLaren), 3 F.3d 958,
965-66 (6th Cir. 1993); Abramowitz v. Palmer, 999 F.2d 1274, 1275-77 (8th Cir. 1993);
Atassi v. McLaren (In re McLaren), 990 F.2d 850, 853-54 (6th Cir. 1993); Samuel v.
Edd, 961 F.2d 220, No. 91-6184, 1992 WL 86698, at *1-*2 (10th Cir. Apr. 24, 1992)
(unpublished table decision); N.I.S. Corp. v. Hallahan (In re Hallahan), 936 F.2d 1496,
1508 (7th Cir. 1991); cf Porges v. Gruntal & Co. (In re Porges), 44 F.3d 159, 163-65
& n.7 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that in adjudicating a creditor's claim against a Chapter
13 bankruptcy estate, there is bankruptcy jurisdiction to enter a money judgment
against the debtor personally after dismissal of the debtor's bankruptcy case,
analogizing to the aforecited cases); Lucas v. Thomas (In re Thomas), 765 F.2d 926,
927-30 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that an action to collect on the bankruptcy
cour's money judgment on a nondischargeable debt from the California Real Estate
Recovery Fund was "related to" the debtor's bankruptcy case). The Fifth Circuit's self-
contradictory reasoning in Bass v. Denney (In re Bass), 171 F.3d 1016 (5th Cir. 1999),
illustrates the stark inconsistencies between these cases and the Pacor test. The Bass
court held that the creditors' garnishment action to collect a personal judgment on a
nondischargeable debt entered by a bankruptcy court was not "related to" the debtor's
bankruptcy case, because "it could not have any effect whatsoever on his estate in
bankruptcy or its administration." Id. at 1022. Nevertheless, the court assumed that
"the litigation between the Debtor and the [creditors] that resulted in their judgment
was related to the Debtor's bankruptcy estate and bankruptcy proceeding." Id. at 1023
(emphasis added); see also A.M.S. Printing Corp. v. Wernick (In re Wernick), 242 B.R.
194, 197 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999) ("Although the litigation between the Plaintiff and
the Debtors that resulted in the non-dischargeable judgment was related to the
Debtors' bankruptcy estate, the dispute over collection of the debt is not related to
the bankruptcy estate." (emphasis added)).
The circuit court cases cited above actually concluded that the jurisdictional rela-
tionship at issue is not merely a noncore "related to" one; all of these cases held that
bankruptcy courts have "core" jurisdiction to entertain an action on the underlying
debt and enter a final judgment against the debtor. Like the inexplicable "related to"
jurisdiction, and as stated in the text, this result also defies the beguiling formulae
for core "arising under" and "arising in" proceedings. See Estate of Eckel v. Narciso
(In re Narciso), 146 B.R. 792, 793 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992). Core jurisdiction to enter
a money judgment on a nondischargeable debt is best explained as consistent with
the historical summary jurisdiction of bankruptcy referees, who were specifically given
jurisdiction under the 1970 discharge amendments to "determine the dischargeability
of debts, and render judgments thereon." Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 66, §
38(4) (emphasis added); see supra note 111.
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the close factual and logical relationship between the dis-
chargeability proceeding and any proceeding on the underlying
debt.6° This is, of course, quite conspicuously, a transactional, in
personam, supplemental approach to federal bankruptcy juris-
diction. In fact, the courts' opinions contain many veiled refer-
ences to principles of supplemental jurisdiction, 615 including
reliance on Alexander v. Hillman60 6 and the accompanying equi-
table maxim in which principles of supplemental jurisdiction are
rooted: complete disposition of an entire controversy. 6 7 In other
words, the rationale for federal jurisdiction is the same as that
precipitating the 1970 dischargeability amendments. It would be
inconvenient and inefficient to require a separate action in state
court to obtain a money judgment on a debt declared nondis-
chargeable, so the federal bankruptcy court has supplemental
jurisdiction to entertain the action on the underlying debt, as an
incident to its independent federal question jurisdiction over the
604. "[I]t is impossible to separate the determination of dischargeability function
from the function of fixing the amount of the non-dischargeable debt." Kennedy, 108
F.3d at 1018 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Devitt, 126 B.R. 212, 215 (Bankr. D.
Md. 1991)); see also McLaren, 3 F.3d at 966 (same). Such a separation, of course, is
possible, as evidenced by the state of affairs extant before the 1970 dischargeability
amendments. But as those 1970 amendments recognized, entertaining dischargeability
actions in federal court without any authority to render a money judgment on a
nondischargeable debt, while possible, is nonetheless manifestly cumbersome and
wasteful. See supra notes 592-97 and accompanying text; cf Porges, 44 F.3d at 164
("[Ilt is illogical to separate the function of determining the validity of a claim from
the function of fixing the claim's monetary value." (emphasis added) (citing Deuitt)).
605. "[Eiquitable jurisdiction attaches to the entire cause of action." Kennedy, 108
F.3d at 1018 (emphasis added) (quoting Devitt, 126 B.R. at 215)); accord McLaren, 3
F.3d at 966 (same). The "cause of action" once marked the apparent limits of pen-
dent-claim jurisdiction, after the Supreme Court's opinion in Humn v. Oursler, 289
U.S. 238, 245-48 (1933). In Gibbs, though, the Court repudiated Hurn's cause-of-action
test as unduly confusing in its application and "unnecessarily grudging" with respect
to the scope of federal jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
722-24, 725 (1966).
606. 296 U.S. 222 (1935), discussed supra notes 148-56, 388-92 and accompanying
text.
607. See Porges, 44 F.3d at 164-65; McLaren, 3 F.3d at 966; Hallahan, 936 F.2d at
1508. As the ever-popular Devitt opinion noted, "the well-known maxim that once
equitable jurisdiction has been properly invoked it will proceed to render a full and
complete disposition of the controversy," like supplemental jurisdiction, is grounded in
notions of judicial economy and procedural convenience, "prevent[ing] a duplication of
effort and a multiplicity of suits." Devitt, 126 B.R. at 215.
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dischargeability action."'8 The action on the underlying debt is
not "related to" the debtor's bankruptcy case by virtue of any in
rem effect on the debtor's bankruptcy estate; the action on the
debt is "related to" the dischargeability proceeding through an in
personam, transactional supplemental nexus.
The courts, thus, have already accepted this particular form of
in personam supplemental jurisdiction as an element of the
statutory grant of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. Yet, they
refuse to acknowledge that any other supplemental state-law
claims can be considered "related to" a dischargeability pro-
ceeding0 9 or an individual debtor's bankruptcy cause of ac-
608. See Kinney v. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Kinney), 114 B.R. 670,
671-72, 671 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990) (holding that "federal courts have jurisdiction over
cases and controversies in their entirety," and "[t]he court has jurisdiction to decide
[the dischargeability] controversy and as an incident thereto has jurisdiction to enter
judgment in favor of [the creditor] on the underlying debt"); Aerni v. Columbus Fed.
Say. (In re Aerni), 86 B.R. 203, 205-06, 207-08 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988) (opining that
the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute contains a grant of ancillary and pendent juris-
diction and, thus, permits a federal judgment on a nondischargeable debt as part of
the dischargeability proceedings); Plumb, supra note 109, at 1397 & n.203 (noting
that "jurisdiction to render personal judgment on the claim is only ancillary to the
issue of discharge" and is not an "independent power to render personal judgments on
debts apart from a determination of the issue of nondischargeability").
609. See, e.g., Community Bank v. Boone (In re Boone), 52 F.3d 958, 959-61 (11th
Cir. 1995) (finding no "related to" jurisdiction of individual debtors' postpetition state-
law tort claims against the creditor asserted in connection with dischargeability and
extent-of-lien proceedings, notwithstanding the common factual issues and logical in-
terrelatedness); Liddle & Robinson, L.L.P. v. Daley (In re Daley), 224 B.R. 307, 309 &
n.1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that even though a creditor's state-law claims
against a third party were properly joined in the dischargeability action under a
transactional joinder standard, subject matter jurisdiction must be established inde-
pendently); Wilcox v. Houghton (In re Houghton), 164 B.R. 146, 147-48 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 1994) (finding no "related to" jurisdiction of fraud claims against codefendants
joined with a nondischargeability claim against the debtor); Heagle v. Haug (In re
Haug), 19 B.R. 223, 224-25 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982) (same). Of course, precisely the op-
posite result can obtain under the 'joint conduct" and "intertwined parties" departures
from the Pacor test. See Abramowitz v. Palmer, 999 F.2d 1274, 1275-76, 1278-79,
1279 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding "related to" jurisdiction over fraud claims against a
codefendant joined with a nondischargeability claim against the debtor, because the
debtor and codefendant "acted jointly" and 'the legal and factual issues involved in
resolving the claims are interrelated"); Haden v. Edwards (In re Edwards), 100 B.R.
973, 974-75, 976, 981 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989) (same); supra Part III.C.1, notes 562-
82 and accompanying text. Again, these alternative tests appear to be nothing more
than a crude and imperfect approximation of transactional, in personam supplemental
jurisdiction. See Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co. v. Green (In re Green), 241 B.R. 550,
558-61, 559, 561 (Bankr. N.D. IM. 1999) (determining that bankruptcy jurisdiction over
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tion,61° with an ironic invocation of Pacor's platitude: "Judicial
economy itself does not justify federal jurisdiction.""'1 Of course,
the manifest incongruity in both rationale and result, like the
Pacor test itself, finds no support in the jurisdictional statute,
which is a uniform grant of federal jurisdiction over all proceed-
ings "related to" a bankruptcy case.61 The only reconciliation
consistent with the terms of the statute and the legislative his-
tory regarding its purposes simply is to recognize that Pacor was
wrong; third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction is supple-
mental jurisdiction, and there is "related to" bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion over any third-party dispute sharing an in rem or an in
personam supplemental relationship with a claim before the
an insurer's nondischargeability action alleging fraud also extended (1) to the insurer's
state-law claim for rescission of the individual debtor's insurance policies, because
"rescission is a proper remedy for fraud in the formation of a contract," and (2) to
state-law compulsory counterclaims against the insurer for breach of contract that the
bankruptcy trustee had abandoned and the debtor was asserting personally, with the
court noting "that the relationship between supplemental jurisdiction ... and 'related
to' proceedings in bankruptcy is 'functionally identical"); Diego v. Zamost (In re
Zamost), 7 B.R. 859, 860-62, 862 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) (ruling that fraud claims
against codefendants joined with a nondischargeability claim against the debtor were
"related to" the debtor's bankruptcy case, irrespective of a lack of effect on the estate,
because "pursuit of this action in the Bankruptcy Court will promote judicial economy,
and will prevent what otherwise would be an unnecessary multiplicity of actions"); cf
Midwest Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shapiro (in re Shapiro), 22 B.R. 685, 686-88 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1982) (in a nondischargeability action under the 1898 Act, finding that the bank-
ruptcy court had jurisdiction over the individual debtor's compulsory counterclaims as-
serted in a personal capacity and not on behalf of the estate).
610. See, e.g., Walker v. Cadle Co. (In re Walker), 51 F.3d 562, 568-70 (5th Cir.
1995) (defendant's third-party impleader claim for contribution in the individual
debtor's suit for an automatic stay violation); Moore v. Jencks (In re Moore), 232 B.R.
1, 5 & n.8 (Bankr. D. Me. 1999) (state-law claim joined with a debtor's claims for
damages and injunctive relief under 11 U.S.C. § 110(i)-(j) (1994)); Adams v. Hartcon
Assocs., Inc. (In re Adams), 212 B.R. 703, 714-16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (state-law
claim joined with the debtor's claims for violation of the automatic stay and the dis-
charge injunction); Goldstein v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. (In re Goldstein), 201
B.R. 1, 5-7 (Bankr. D. Me. 1996) (same).
611. Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984), discussed supra notes
486-87 and accompanying text.
612. The embarrassment of the dischargeability cases for extant "related to" juris-
diction doctrine is evident in the inconsonant reasoning of one court that "[aibsent
'related to' jurisdiction, it is doubtful that this Court has general ancillary jurisdiction
under United Mine Workers v. Gibbs and its progeny, except to enter a dollar judg-
ment in actions to bar dischargeability." Official Creditors' Comm. of Prods. Liab. &
Personal Injury Claimants v. International Ins. Co. (In re Pettibone Corp.), 135 B.R.
847, 852 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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court (1) "arising under" the Bankruptcy Code, or (2) to which
the federal bankruptcy estate is a party.
D. Erasing the Line Between "Related to" and "Supplemental"
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
Subsequent case law has tacitly refused to follow Pacor's dis-
avowal of third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction as a
grant of supplemental jurisdiction. The migration of third-party
"related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction toward both in rem and in
personam versions of supplemental jurisdiction seems clear.
Nonetheless, the courts' failure to challenge the Pacor opinion
outright, and indeed their unthinking repetition of Pacor's plati-
tudes, has produced a third-party "related to" bankruptcy juris-
diction that is, at best, only a crude and incomplete form of sup-
plemental jurisdiction."3 The jurisdictional frictions lying in
Pacor's wake have also manifested in what is now cast as a
distinct doctrine of "supplemental" bankruptcy jurisdiction,
which has stirred quite a controversy with considerable aid from
Professor Block-Lieb's critical commentary.614
So-called supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction is a direct
outgrowth of Pacor's declaration that third-party "related to"
bankruptcy jurisdiction is not supplemental jurisdiction. That
conclusion, of course, leads to the further inquiry as to whether
bankruptcy courts nonetheless can exercise supplemental juris-
diction as an incident to their statutory bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion.61 Thus, when confronted with third-party disputes to
613. For example, one lower court correctly "reads Salem Mortgage as supporting a
finding that proceedings are 'related to' bankruptcy cases not only where the outcome
of the proceeding may conceivably have an effect upon the estate being administered,
but also where parties are sufficiently intertwined with the debtor," Ameritrust Co. v.
Opti-Gage, Inc. (In re Opti-Gage, Inc.), 128 B.R. 189, 195 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991),
but notes that '[ulnfortunately, it is impossible to precisely define when parties are
sufficiently intertwined with the debtor to find bankruptcy jurisdiction," id. at 196.
614. See Block-Lieb, supra note 20. Professor Block-Lieb's arguments have been ac-
knowledged in both of the major court of appeals cases questioning the validity of
"supplemental" bankruptcy jurisdiction. See Chapman v. Currie Motors, Inc., 65 F.3d
78, 81 (7th Cir. 1995); Walker v. Cadle Co. (In re Walker), 51 F.3d 562, 570 (5th Cir.
1995).
615. "In the event that the [third-party claims] are not 'related to' [debtor's] bank-
ruptcy, then it would be appropriate to explore the subjects of ancillary or pendent
jurisdiction." Opti-Gage, 128 B.R. at 193.
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which Pacor affords no "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, but
that arise in contexts in which federal courts have routinely
resorted to supplemental jurisdiction, many bankruptcy courts
have done the same.
Take, for example, a suit commenced in bankruptcy court by a
bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession against several code-
fendants. Conduct of that suit, known as an "adversary proceed-
ing," is governed by bankruptcy procedural rules that largely
incorporate, with some modifications, the entirety of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, including all of the joinder rules." 6 The
bankruptcy estate, therefore, could join its claims against mul-
tiple codefendants in one action pursuant to the transactional
joinder standard of Rule 20(a).617 The propriety of federal bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction over the estate's claims against the defen-
dants is, of course, beyond doubt. Claims under bankruptcy
causes of action would come within the bankruptcy court's "aris-
ing under" bankruptcy jurisdiction, and state-law claims could be
entertained through either "arising in" or "related to" bankruptcy
jurisdiction.618
If a defendant in the estate's adversary proceeding were to
make a state-law cross-claim against a codefendant for contri-
bution or indemnification, joinder of such a cross-claim in the
same action would be permissible under the transactional join-
der standard of Rule 13(g).619 Unlike the estate's claims against
616. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001-7071.
617. Rule 20(a) provides:
All persons... may be joined in one action as defendants if there is
asserted against them... any right to relief in respect of or arising out
of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurren-
ces and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will
arise in the action.
FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a), incorporated by reference in FED. R. BANKR. P. 7020.
618. See supra Part III.A, notes 411-54 and accompanying text. Existing doctrine
categorizes Marathon claims--prepetition state-law claims that become property of the
bankruptcy estate when the bankruptcy case is commenced-as noncore "related to"
claims. Postpetition state-law claims accruing to the estate after the bankruptcy case
is commenced, however, are often characterized as core "arising in" claims. See 1
COLLIER (15th ed.), supra note 66, 1 3.02[5]; Susan Block-Lieb, The Costs of a Non-
Article III Bankruptcy Court System, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 529, 548 & nn.72, 75-76
(1998).
619. "A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party against a co-
party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter . . . of
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the defendants, however, this cross-claim would be a third-party
dispute that is not within "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction
under the Pacor test.
620
Consider also a defendant's third-party impleader of a state-
law contribution or indemnification claim against a new third-
party defendant under Rule 14(a).62' Nearly one hundred years
ago, in Bryan v. Bernheimer,61 the Supreme Court intimated
that there ought to be room for federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
over such a third-party impleader claim, even under the 1898
Act's more restrictive third-party "related" jurisdiction, as a
matter of simple fairness to the defendant haled into federal
court.6" Nevertheless, according to the Pacor test, such a third-
party impleader claim finds itself outside the bounds of the
current statute's unqualified third-party "related to" bankruptcy
jurisdiction, because the possibility of a defendant recouping
sums paid to the estate from a codefendant or a third party has
no bearing at all on the estate's anterior claim against the de-
fendant.6" In fact, such a third-party claim for contribution or
the original action...." FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g), incorporated by reference in FED. R.
BANKR. P. 7013.
620. See, e.g., Official Creditors' Comm. of Prods. Liab. & Personal Injury Claimants
v. International Ins. Co. (In re Pettibone Corp.), 135 B.R. 847, 849-51 (Bankr. N.D.
IlM. 1992); cf Munford v. Munford, Inc. (In re Munford, Inc.), 97 F.3d 449, 454 (11th
Cir. 1996) (acknowledging in dictum that 'we do not dispute the ... contention that
non-debtors in an adversary proceeding cannot assert state cross-claims of contribution
and indemnity because such claims standing alone ... 'could not conceivably' have an
effect on the debtor's estate").
621. Rule 14(a) provides:
At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a
third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served
upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to the
third-party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the
third-party plaintiff.
FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a), incorporated by reference in FED. R. BANKR. P. 7014.
622. 181 U.S. 188 (1901), discussed supra Part I.B.2.b, notes 124-42 and accompany-
ing text.
623. See Bryan, 181 U.S. at 198.
624. See Adams v. Prudential Sec., Inc. (In re Foundation for New Era Philan-
thropy), 201 B.R. 382, 390-91 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (collecting cases). But see
Masterwear Corp. v. Rubin Baum Levin Constant & Friedman (In re Masterwear
Corp.), 241 B.R. 511, 515-17, 516 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding "related to" juris-
diction over third-party impleader claims, because "the Third Party Defendants have
articulated a 'reasonable legal basis' to recover indemnification from the [debtor's
923
924 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:743
indemnification. presupposes that the bankruptcy estate has
already successfully recovered from the defendant, and the
third-party claim merely reallocates ultimate responsibility for
that recovery." 5
Rule 13 cross-claims and Rule 14 impleader claims, though,
are a common context for the invocation of supplemental juris-
diction, because the federal courts have tended to equate the
Gibbs "common nucleus of operative fact" supplemental nexus
with the Federal Rules' "same transaction or occurrence" joinder
standard.626 Thus, there is considerable authority holding that
federal bankruptcy courts, likewise, can exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over properly joined third-party claims in such an
adversary proceeding, as an incident to their federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction over the claims asserted by the bankruptcy estate.627
estate] should they be forced to pay" the defendant); Burns v. First Citizens Bank &
Trust Co. (In re Rainbow Sec. Inc.), 173 B.R. 508, 510-12 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1994)
(finding a conceivable effect on the estate in that the outcome of the third-party com-
plaint would determine who asserted a section 502(h) claim against the bankruptcy
estate); Young v. Sultan Ltd. (In re Lucasa Int'l Ltd.), 6 B.R. 717, 719-21 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same); Hawkins v. Eads (In re Eads), 135 B.R. 387, 393 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. 1991) (finding "related to" jurisdiction over third-party impleader claims, because
"the possibility of recovery on the third-party complaint enhances the collectability of
any judgment against the . . . defendants").
625. A defendant's Rule 13 cross-claim and Rule 14 impleader claim in the estate's
suit can be represented graphically as follows:
Third-Party
Defendantt
impleaderI
Defendant 1
Bankruptcy I
Estate cross-claim
< Defendant 2
626. See Freer, supra note 138, § 14.41[3]-[4][a]; Edward F. Sherman, Counterclaim
and Cross-Claim, in 3 MOORE, supra note 138, § 13.110[l][oc].
627. For cases finding supplemental jurisdiction over Rule 20 coplaintifib' claims
against a defendant sued by the bankruptcy estate, see Klein v. Civale & Trovato,
Inc. (In re Lionel Corp.), 29 F.3d 88, 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1994); National Westminster
Bancorp N.J. v. ICS Cybernetics, Inc. (In re ICS Cybernetics, Inc.), 123 B.R. 467, 471-
72 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989), affd mem., 123 B.R. 480 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); Petrolia Corp.
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As stated by one court, "[w]e can perceive no reason why a bank-
ruptcy court cannot exercise pendent jurisdiction and hear non-
federal claims raised in a proceeding before it, in the same fash-
ion as any other federal court."28
Aldinger,29 Finley,3 ° and the subsequent 1990 supplemental
jurisdiction statute,631 however, point up the need to find statu-
tory approbation for supplemental jurisdiction over such third-
party claims, 6 2 and as explored in this Part HLI.D, a host of both
statutory and constitutional objections to this "supplemental"
bankruptcy jurisdiction have now appeared. 6' The tussle over
so-called supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction, however, actu-
ally reinforces the true supplemental nature of third-party "re-
v. Elam (In re Petrolia Corp.), 79 B.R. 686 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); In re Wood, 52
B.R. 513, 522-24 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985). Cf Davis v. Courington (In re Davis), 177
B.R. 907, 912 (B.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (finding supplemental jurisdiction over Rule 20
state-law claims joined with an individual debtor's action for willful violation of the
automatic stay); Jones v. Woody (In re W.J. Servs., Inc.), 139 B.R. 824, 826-27
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992) (finding that a malpractice action by the debtor and its indi-
vidual shareholders was supplemental to bankruptcy proceedings to allow the
attorney's fees from the debtor's estate); Total Petroleum, Inc. v. Coral Petroleum, Inc.
(In re Coral Petroleum, Inc.), 62 B.R. 699 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986) (finding supplemen-
tal jurisdiction over the plaintiffs Rule 20 claims against the bankruptcy estate and
codefendants). Several courts have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over Rule 14
third-party impleader claims. See, e.g., Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 111 B.R.
162, 166-67 (N.D. M11. 1990); Cassirer v. Sterling Natl Bank & Trust Co. (In re
Schick), 223 B.R. 661, 664 n.3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998); Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors v. Riviera Med. Dev. Corp. (In re South Bay Med. Assocs.), 184 B.R. 963,
970 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995), appeal dismissed, 226 B.R. 283 (BAP. 9th Cir. 1997)
(unpublished table decision); Goger v. Merchants Bank (In re Feifer Indus.), 141 B.R.
450, 452 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991); Hawkins v. Eads (In re Eads), 135 B.R. 387, 393-97
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991); Dechert Price & Rhodes v. Direct Satellite Communications,
Inc. (In re Direct Satellite Communications, Inc.), 91 B.R. 5, 6-7 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1988); Providers Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Group, Inc. (In re Tidewater
Group, Inc.), 63 B.R. 670, 673-74 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986); Harrison v. Helena Fuel &
Harbor Serv., Inc. (In re H&S Transp. Co.), 35 B.R. 67, 68-69 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1983). Other cases demonstrate supplemental jurisdiction of Rule 13 cross-claims. See,
e.g., Cook v. United States (In re Earl Roggenbuck Farms, Inc.), 51 B.R. 913, 925-27
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985); Griffith v. Realty Executives, Inc. (In re Griffith), 6 B.R.
753, 755-56 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1980).
628. Direct Satellite, 91 B.R. at 6.
629. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
630. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
631. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
632. See supra Part III.B.3, notes 484-96 and accompanying text.
633. See infra Part I.D.1-2, notes 634-84 and accompanying text.
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lated to" bankruptcy jurisdiction and punctuates the remarkably
misguided ferment of Pacor's reign. When the illusive divide be-
tween "related to" and "supplemental" bankruptcy jurisdiction is
destroyed, statutory and constitutional clouds over supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction vanish, revealing a self-contained bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction statute, for which resort to any auxiliary
source of "supplemental" bankruptcy jurisdiction is entirely
unnecessary and counterproductive.
1. The Irrelevance of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute
Relying upon the supplemental jurisdiction statute for "sup-
plemental" bankruptcy jurisdiction is troublesome, because that
statute gives no jurisdictional authority to the non-Article III
bankruptcy courts in which all bankruptcy litigation origi-
nates.6 4 It is not necessary, however, to resort to the supple-
mental jurisdiction statute, because the bankruptcy courts'
third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction is itself a grant
of supplemental jurisdiction. Moreover, those who object to "sup-
plemental" bankruptcy jurisdiction, in an unknowing indictment
of Pacor, actually advance that proposition very forcefully.
If third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction is not sup-
plemental jurisdiction, as Pacor propounds, then the only alter-
native statutory receptacle for supplemental bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion is the 1990 supplemental jurisdiction statute, which pro-
vides the federal district courts with supplemental jurisdiction
"in any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction."M5 Federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is a source of
original jurisdiction for the district courts.3 6 Thus, the bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction statute and the supplemental jurisdiction
statute, in combination, would appear to give the federal district
courts supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction. Indeed, several
courts have so held.Y
634. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
635. Id.
636. See id. § 1334(a)-(b).
637. See Security Farms v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 124 F.3d 999, 1008 n.5
(9th Cir. 1997); Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 448, 455-56 nn.3-4 (5th Cir. 1996);
Publicker Indus. Inc. v. United States (In re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp.), 980 F.2d 110,
114-15 (2d Cir. 1992); Greiner v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 41 F. Supp. 2d
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Original bankruptcy jurisdiction, though, is seldom exercised
by the district courts. The Judicial Code permits a district court
to refer all of its bankruptcy jurisdiction to the non-Article III
bankruptcy court for the district,68 and the district courts have
done so through standing orders of reference in effect in every
district.639 Thus, despite the fact that the district courts are the
statutory conduit for original federal bankruptcy jurisdiction,
bankruptcy litigation, as an initial matter, begins in bankruptcy
court. This is true even in noncore "related to" proceedings, in
which the bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction to "hear" the pro-
ceedings and "submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law to the district court" for entry of any final order or judg-
ment by the district judge.'
Given the fact that bankruptcy litigation, as a practical mat-
ter, occurs in the bankruptcy courts and not in the district
courts, supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction will be an effective
jurisdictional medium only to the extent that it can be employed
in the bankruptcy courts. Moreover, it is in the bankruptcy
courts, not the district courts, where "supplemental" bankruptcy
jurisdiction has encountered the strongest resistance.6'
625, 627-28 & n.4 (S.D. W. Va. 1999); Holloway v. Household Automotive Fin. Corp.,
227 BR. 501, 508 n.3 (N.D. 111. 1998) (dictum); Glinka v. Abraham & Rose Co., 199
B.R. 484, 491-93 (D. Vt. 1996) (stating the proposition, but finding that supplemental
jurisdiction did not reach the claims at issue); Simmons v. Johnson, Curney & Fields,
P.C. (In re Simmons), 205 B.R. 834, 845-46 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997).
638. "Each district court may provide that any or all cases under [the Bankruptcy
Code] and any or all proceedings arising under [the Bankruptcy Code] or arising in or
related to a case under [the Bankruptcy Code] shall be referred to the bankruptcy
judges for the district." 28 U.S.C. § 157(a).
639. With one exception, every judicial district, by local rule, provides that all bank-
ruptcy cases and proceedings are referred automatically to the bankruptcy court. See
1 COLLIER (15th ed.), supra note 66, 3.02[1], at 3-33; 1 NORTON, supra note 16, §
4:18, at 4-93. The one exception is the District of Delaware, which revoked its stand-
ing orders of reference with respect to Chapter 11 cases. In Delaware, the judge for a
Chapter 11 filing is now drawn from a pool composed of both bankruptcy judges and
district judges. See Delaware District Court Withdraws the Reference in Chapter 11
Cases, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. Wkly. News & Comment (LRP) No. 3, at Al (Feb. 4, 1997);
Delaware's Withdrawal of the Reference: What It Means, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. Wkly.
News & Comment (LRP) No. 4, at Al (Feb. 11, 1997).
640. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
641. Compare supra note 637 and accompanying text, with infra note 643 and ac-
companying text.
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The derivative jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts is defined
and limited by the statute authorizing referral of federal bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts and the district
courts' standing orders of reference. The premise of "supplemen-
tal" bankruptcy jurisdiction as a distinct doctrine, of course, is
that it permits joinder in one action of both (1) claims founded
on statutory bankruptcy jurisdiction and (2) transactionally re-
lated third-party claims that are outside the scope of statutory
bankruptcy jurisdiction. There is no statutory sanction, however,
for bankruptcy courts to hear any claims other than those within
the district courts' statutory bankruptcy jurisdiction over "aris-
ing under," "arising in," and "related to" bankruptcy proceed-
ings.642
Thus, even if the supplemental jurisdiction statute enhances
the bankruptcy jurisdiction of the district courts, by appending
"supplemental" jurisdiction to the district courts' statutory bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction, nothing in the Judicial Code seems to permit
the district courts to refer this "supplemental" bankruptcy juris-
diction to the bankruptcy courts. Consequently, many courts
have concluded more recently that bankruptcy courts have no
"supplemental" bankruptcy jurisdiction whatsoever, not even for
purposes of entry of proposed findings and conclusions with
respect to "supplemental" third-party claims.' Furthermore, the
642. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a)-(c).
643. See, e.g., Walker v. Cadle Co. (In re Walker), 51 F.3d 562, 570-73 (5th Cir.
1995); Halvajian v. Bank of N.Y., NA., 191 B.R. 56, 57-59 (D.N.J. 1995); Masterwear
Corp. v. Rubin Baum Levin Constant & Friedman (In re Masterwear Corp.), 241 B.R.
511, 517 & n.6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (questioning, in dictum, the validity of control-
ling Second Circuit precedent cited supra note 627); Simmons v. Ford Motor Credit
Co. (In re Simmons), 224 B.R. 879, 886 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998); Davis v. Victor Warren
Properties, Inc. (In re Davis), 216 B.R. 898, 902 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997); Adams v.
Hartconn Assocs., Inc. (In re Adams), 212 B.R. 703, 715 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997);
Simmons v. Johnson, Curney & Fields, P.C. (In re Simmons), 205 B.R. 834, 845
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997); Adams v. Prudential Sec., Inc. (In re Foundation for New
Era Philanthropy), 201 B.R. 382, 397-99 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996); Goldstein v. Marine
Midland Bank, N.A. (In re Goldstein), 201 B.R. 1, 5-7 (Bankr. D. Me. 1996); Romar
Int'l Ga., Inc. v. SouthTrust Bank (In re Romar Intl Ga., Inc.), 198 B.R. 401, 406-07
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1996); Boyajian v. DeLuca (In re Remington Dev. Group, Inc.), 180
B.R. 365, 371-75 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1995); Wilcox v. Houghton (In re Houghton), 164 B.R.
146, 148 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1994); Fisher v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n (In re
Fisher), 151 B.R. 895, 898-99 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993); accord Block-Lieb, supra note
20, at 809-11.
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district courts do not seem eager to fill the void by exercising
their "supplemental" bankruptcy jurisdiction.'
The statutory gap identified by these, courts, of course, is
wholly dependent upon the assumption that third-party "related
to" bankruptcy jurisdiction-unquestionably within the province
of the bankruptcy courts-is not a grant of supplemental juris-
diction. As this Article maintains, though, this is a wholly un-
warranted assumption, carelessly asserted in Pacor and never
openly or critically questioned since. " When third-party "related
to" bankruptcy jurisdiction is properly recognized as a grant of
supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction, in its own right, the inter-
action between the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute, the supple-
mental jurisdiction statute, and the bankruptcy referral statute
is simply immaterial. The bankruptcy courts derive their supple-
mental jurisdiction from the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute, not
the supplemental jurisdiction statute; the noncore third-party
"related to" jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts is supplemental
jurisdiction. Moreover, the irony in the attacks on "supplemen-
tal" bankruptcy jurisdiction is that they actually acknowledge
that "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction is, indeed, a grant of
supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction.
Those who question the validity of "supplemental" bankruptcy
jurisdiction not only challenge supplemental bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion in the bankruptcy courts, they also cast doubt on the legiti-
macy of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction in general, even
in the district courts. The skeptics surmise that "supplemental"
bankruptcy jurisdiction is fundamentally inconsistent with the
jurisdictional scheme of federal bankruptcy law.' For this pur-
644. Compare Halvajian, 191 B.R. at 57-59 (finding that a lack of bankruptcy court
jurisdiction over supplemental claims is insufficient cause for the district courtes with-
drawal of reference under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d)), with SouthTrust Bank v. Alpha Steel
Co. (In re Alpha Steel Co.), 142 B.R. 465, 472 n.5 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (withdrawing the
reference of claims over which the bankruptcy court would not exercise supplemental
jurisdiction).
645. See supra Part III.B.3, notes 484-96 and accompanying text.
646. Professor Block-Lieb notes that the supplemental jurisdiction statute, by its
terms, applies only "in any civil action of which the district courts have original juris-
diction," 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (emphasis added), whereas bankruptcy jurisdiction, by
contrast, is over bankruptcy "proceedings," id. § 1334(b). See Block-Lieb, supra note
20, at 804. As discussed above, though, the American concept of a bankruptcy "pro-
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pose, they invoke the argument that "related to" bankruptcy
jurisdiction is itself a form of supplemental jurisdiction. Thus,
any construction of the supplemental jurisdiction statute that
would give the federal courts even more supplemental bankruptcy
jurisdiction supposedly would undermine any intended limits on
supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction implicit in the bankruptcy
jurisdiction statute.647 As the most widely quoted expression of
this thesis put it, "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction "already
allow[s] bankruptcy courts to hear, to the extent Congress in-
tended, all supplementary claims that have a logical relationship
to an underlying bankruptcy proceeding," 8 and so-called supple-
mental bankruptcy jurisdiction, therefore, "would step on the
toes of the bankruptcy statute conferring 'related to' jurisdic-
tion,"649 which "would be rendered substantially, if not entirely,
superfluous."6 ° "Thus, it would be somewhat incongruous to gut
this careful system by allowing bankruptcy courts to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction to pull into bankruptcy courts matters
Congress excluded in its specific jurisdictional grants."651
Of course, this view is entirely accurate insofar as it correctly
recognizes that third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction is
a grant of supplemental jurisdiction, and as a result, the supple-
mental jurisdiction statute should simply be inoperative and
irrelevant in the bankruptcy context. It is misleading, though, to
the extent that it overlooks its obvious inconsistency with Pacor
and portrays extant third-party "related to" doctrine as imple-
menting supposed limitations that Congress intended for supple-
mental bankruptcy jurisdiction. There is absolutely no evidence
of any such congressional intent, and third-party "related to"
ceeding" has always subsumed the equivalent of a nonbankruptcy "civil action," and
there is every reason to believe that bankruptcy "proceedings" can be governed by
general statutory references to a "civil action." See supra notes 361-62 and accompa-
nying text and Parts I.A-B.1 & II.C.2, notes 37-111, 343-69 and accompanying text.
647. See Chapman v. Currie Motors, Inc., 65 F.3d 78, 81-82 (7th Cir. 1995); Walker,
51 F.3d at 572-73; Halvajian, 191 B.R. at 58; Alpha Steel, 142 B.R. at 471; Davis,
216 B.R. at 902; Remington Dev. Group, 180 B.R. at 373-74; Houghton, 164 B.R. at
148; Block-Lieb, supra note 20, at 800-03; Fruehwald, supra note 20, at 33.
648. Alpha Steel, 142 B.R. at 471.
649. Currie Motors, 65 F.3d at 81.
650. Alpha Steel, 142 B.R. at 471.
651. Walker, 51 F.3d at 573.
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doctrine has limited supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction only
because Pacor erroneously assumed that "related to" bankruptcy
jurisdiction is not supplemental jurisdiction.652
Supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction, therefore, finds itself in
the proverbial "Catch 22" of blind adherence to mutually incon-
sistent rules. Efforts to imbue third-party "related to" bankruptcy
jurisdiction with principles of supplemental jurisdiction are met
with the edict of Pacor that third-party "related to" bankruptcy
jurisdiction is not supplemental jurisdiction, while those who
resort to the supplemental jurisdiction statute are told they
must look to "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction for such prin-
ciples. The absurdity of this jurisdictional predicament is visible
in courts' frequent expressions of regret and exasperation when
jurisdiction is found lacking on third-party claims that beg for
an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.653 This jurisdictional
652. See supra Part III.B.3, notes 484-96 and accompanying text. The analytical con-
struct devised in the Aldinger case permitted the federal courts to assume the pro-
priety of supplemental jurisdiction, unless the jurisdictional statute at issue "expressly
or by implication negated its existence." Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976);
see Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978). Under the 1898
Act, one could certainly fashion a credible "implied negation" argument against gen-
eral supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction that would skirt section 23's affirmative
restrictions on federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over the estate's state-law causes of
action and section 2a(6)'s affirmative limitation of bankruptcy jurisdiction over third-
party claims to cases of administrative necessity. See supra Part I.B.2.b-d, notes 124-
61 and accompanying text. The unqualified "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction of the
1978 Reform Act, however, would no longer permit such an "implied negation" argu-
ment, and that was the uniform conclusion of those "supplemental" bankruptcy juris-
diction cases that conducted Aldinger's "implied negation" analysis. See Wieboldt
Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 111 B.R. 162, 166-67 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Petrolia Corp. v.
Elam (In re Petrolia Corp.), 79 B.R. 686, 689-93 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); Total Pe-
troleum, Inc. v. Coral Petroleum, Inc. (In re Coral Petroleum), 62 B.R. 699, 705-07
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); In re Wood, 52 B.R. 513, 523-24 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985).
Pacor, of course, did not even bother with the 'implied negation" analysis and simply
took from Aldinger a dullard hostility toward supplemental jurisdiction. See supra
notes 486-88 and accompanying text. After the Finley case changed the calculus from
a search for "implied negation" to "express authorization" of supplemental jurisdiction,
one can conclude that there is no express authorization for supplemental bankruptcy
jurisdiction only by relying upon Pacors thoughtless assumption that "related to"
bankruptcy jurisdiction is not supplemental jurisdiction. See, e.g., Marine Iron & Ship-
building Co. v. Duluth (In re Marine Iron & Shipbuilding Co.), 104 B.R. 976, 980-81,
983-87 (D. Minn. 1989); Royal Bank v. Selig (In re Selig), 135 B.R. 241, 243-44, 245-
46 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992).
653. See, e.g., Congress Credit Corp. v. AJC Int'l, Inc., 42 F.3d 686, 687-91 (1st Cir.
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farce is directly attributable to Pacor, and in fact, the courts'
widespread tendency to recognize some form of "supplemental"
bankruptcy jurisdiction65 is simply another indication of the
conspicuous inadequacy of Pacor. As one court plainly expressed:
"The absence of ancillary jurisdiction would make it virtually
impossible for bankruptcy courts to implement a modern system
of procedural rules." 5
Perhaps the most confounding aspect of the "supplemental"
bankruptcy jurisdiction cases comes from the deceptive label
that has been affixed to them. The courts that have been de-
scribed as adopting "supplemental" bankruptcy jurisdiction have
not created an illicit extrastatutory jurisdiction, as alleged by
their critics. Careful examination reveals that these courts merely
recognize what Pacor did not: The bankruptcy courts have unre-
stricted supplemental jurisdiction as part of their "related to"
bankruptcy jurisdiction.656 In fact, the earliest of the so-called
supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction cases were simply constru-
1994); Walker v. Cadle Co. (In re Walker), 168 B.R. 114, 120 (E.D. La. 1994), affd,
51 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 1995); Goldstein v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. (In re
Goldstein), 201 B.R. 1, 5-6 (Bankr. D. Me. 1996); Boyajian v. DeLuca (In re
Remington Dev. Group, Inc.), 180 B.R. 365, 374-75 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1995); Wilcox v.
Houghton (In re Houghton), 164 B.R. 146, 147 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1994); Spaulding
& Co. v. Buchanan (In re Spaulding & Co.), 111 B.R. 689, 694 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.),
affd, 131 B.R. 84 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
654. See supra notes 627, 637 and accompanying text.
655. Aerni v. Columbus Fed. Sav. (In re Aerni), 86 B.R. 203, 207 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1988).
656. "The interest of judicial economy . .. mandate[s] that the bankruptcy and dis-
trict courts have ancillary and pendent jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334." Id. at
207. "In our opinion, ['related to' bankruptcy jurisdiction] is, in effect, a statutory
grant of ancillary jurisdiction." Cook v. United States (In re Earl Roggenbuck Farms,
Inc.), 51 B.R. 913, 926 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985); accord National Westminster
Bancorp N.J. v. ICS Cybernetics, Inc. (In re ICS Cybernetics, Inc.), 123 B.R. 467, 472
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989), affd mem., 123 B.R. 480 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); Petrolia Corp. v.
Elam (In re Petrolia Corp.), 79 B.R. 686, 693 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); cf Publicker
Indus. Inc. v. United States (In re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp.), 980 F.2d 110, 115 (2d
Cir. 1992) (using the "intertwined" rationale from third-party "related to" jurispru-
dence as an indication of the existence of "supplemental" bankruptcy jurisdiction and
equating bankruptcy abstention from third-party "related to" claims with discretion to
decline supplemental jurisdiction); Masterwear Corp. v. Rubin Baum Levin Constant &
Friedman (In re Masterwear Corp.), 241 B.R. 511, 519 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating
that although decline of supplemental jurisdiction and permissive bankruptcy absten-
tion from third-party "related to" claims "pose[] two separate questions," nonetheless
noting that "[tlhe analyses overlap").
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ing the scope of "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, without the
"benefit" of the Pacor test.
657
The supplemental jurisdiction statute, therefore, is inappli-
cable in the bankruptcy context, but not because of the negative
implication of a more limited statutory bankruptcy jurisdiction
that could be rendered superfluous by the supplemental jurisdic-
tion statute. When third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion is properly construed as an unqualified grant of supplemen-
tal jurisdiction, the supplemental jurisdiction statute simply
becomes redundant.658
2. Braving the Chill of Indeterminate Constitutional Theory
Constitutional anxiety abounds in the resistance to supple-
mental bankruptcy jurisdiction over third-party disputes. Consti-
tutional concerns about supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction,
though, are rooted in the inapposite separation of powers influ-
ence of Marathon and an antiquated in rem constitutional theory
of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction that must not be permitted to
impose such a substantial burden upon Congress's design of an
all-encompassing in personam federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.
The advantageous features of in personam transactional sup-
plemental jurisdiction will not be fully available in bankruptcy
litigation until the uncertainties surrounding third-party "related
657. See In re Palazzo, 19 B.R. 229, 230 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (opining that "re-
lated to" bankruptcy jurisdiction over Rule 20 claims of the debtor's coplaintiffs de-
pends upon principles of pendent jurisdiction); Diego v. Zamost (In re Zamost), 7 B.R.
859, 860-62, 861 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) (finding bankruptcy jurisdiction over Rule 20
claims against the debtors and codefendants, in order to "promote judicial economy,
and [to] prevent what otherwise would be an unneccessary multiplicity of actions,"
and affirmatively rejecting the proposed test of "impact upon the administration of the
debtors' estates" as an unduly "narrow view of [the] jurisdictional grant from Con-
gress"); Griffith v. Realty Executives, Inc. (In re Griffith), 6 B.R. 753, 755-56 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 1980) (finding "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction over Rule 13 cross-claims,
relying upon principles of ancillary jurisdiction and Kennedy, supra note 446); Young
v. Sultan Ltd. (In re Lucasa Intl Ltd.), 6 B.R. 717, 719-20, 720 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1980) (exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction over Rule 14 impleader claims, because "Rule
14 fosters judicial economy and simplifies procedures for it is a tool which allows two
actions to be tried together, thus saving time and cumulative expense").
658. Cf Goger v. Merchants Bank (In re Feifer Indus.), 141 B.R. 450, 452 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1991) (noting that "there is nothing in § 1367 that suggests bankruptcy
courts lack supplemental jurisdiction").
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to" bankruptcy jurisdiction and the validity of "supplemental"
bankruptcy jurisdiction are resolved. The unfairness of subject-
ing parties to suit without an ability to assert third-party miti-
gating claims, the risks of inconsistent adjudications and preclu-
sion pratfalls when multiple courts address common occurrences,
and the duplication of effort and delay occasioned by fracturing
of disputes are all as prevalent in the bankruptcy context as in
nonbankruptcy litigation.659 Even more importantly, though,
bankruptcy can amplify the most pernicious aspects of incom-
plete joinder-multiplicative litigation and dilution of the federal
forum.6
60
To the extent that the automatic stay and discharge injunc-
tion effectively prevent assertion of claims against the bankruptcy
estate in any forum other than the bankruptcy court,61 if logi-
cally related claims cannot be joined in the bankruptcy court for
lack of supplemental jurisdiction, fragmented litigation or aban-
donment of claims will perforce result. Of course, the claims
most readily abandoned will be those for which the federal bank-
ruptcy forum is intended--creditors' reduced-payment claims
against the bankruptcy estate. Alternatively, when supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction is unavailable, the desire to prevent
unseemly splintering of claims can lead a bankruptcy court to
simply abstain from hearing claims by or against the bankruptcy
estate-remitting the parties to a state forum in which all
transactionally related claims can be joined." By doing so,
659. See Freer, supra note 143, at 813-17; Matasar, supra note 7, at 1404 n.6;
Matasar, supra note 382, at 110-14; McLaughlin, supra note 366, at 861-65.
660. With respect to the importance of supplemental jurisdiction in removing
disincentives to federal court litigation relative to the state courts, see Sidney
Schenkier, Ensuring Access to Federal Courts: A Revised Rationale for Pendent Juris-
diction, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 245 (1980).
661. See supra notes 480, 505 and accompanying text.
662. In Marine Iron & Shipbuilding Co. v. City of Duluth (In re Marine Iron &
Shipbuilding Co.), 104 B.R. 976 (D. Minn. 1989), the Chapter 11 debtor and a
coplaintiff sued a single defendant for damages arising from the defendant's alleged
breach of contract. See id. at 977-80. After concluding that there was neither "related
to" nor "supplemental" bankruptcy jurisdiction to entertain the coplaintiffs claim
against the defendant, the court determined that the "interest of justice" compelled
abstention from hearing the debtor's claim, citing all of the standard justifications for
supplemental jurisdiction in federal court!:
The two claims involve numerous common factual issues, and sequential
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though, the court has denied the bankruptcy estate a federal
forum, in contravention of the underlying premise of the 1978
Reform Act's pervasive jurisdictional scheme, that, to the great-
est degree possible, all litigation concerning a debtor's estate
should be centralized in federal bankruptcy court.'a3
The vision and benefits of a complete, pervasive federal bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction cannot be realized without universal accep-
tance of unrestricted supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction in
third-party disputes. The possibilities for cultivating enhanced
settlement opportunities, 66 alone, are reason enough for serious
concern about attitudes that appear resigned to the prospect
that supplemental jurisdiction is simply unavailable in bank-
ruptcy litigation. It seems strangely incongruous that the only
context in which the federal courts would be confined to a more
cumbersome and inefficient jurisdictional scheme is bankruptcy
-where efficient dispute resolution is the overriding function of
the federal forum.
legal issues. Thus, they should be heard and decided by the same court
in the same lawsuit .... At the very least, a renewed joinder of the
claims under a single state-court complaint would avoid the prospect of
complex collateral estoppel issues, and the possibility of inconsistent ad-
judications, which would otherwise result were the claims separately liti-
gated in state and federal courts. To be sure, the central importance of
Debtor's claim to the interests of its creditors is one factor auguring
against abstention in and [sic] favor of retaining federal jurisdiction.
However, the factual intertwining and derivative relationship of the two
claims suggest that abstaining from Debtor's claim is the only appropri-
ate result, given the inability of the federal courts to entertain [the
coplaintiffs] claim.
Lastly, judicial economy supports abstention.... There is no reason
why two courts should have to preside over separate jury trials, where
the claims to be tried thereby have the relationship which is present
here. A single litigation in a single court with the participation of all
involved parties will conserve the courts' and the parties' resources,
which is yet another appropriate reason why the federal courts should
abstain.
Id. at 988; see also American Educators Fin. Corp. v. Bennett, 928 F. Supp. 1113,
1116 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (same); Foxmeyer Health Corp. v. McKesson Corp. (In re
Foxmeyer Corp.), 230 B.R. 791, 793-97 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998) (same).
663. See supra Part I.C, notes 162-211 and accompanying text; see also S. REP. No.
98-55, at 41 (1983) (noting "the important interests promoted by the 1978 Act in con-
solidating as much jurisdiction as possible in a single decision-making body").
664. See supra notes 571-72 and accompanying text.
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The most intimidating obstacle for supplemental bankruptcy
jurisdiction is constitutional diffidence. Indeed, the most visible
critic, Professor Block-Lieb, acknowledges the many advantages
supplemental jurisdiction holds for bankruptcy litigation, yet
concludes that "Isitill, constitutional concerns may cause courts
to question the wisdom of such an exercise."665 Moreover, the
Pacor court's disfavor of supplemental jurisdiction precepts also
seemed to be an outgrowth of constitutional trepidations.666 The
scope of pervasive "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, though,
was designed to be as broad as the Constitution permits. A pro-
per interpretation of the exterior perimeter of third-party "re-
lated to" jurisdiction, then, requires an active search for those
constitutional limits, rather than a rule of construction that at-
tempts to sidestep constitutional complications. And as we've
seen, the Pacor test does not successfully avert constitutional
imbroglios; quite to the contrary, Pacor's literal breadth perpetu-
ates the constitutional quandary inherent in pervasive "related
to" bankruptcy jurisdiction.66 v Of course, this Article's proposed
alternative to the Pacor test-that third-party "related to" juris-
diction should be interpreted as a grant of conventional supple-
mental jurisdiction-will elude that same criticism only if
grounded in sound constitutional theory, and therein lies the
significance of the comprehensive constitutional theory devel-
oped in Part II of this Article.
665. Block-Lieb, supra note 20, at 825; see Fruehwald, supra note 20, at 33. Profes-
sor Block-Lieb also expresses the concern that in many instances an exercise of sup-
plemental bankruptcy jurisdiction may frustrate the goal of efficient administration of
the bankruptcy estate and emphasizes the heightened importance of comity consider-
ations in the bankruptcy context. See Block-Lieb, supra note 20, at 811-29. As Block-
Lieb recognizes, though, "[w]hether an exercise of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction
is consistent with, or contradicts, Congress' goal 'to facilitate an expeditious resolution
of an estate differs depending on the circumstances, and thus generally should be left
to a case by case consideration." Id. at 826. The necessary judicial flexibility needed
for case-by-case balancing of efficiency and comity considerations, however, is already
fully accommodated through bankruptcy's permissive and mandatory abstention stat-
utes. See supra notes 202-06, 442-44 and accompanying text. These concerns, then, do
not seem to support arguments that would restrict the scope of supplemental bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction and, indeed, seem particularly well-suited to reasoned judicial dis-
cretion. See Shapiro, supra note 444, at 580-85, 587-88.
666. See supra notes 461, 472, 510 and accompanying text.
667. See supra Part III.B.1, notes 461-73 and accompanying text.
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To illustrate the constitutional apprehensions surrounding
supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction, return to our example of a
Marathon state-law action in which a trustee or debtor-in-pos-
session sues multiple codefendants in an adversary proceeding
in the bankruptcy court, and one of the defendants wishes to
assert both a transactionally related state-law (1) cross-claim
against another defendant and (2) an impleader claim against a
new third-party defendant. It is the thesis of this Article that
the defendant's third-party claims are properly entertained in
the bankruptcy court as "related to" proceedings. Those third-
party claims are "related to" the bankruptcy case within the
meaning of the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute, because they
share a transactional, in personam supplemental relationship
with the bankruptcy estate's laims against the defendants."6 '
The constitutional challenge to supplemental bankruptcy jur-
isdiction over the defendant's third-party claims, like the statu-
tory challenge (and again, somewhat ironically), also proceeds
from the assumption that "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction is
itself a grant of supplemental jurisdiction.6 9 Of course, the Mar-
athon actions against the defendants are now regarded as "relat-
ed to" proceedings. 7 If the defendant's third-party supplemental
claims are also "related to" claims, as this Article asserts, then it
is because they are "related to" the estate's "related to" claims.
6 71
668. See supra Part IA , notes 411-54 and accompanying text.
669. See Block-Lieb, supra note 20, at 779-84.
670. See supra Part II.A.1, notes 418-30 and accompanying text.
671. Those claims can be represented graphically as follows:
Third-Party
Defendant
"related to"
"rrelated to" De
Bankruptcy
Estate
"related to"
Defendant 2
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Detractors cast this as an unconstitutionally attenuated related-
to related-to relationship, twice removed from the core federal
element of the debtor's bankruptcy case and inviting a poten-
tially limitless number of links in a "related to" chain."7 2
We now discover the damage wrought by the hapless pigeon-
holing of Marathon actions as "related to" proceedings and an
indiscriminate mixing of statutory and constitutional apples,
oranges, and bananas. The content of "related to" bankruptcy
jurisdiction has been defined more by separation of powers con-
cerns surrounding our non-Article III bankruptcy judges than it
has by principles of supplemental jurisdiction, and inclusion of
Marathon actions as "related to" proceedings is attributable to
the former rather than the latter.""3 With Marathon claims now
permanently ensconced in the "related to" category, though, the
afterthought that "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction may, in-
deed, be a grant of supplemental jurisdiction leads to a reflexive
adoption of the misplaced in rem receivership model of supple-
mental bankruptcy jurisdiction,7 4 which fallaciously character-
izes a Marathon action as a supplemental claim. 5 The related-
to related-to argument, then, is founded upon an anachronistic,
beguiling in rem constitutional theory.
If Justice Story believed that he was freeing the scope of fed-
eral bankruptcy jurisdiction and American principles of judicial
federalism from the English notion of bankruptcy jurisdiction in
Ex parte Christy,676 he was mistaken. Of course, the struggle
with the idea of federal "bankruptcy proceedings" under the
672. See Block-Lieb, supra note 20, at 784-91. The related-to related-to argument is
a popular one, although it often seems favored merely for its visceral appeal rather
than its implicit constitutional dimensions. See Walker v. Cadle Co. (In re Walker), 51
F.3d 562, 573 (5th Cir. 1995); Halvajian v. Bank of N.Y., N.A., 191 B.R. 56, 59
(D.N.J. 1995); SouthTrust Bank v. Alpha Steel Co. (In re Alpha Steel Co.), 142 B.R.
465, 471 (M.D. Ala. 1992); Boyajian v. DeLuca (In re Remington Dev. Group, Inc.),
180 B.R. 365, 374 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1995); Wilcox v. Houghton (In re Houghton), 164
B.R. 146, 148 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1994); Fisher v. Federal Natl Mortgage Ass'n (In
re Fisher), 151 B.R. 895, 899 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1993); Fruehwald, supra note 20, at
28; Lofgren, supra note 340, at 1262-63.
673. See supra Part IIIA1, notes 418-30 and accompanying text.
674. See sources cited supra note 449.
675. See supra notes 448-50 and accompanying text.
676. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292 (1845), discussed supra Part I.A.2, notes 45-57 and ac-
companying text.
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1898 Act, traced above, ultimately vindicated Justice Story.677
Nevertheless, now we see that another subtle influence of the
more limited English concept of bankruptcy jurisdiction contin-
ues to linger. The bifurcated English, in rem model of bankruptcy
jurisdiction, revived in the 1898 Act, also became the separation
of powers model for Marathon.678 English ideas of bankruptcy
jurisdiction, thus, obliquely encumber the scope of federal bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction once more, through Marathon's seepage into
"related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction and the resulting insinua-
tion of an in rem constitutional theory of federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction.
I Of course, it is not at all surprising that such an in rem con-
stitutional theory will not sustain federal jurisdiction over the
defendant's third-party claims in our example. The constitutional
theory developed in this Article has already revealed the inade-
quacy of such an in rem theory for third-party state-law
claims,679 just as Pacor's in rem approach to "related to" bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction cannot reach these third-party claims.6 ° Fed-
eral jurisdiction of the defendant's third-party claims simply is
not based upon a functional, in rem relationship to a jurisdic-
tional res; it is dependent upon an in personam, transactional
nexus to the estate's claims against the defendants.
An in personam approach to supplemental bankruptcy juris-
diction requires an in personam model of federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction-as a matter of both statutory and constitutional
theory. An in personam model of statutory federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction leads us to abandon the Pacor test for third-party
"related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction,681 and in our example, the
constitutional basis for federal jurisdiction over the defendant's
third-party claims becomes clear only when one adopts an in
personam constitutional theory of federal bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion.682
677. See supra Part I.B.1, notes 74-111 and accompanying text.
678. See supra note 111.
679. See supra notes 379-80 and accompanying text.
680. See supra notes 619-25 and accompanying text.
681. See supra Part III.C, notes 561-612 and accompanying text.
682. See supra Part II.C.3, notes 370-95 and accompanying text.
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An in personam model of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction com-
prehends the bankruptcy estate as more than a mere jurisdic-
tional res; such an in personam model views the bankruptcy es-
tate as a jurisdictional person. If we regard the bankruptcy
estate as a federally created legal entity, rather than a jurisdic-
tional res, then Justice Story's original conception of a general
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over all claims by and against a
bankruptcy estate is not an in rem jurisdiction over all claims
connected to the res; general federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
becomes in personam jurisdiction over all claims by and against
our jurisdictional person-the bankruptcy "estate." The constitu-
tional theory fortifying this in personam model of general federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction is, of course, Osborn's federal entity
theory, which teaches that any claim by or against the federally
created bankruptcy estate has an independent constitutional
basis for federal jurisdiction as a constitutional federal question.
This in personam constitutional theory, in turn, informs our
construction of third-party "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction.683
In our example, then, the defendant's third-party claims are
not "related to" the debtor's bankruptcy case because their out-
come will or will not affect the jurisdictional res (per Pacor's in
rem formulation). Rather, those third-party claims are "related
to" the debtor's bankruptcy case because they are "related to"
the claims of our jurisdictional person-the debtor's bankruptcy
estate. The defendant's third-party claims are "related to" the
estate's claims because all of the claims share a close factual,
logical, and transactional origin-which, of course, is the ratio-
nale for the procedural rules permitting their joinder in one
action and for an exercise of in personam supplemental jurisdic-
tion. Because the bankruptcy estate's claims against the defen-
dants have an independent, freestanding constitutional basis for
federal jurisdiction in the federal question category of Article III,
the defendant's transactionally related third-party claims can
also be heard in federal court, as the relationship between the
claims "permits the conclusion that the entire action before the
court comprises but one constitutional 'case."'6
683. See supra Part III.A.2, notes 431-54 and accompanying text.
684. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
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CONCLUSION
Widespread confusion among scholars and the courts has
made federal bankruptcy jurisdiction one of the most mysterious
and perplexing facets of federal jurisdiction." 5 Consequently, the
development of the scope of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction has
been retarded and remains shackled to outmoded ideas of in rem
jurisdiction. Thus, as we stand on the cusp of a new millennium,
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction seems hopelessly mired in the
nineteenth century. This Article, though, has constructed a com-
prehensive, unifying theory that can not only rationalize both
the constitutional and statutory nature and extent of federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction, but greatly simplify and modernize
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. We need not modify our accumu-
lated understanding of federal jurisdiction to accommodate
bankruptcy. Indeed, just the opposite is true. We must alter the
prevailing conception of bankruptcy in order to assimilate the
wisdom of accepted principles of federal jurisdiction.
685. Professor Oakley recently described federal bankruptcy jurisdiction as "a body of
law practiced and analyzed almost exclusively by specialists, founded on statutes that
are as confused as they are confusing, and beset by an identity crisis." John B.
Oakley, Prospectus for the American Law Institute's Federal Judicial Code Revision
Project, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 888 (1998).
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